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ABSTRACT
The general reference of this study is to the relationships 
between the economics of John Maynard Keynes and received economics.
Hie term "received economics" refers to the economic theory promul­
gated before Keynes. The specific problem was to place properly the 
economics of Keynes in the history of economic theory with specific 
reference to his more important antecedents.
Within this frame of reference, the following aspects of Keynesian 
economics were examined: (a) his general demand analysis, (b) his
theories of value, (c) his doctrine of effective demand, and (d) his 
monetary theory. The research took the form of examining the works 
of those economists who have been largely responsible for the formu­
lation of economic theory from the period of Mercantilism to Keynes. 
Primarily, this involved the Classical School, Austrian theory, and 
the thoupjit systems of some of the so called economic "heretics."
The results of the study strongly indicnte that economists may 
confidently reject the hypothesis that the idea system of Keynes con­
stituted a break from the past and created a new economics. The de­
mand analysis employed by Keynes had its beginning with the Austrians, 
Insofar as he embraced a labor theory of value, Keynes accepted--at 
least in part— the value theory of the Classicists. His commanded 
value theory was derived directly from the Austrians, and his expec­
tation theory of value was virtually identical with John R. Commons'
volitional theory of value. The doctrine of effective demand has a 
long and interesting history. With reference to this doctrine, 
Boisguilbert, Lauderdale, Maithus, Sismondi, Aftalion, Hobson, and 
others wore important predecessors of Keynes. Macro-economics was 
by no means original with Keynes. All business cycle theories run 
in macroscopic terms. The consumption function has long been a 
major factor in underconsumption economics. And, of course, it was 
virtually stated in Engel's Law of Consumption, Keynes' attack on 
saving and his enthusiasm for spending was n concept which has been 
present in the literature of economies for at least two centuries. 
Keynes was a monetary "heretic," but there were important antecedents 
to his monetary theory and to his distrust of financial capitalism. 
Finally, the General Theory is full of tendency concepts quite in 
keeping with classical economics.
The general conclusion is that Keynes took scattered ideas 
that had long been present in economic thought and formulated an 
economic theory that was an intellectual response to existing eco­
nomic conditions. Tlie General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money marked an important milestone in the development of economic 
theory; it caused all economists to re-ovaluate their fundamental 
theories. But it cannot properly be referred to as the "Keynesian 
Revolution." It wTas simply an important part in the evolution of 
economic theory.
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THE PLACE OF KTiH® IN THE !i 35 TOOT OF ECONOMIC THKOOT
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There is a significant gap in the literature treating the idea 
system of the great EngliBh economist, John Maynard Keynes. That gap 
1b present because no one has seriously attempted to view the economics 
of Keynes from the perspective of the history of economic thought; that 
is, place Keynes in his proper position in the development of economic 
theory. To be sure, many writers have explained that this or that 
aspect of KeyneB can be found in the writings of earlier economists,'1' 
but none hove searched diligently through the history of economic thought 
for the precise purpose of discovering whether Keynes' so-called "New 
Economics" is in fact new or whether it is a brilliant combination of 
pre-existing economic theories presented at a very opportune time in 
the development of the capitalistic economic system. Economists, as a 
group, have been too busy either eulogizing or criticizing the General 
Theory^ to concern themselves with this issue. This study is an
^For example see; Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution 
(New York; The Macmillan Co., 19^7), Ch. 5; The essays in The New 
Economics— Keynes• Influence on Theory and Public Policy (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, I9W), by Seymour Harris (Chs. 1, 3, and 6), Joseph 
Schumpeter (Ch. 9), Paul Sarauelson (Ch. 13), Gottfried Haberler (Ch.
1*0, J. Tinbergen (Ch. 18), Wassily Leontief (Ch. 19), Arthur Smithies 
(Ch. 39), and R. F. Harrod (Ch. 1*1).
2John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193^). Hereafter cited as
General Theory.
1
attempt to bridge this gap in the Keynesian literature.
Obviously, the whole of the history of economic thou$it cannot be 
presented in u study of this type. Fortunately, that is not necessary to 
realize the objectives of the study. Only those parts of the stream 
of economic theory will be examined which clearly anticipated the major 
principles contained in the General Theory.
In view of the great body of Keynesian literature, there is 
no need for still another detailed analysis of the economics of Keynes, 
and this study does not purport to present such an analysis. Quite 
the contrary, the assumption is made throughout that the reader is 
familiar with the General Theory.
Many writers have explained that the appearance of the General 
Theory in 193^ was in response to the depression that was sweeping 
the capitalistic world at that time. This explanation has a great 
degree of validity but it is not the complete story. There is reason 
to believe that Keynes wrote as he did for more reasons than those 
prompted by the great depression, reasons which were primarily philo­
sophical and pragnatic in nature. Keynes lived during a period of 
rather radical change in philosophical thought, and his own thinking 
in matters of an economic nature was profoundly affected. The ob­
jective of Chapter Two is to examine the philosophical environment 
which surrounded Keynes and to relate this environment to the theo­
retical approach employed in the General Theory.3
^Ferdinand Zweig, Economic Ideas (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1950), p. 21. "Keynes himself was, so to speak, pre-Keynesian, 
Keynesian, and Post-Keynesian. What is called Keynesian doctrine 
culminated in the year 1936 with the publication of the General Theory
Keynes believed that his major mission in writing the General 
Theory was to refute classical economic theory, and many economists
ll
claim that he accomplished his mission. To be sure, Keynes employs 
the demand approach in his idea system, while the classicists utilized 
the supply approach. However, it was not Keynes who brought about this 
great cleavage in the development of economic theory. The Austrian 
school was responsible for that change in the direction of economic 
analysis. Chapter Three is devoted to an examination of Keynes' 
theory as it relates to the received economics.
Economists generally agree that the doctrine of "effective 
demand" constitutes the very core of the Keynesian idea system. Was 
this a new doctrine? Was it of such a nature- that economic theory was 
pushed throu#i a revolutionary metamorphosis and emerged as a completely 
new theoretical framework upon which a new economics could be constructed? 
Or was it merely a blooming--under ideal weather conditions— of a kind 
of century plant, the seeds of which had been planted quite early in the 
history of modem economic theory and nurtured carefully down throu#i 
the years by repeated grafts, cuttings, and trimmings? Chapter Four 
deals with these questions.
Throu#iout the history of industrial capitalism, and in the 
face of "refutations" without number at the hands of orthodox economists,
The two basic ideaB of classical theory are: (1) the theory
of capital formation, which holds that saving is a dynamic factor in 
capital accumulation; and (2) J. E. Say's Law of Markets, which states 
that demand can never be deficient. Keynes, with his liquidity- 
preference theory of interest, his concept that saving was a residual, 
and his doctrine of effective demand, believed that classical economics 
had been refuted. See General Theory, p. 3 end Chs. 2, 3, 7, and 13.
1+
the doctrines of monetary "heretics" have tenaciously persisted.
Their proposals for reform and their accompanying unorthodox principles
have been particularly prominent during periods of severe economic 
5
criseB. In the contemporary controversy over monetary policy and 
theory, KeyneB, as perhaps the most distinguished of the monetary 
radicals, occupies a focal point. Since the publication of the 
General Theory in 1936, many of the old "heresies" of general economic 
thinking have been revived and have assumed prominence in academic 
discussion. From the point of view of the history of economic thought, 
the Keynesian controversy represents a revival of the challenge which 
economic orthodoxy has been unable to extinguish during the past one 
hundred and fifty years.
Keynes expressed great admiration for Silvio Gesell in the 
General Theory, and Gesell considered himself a disciple of P. J. 
Proudhon. Because of this, the assumption may be made that there 
exist significant similarities among the three economists. Gesell 
and Proudhon are believed to be important predecessors of Keynesj 
their thought appears to have presupposed much of Keynes' monetary 
theory. Chapter Five is a testing of this assumption.
Chapter Six presents seme conclusions of the study.
^"Monetary reform" is here used to mean, not a program which 
treats only incidentally changes in the financial structure, but one 
which attributes basic economic maladjustments to monetary factors, 
and places primary emphasis on the altering of financial institutions 
while leaving intact ownership of property and private industrial 
enterprise.
CHAPTER II
SOME FitILOSOFnICAL ASPECTS OF E O K  * IDEA SYSTEM
Anyone acquainted with the prop,vans of philosophical thinking 
since Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species (1899) cannot 
but realize the extent to which the frameworks of interpretation 
into which economists pour their thinking 'nave been influenced by 
philosophical thinkers. Although it is not the purpose of thin 
study to examine the evolution of philosophical thought, the attempt 
to assign to Keynes his proper place in the history of economic 
thought does dictute at least a brief investigation of his philo­
sophical orientation. This is .true because there in such a close 
correlation between modern philosophy^' and the basic framework of 
Keynes' icon system. Thus the purpose of thin chapter is to demon­
strate this correlation and to examine the Keynesian system in terms 
of "logic," "opistemology," and "ethics."''
Before examining the relationship which exists between the
By "modern philosophy" the writer means that body of philo­
sophical thoutyit promulgated by such philosophers as James, Whitehead, 
and Bergson in contrast with the philosophy of such men as Newton, 
Descartes, and Leibnitz. Keynes' philosophical outlook was clearly 
based on the thought of the former three men, whereas orthodox econo­
mists from Ricardo to Marshall owed their intellectual orientation to 
the latter three men.
O
‘"Keynes was not in any way a specialized student of modern 
philosophy, his intellectual interests having been absorbed by studies 
in the fields of mathematics and economics.
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economics of Keynes and recent developments in philosophy, it is well 
to present briefly those major features of modem philosophical thouf^it 
which have so greatly influenced, not only Keynes, but the thinking in 
the social sciences in general.^ Hiese features, which characterize 
twentieth century philosophy, may be termed: (a) the significance of
the whole, (b) the emergent nature of things, and (c) the attempt to 
be realistic. It is readily seen that these new elements in philoso­
phy are of a methodological nature; that is, the true significance of 
modem philosophy is to be found in new methods of analysis.
The philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 
characterized by an atomistic attitude. According to this method of 
analysis, one must use the individual unit method of examination. Then, 
to understand the essential conditions of whatever was being investi­
gated as a whole, one merely added together the component parts of the 
whole. In short, it was a method of generalizing with reference to the 
whole from specific findings derived from analyzing the individual 
parts. The basic assumption, of course, was that the whole was always 
equal to the sum of its parts. Hie new philosophy turns this method 
of analysis upside down, and approaches an investigation with an 
holistic attitude; that is, it believes the proper method of analysis 
is one which emphasizes the totality of things. Once the character­
istics of the whole are known, then, an examination of the component
3lhe major source of information for this discussion of modern 
philosophy is: Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. D. D. Runes (New York:
Philosophical Library, 19*4-3)', especially the following essays: John E.
Boodin, "Philosophy of History;" Victor F. Lenzen, "Philosophy of 
Science;" Alfred N. Whitehead, "Philosophy of Life;" Bertrand Russell, 
"Philosophy of the 20th Century;" and Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism
7parts is proper. Ihis view is based upon the realization that the 
whole may be more or less than the sum of its parts. Furthermore, 
the new philosophy insists that the whole is basically different in 
character from it3 separate parts; consequently, one can never under­
stand the nature of the whole by merely inquiring into the character­
istics of the component parts.
The second significant feature of modem philosophical thought 
is the importance it gives to the emergent nature of things. This is 
closely associated with the holistic method of analysis because the 
totality of things which interests the modem social scientist is the 
evolving or emergent whole. Whitehead says, "Existence is activity 
ever merging into the future." By this, Whitehead means that every­
thing that exists is always in the process "of being made;" thus, the 
universe, the physical world, and social systems have had a pant, do 
have a present, and will have a future. Of course this is the evo­
lutionary or continuous process, and most social scientists are inter­
ested in incorporating this concept of change and its consequences 
into their theoretical systems of thouf^it. Many scholars recognize 
that in some circumstances the concept of the emergent nature of 
things is a much more useful tool for analysis than the concept of 
the mechanism itself.
Modem philosophical thought prides itself in its attempt 
to be "realistic." This is the third important characteristic of 
twentieth century philosophy with which this study is concerned.
Tiiis realistic approach in philosophy bears a close affinity
^Whitehead, on. cit., p. lM*.
8to the methodology of the physical sciences. Not only has philosophy 
adopted their methods, the modern philosopher attempts to formulate 
his thought in such a manner that it conforms with the conclusions 
reached in the physical sciences. Whitehead and others explain that 
it is unnecessary for conflict to exist between philosophical and 
scientific thought. They point out that it is not sufficient for 
philosophy to be merely consistent within itself, there must be room 
in the body of philosophy for the contributions of science. The modern 
philosopher is especially careful to see to it that he has made a place 
within his thought system for all generally accepted scientific doc­
trines.^ IhiB development in philosophical thinking haB brougit phi­
losophy and science into a very close relationship during the past 
half-century. This has not been a case of a reciprocal influence.
Quite the contrary, the realism of science has caused philosophy to 
be much more realistic or inductive in the sense that today's phi­
losopher actually looks for support for his own views among those of 
the scientists. The modem philosopher is quite willing to re-examine 
his own position if his opinions differ from those of the scientists.
In most instances if a change in opinion is called for, it is the 
philosopher who shifts his position, not the scientist. It is this 
willingness to take account of the discoveries of natural science 
that gives a realistic flavor to much of recent philosophical thought 
and which sets it off from the more speculative thought of earlier 
centuries.
5
xSee Lenzen, Whitehead, and Russell, op. cit.
9Keynes Incorporated these three aspects of modern philosophy 
Into the intellectual structure of his idea system. He embraced the 
totalis tic or aggregative approach to economic analysis to such an 
extent that the fundamental basis of his over-all idea system is the 
aggregates of employment, national income, national output, aggregate 
supply, aggregate demand, total social consumption, total social in­
vestment, and total social savings. This is not to say that KeyneB 
completely ignored the individual unit method of analysis; he simply 
made the individual aspects of the economy— for example, prices and 
values--subsidiary to the aggregate of employment, income, etc.
In adopting the holistic method of analysis from the philoso­
phers, Keynes abandoned what he described as the "atomic hypothesis."^- 
This hypothesis assumed that; (a) the economic system was a static 
organism consisting of many essentially independent parts; each eco­
nomic unit functioned as a separate and distinct entity; and the man­
ner in which the entire system functioned was simply the sum of the 
manner in which the individual ports functioned. This Newtonian at­
titude toward economic analysis has dominated the theoretical frame­
work of economics since Ricardo.^ Keynes departed (althoupfr he was
6j. M. Keynes, Essays in Biography (London; Macmillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1933), P. 28.
^Ih his discussion of the "paradox of thrift," Paul Samuelson 
says, "In economics, we must always be on guard against the logical 
fallacy of composition. What is good for each person separately need 
not be good for all; under some circumstances, private prudence may be 
social folly. Specifically, this means that the attempt of each and 
every person to increase his saving may. . .result in a reduction in 
actual saving by all the people in the community. Note the italicized 
words ‘attempt1 and ‘actual1; between them there may be a world of 
difference if people find themselves thrown out of Jobs and with
10
by no means the first to do 30) from this atomistic or Newtonian 
approach to economic studies. "We are faced at every turn," Keynes 
said, "with the problems of Organic Unity, of Discreteness, of Dis­
continuity --the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts, compari­
sons of quality fail us, small changes produce large effects, the 
assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied."
One of Keynes * fundamental concepts was that the modern econo­
my differed greatly from the economic order which Alfred Marshall 
wrote about in 1379. The economy had changed both in structure and 
in function. He was convinced that the Marshallian theory, based 
upon the assumption of a small-scale competitive economy, was inade­
quate to explain an economy dominated by big business. The corporate 
form of business organization which resulted in separation between 
ownership and management had become the rule not the exception. Thus
lowered income payments." Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 191^8), pp. 270, 271.
Under a sub-head "The Whole And The Part," Samuelson says, 
'"Die first lesson in economics is: things are often not what they
seem. Some examples chosen at random may illustrate this:
1. If all farmers work hard and nature cooperates in producing a
bumper crop, total farm income falls.
2. One man by great ingenuity in hunting a job or by a willingness 
to work for less may thereby solve his own unemployment problem, but 
all cannot solve their problems in this way.
3. Higher prices for one industry may benefit itB members but, if
the prices of everything bou#it and sold increased in the same pro­
portion, no one would be any better off.
1*. It may pay the United States to reduce tariffs charged on goods 
imported even if other countries refuse to do likewise. . .
5. What is prudent behavior for an individual or a single business 
firm may at times be folly for a nation or a state." Ibid., p. 8.
See Ibid., pp. 3 2k, 1*26, and 1*52 for other examples of the 
"fallacy of composition."
Q
Essays in Biography, p. 20.
11
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at times "enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation."
In this new economy characterized by a dichotomy of "business" 
and "Industry," the whole was frequently less than the sum of Its 
parts. As early as 1926, Keynes contended that one could not deter­
mine community welfare by simply adding together Individual welfares.
The quantities were unequal, with community welfare usually less than 
the sum of its individual parts. Individual economic behavior could 
create advantages for the individual but there was no assurance that 
this would result in community betterment.10 It was entirely possible 
for an individual to exploit others and enrich himself, but by no type 
of reason or logic could one conclude that this would enrich the econo­
my. Using the individual firm method of analysis, it is entirely logi­
cal to hold that a reduction in wages will result in more employment.
But when the economy is viewed in macrocosmic terms, it becomes clear 
that employment cannot increase if all business firms reduce wages. 
Purchasing power would fall and this would cause business to reduce 
production. Less employment and not more would result.
On the baBis of this philosophical attitude, Keynes developed 
his macro-economic analysis which deals with "the economic system as 
a whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system's en­
tire resources."11 It was not the quantity of resources that was 
important; it was the employment of them that dominated Keynes'
^General Theory, pp. 150, 159*
10J. M. Keynes, Laisaez-Falre and Communism (New York: New
Republic Inc., 1926), p. 57.
^ General Theory, pp. 339/ 3*+0.
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thinking. The quantity vas taken as given. Keynes' totallstic at­
titude toward economic Investigation was in keeping with recent de­
velopments in philosophy and all the social sciences. The sciences 
which treat of human behavior were turning more and more toward a 
more totallstic outlook during the period of Keynes' intellectual 
development.^
The essence of Keynes' holistic approach to an analysis of 
the economic system may be grasped by pointing out that the 
older economists made the general level of economic activity 
a function of the behavior of the individual firm. When the 
individual firm was in equilibrium, the whole economy was 
assumed to be in the same condition. In Keynes' system the 
reverse is true. The behavior of the individual firm is held 
to be a function of the behavior of the whole economic system. 
As the economy rises and falls, it takes the individual firm 
with it. Private businessmen determine their economic policies 
in the li^it of their expectations or forecasts relating to the 
future behavior of the entire economic system. For this reason 
the behavior of the individual businessman is in large part 
nothing but a reflection of the larger behavior pattern of the 
whole economic community; and to understand the activities of 
the private firm, one must first have an understanding of the '
way in which the entire economic system operates.
By treating the economy as an emerging process, Keynesian eco­
nomics duplicated another important characteristic of modern philosophy. 
Keynes was interested with the manner in which the economic systems of 
western Europe and the United States wer. evolving. His concern with
this continuum is demonstrated in nearly all of his writings. The
English economy was plagued with heavy unemployment during the 1920's.
In attempting to find causes for this, Keynes studied the economic 
history of England, and concluded that fundamental changes had occurred
^See Allan G. Gruchy, "The philosophical Basis of the New 
Keynesian Economics," Ethics, LVIII (July, 19^8), P. ?38.
1^Ibld.
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in English economic life. In the nineteenth century certain dynamic 
growth factors were present to absorb the savings of wealthy individ­
uals and to maintain virtually full employment of all the productive 
resources most of the time. These factors were: (1) a rapid increase
in population, (2 ) a heavy and constant flow of inventions and in­
novations, (3) the settlement and exploitation of new land areas,
ll+
and (1+) frequent wars. These forces operating within a laissez- 
faire environment created Beemingly unlimited private investment 
opportunities. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
these growth factors which made "individualistic capitalism" function 
at hi#i levels of income and employment were losing much of their 
dynamic effects. Population had begun to grow at a decreased rate, 
there was a slowing down of technological progress, and there was 
no longer large land areas available for exploitation. Thus by the 
close of World War I, the English economy and other industrialized 
nations, which depended upon private investment for their level of 
operation, had reached a stage of maturity where private investment 
was not sufficient to create and maintain full employment of all 
available productive resources.
Keynes explained his fundamental theBis in the following
manner:
When a country is growing in wealth somewhat rapidly, the 
further progress of this happy state of affairs is liable to 
be interrupted, in conditions of laissez-faire, by the in­
sufficiency of the inducements to new investments. When 
investments in new plant and equipment fail to materialize, 
chronic stagnation and mass unemployment become persisting
lUGeneral Theory, p. 307.
features of economic life. Money ceases to function as a 
vital factor aiding in the creation of useful material goods; 
instead, it becomes merely a means of storing wealth. Idle 
or unspent money means less demand for the products of farm 
and factory, and hence less employment, lhrift or saving, 
which was regarded as a private virtue by the orthodox econo­
mists, now becomes a public or communal vice since it leads 
to business stagnation and low levels of employment end na­
tional income.^5
Thus, "Keynes' fundamental thesis, stripped of all its technicalities, 
was that wo had arrived at a stage in our economic evolution where 
the tendency to save on the part of the middle and upper classes 
outstrips the ability of businessmen to absorb private savings through 
the investment process."^ The fact that Keynes does not inquire very 
far into the past or the future of capitalistic society does not deny 
the essentially emergent nature of his. economic analysis. As early as 
1920 he said, "Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely 
unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the 
economic organization by which Western Europe has lived for'the last 
half century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of 
our late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and 
we lay our plans accordingly."^
Much of Keynes' analysis is of the short-run variety and a 
great deal of his energy was directed toward solving immediate eco­
nomic problems. Nevertheless, he never lost sifgit of the importance 
of historical economic forces and the manner in which they had shaped 
the modem capitalistic economy. For Keynes, all industrialized
^ Ibid., p. 335. ^Gruchy, op. cit., p. 239.
17J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920), p. 3.
15
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capitalistic countries could correctly hold that "an age is over."
The third way in which the economics of Keynes duplicated 
modem philosophical thought was in its claim to be more realistic 
than the inherited or received economics. Throughout his writings 
KeyneB emphasized the fact that he was dealing with the "complex 
real world." What concerned him were the "actual practices and in­
stitutions of the contemporary world" and "the problems of the real 
world."^ Keynes "had no special concern with any simplified pro­
paedeutic of his science. He strongly protests against any attempt 
on the part of economists to reduce their science to an oversimplified
model or scheme of general relations which has little connection with
POthe actual world of hard-and-fast facts."
Keynes was especially critical of the tendency to make eco­
nomics less a social and more a mathematical science. "Too large a 
proportion of recent mathematical economics," he said, "are mere con­
coctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which
allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies
21
of the real world in a maze of pretentions and unhelpful symbols.
Thus Keynes' idea system reflected the new philosophy of the 
twentieth century. His analysis emphasized the emergent, the total- 
istic, and the realistic nature of things. Despite the fact that he 
never completely abandoned eighteenth-century British empiricism, his 
intellectual orientation was clearly post-Darwinion rather than
^ Ibld., p. 4. ^ G e n e r a l  theory, pp. 26k, 266, 293.
20Gruchy, 0£. cit., p. 2^1. S1General Theory, p. 298.
16
Newtonian.
Attention may now be turned to the logic, eplstemology, and 
ethics of Keynes' Idea system for a closer insist into the philo­
sophical aspects of his system of thought,
A. Logic
What Is now generally classified as modern philosophy had Its 
beginning with Bacon. The primary distinguishing characteristic of 
this type of philosophy Is its disregard for the metaphysical search 
for the "truth" and the "real." Modem philosophy Is primarily con­
cerned with two questions; "How do we know?" and "How do we go about 
finding truth?" In short, modem philosophy has wrou#it a change In 
methodology, not merely a shift In emphasis. The'concern here, however, 
Is not with philosophical methodology per so; rather the Interest lies 
in the Influence which this new method of philosophical examination 
has had on the study of logic. Everyone will agree that the advance 
in logic during the last four or five decades has been remarkable, and 
Keynes, throughout his life, was close tothis new development in philoso­
phy. During his years at Cambridge Keynes was a close friend and as­
sociate of such great philosophers as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred 
Whitehead, Betrand Russell, and Frank Ramsey. These men were primarily 
responsible for the formulation of the new philosophy. Moreover,
Keynes had the training and the background to understand what was 
occurring In this basic discipline. His father had made significant 
contributions both to mathematical logic and to methodology In the 
social sciences. Keynes was a trained mathematician. However, his 
interest lay, not In pure mathematics, but rather in "the borderland
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between mathematics and philosophical problems." Helen Phillips 
points out that Keynes "was familiar with Principia Mathematlca from 
the time of its publication, remarking in Mjr Early Beliefs that it 
was a companion volume to Moore's Ethics in that it provided a sci­
entific method capable of analyzing the ethical problems raised by 
Moore. "2^
Keynes was never greatly concerned with formal logic and con­
tributed nothing to the new movement in philosophy. He much preferred 
the informal analysis of Russell to the more formal logic of Wittgenstein, 
and his attitude toward logic is to be found only in the area of non- 
formal logic. Biis, of course, is what one should expect since Keynes, 
although he was interested in philosophy, was not engrossed in that 
discipline. Keynes demonstrated quite clearly his naminalistic position 
with reference to the problem of universals in his Introduction to 
Ramsey's The Foundation of Mathematics. In a subsequent essay he 
once more revealed his position by quoting several passages from 
Ramsey's book. Ihe material he selected to quote leaves no doubt 
but that he was basically concerned with the principle that all science 
must deal with the problem of meaning.
We are driven to philosophise because we do not know clearly 
what we mean; the question is always "What do I mean by X?"
And only very occasionally can we settle this without re­
flecting on meaning. But it is not only an obstacle, this 
necessity of dealing with meaning; it is doubtless an es­
sential clue to the truth.
22E. A. G. Robinson, "Lord Keynes, 1883-19^6," Economic 
Journal, LVII (March, 19*+7), p. 1.
2%elen Phillips, J. M. Keynes, Vision and Technique (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1951), P* 13•
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. . .we cannot get clear about these terms and sentences 
without getting clear about meaning, and we seem to get 
into the situation that we cannot understand, e.g. what 
we say about time and the external world without first 
understanding certainly time and probably the external 
world which are involved in it. So we have to take our . 
problems as a whole and jump to a simultaneous solution.
Keynes was convinced that human language conventions were not as
precise as the older logic implied or as people generally believed.
His conviction was based upon his belief that human beings "feel"
that they understand a word, but are unable to define it in precise
terras.
. . .1 feel we may get into the absurd position of the 
child in the following dialogue: "Say breakfast." "Can't."
"What can't you soy?" "Can't say breakfast."
I used to worry myself about' the nature of philosophy 
through excessive scholasticism. I could not see how we 
could understand a word and not be able to recognise
whether a proposed definition of it was or was not correct.
I did not realise the vagueness of the whole idea of 
understanding. . .
It seems to me that in the process of clarifying 
our thouf£it we come to terms and sentences which we 
cannot elucidate in the obvious manner by defining their 
moaning. For instance, theoretical terras we cannot define, 
but we can explain the way in which they are used. . .25
Keynes believed that words should be considered as useful tools of
thought, and he did not accept the idea that there should exist a
rigid relationship between word and thing. In short, words were
merely "tags" which ouf^ vt to be used as a means of describing and
manipulating the human environment.
I don't think it is necessary to say with Moore that 
definitions explain what we have hitherto meant by our
^ Essays in Biography, pp. 305 , 306.
25prank Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, in Ibid., 
pp. 30 ,^ 306.
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propositions, but rather that they show how we intend 
to use them in the future. Moore would say they were 
the same, that philosophy does not change what anyone 
meant by "This is a table." It seems to me that it might; 
for meaning is mainly potential.2”
The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference 
to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or, more 
vaguely still, by its possible causes and effects.27
But he remained silent with reference to the word-making ac­
tivity and to the status of the entities to which words refer. There 
was a metaphysics in his nominalism, but it was of the type which 
emphasized the creative role of mental activity for reality. However, 
this does not justify a general statement to the effect that Keynes 
was a realist. The truth is that there is not enoui^ i evidence in 
the Keynesian literature to warrant classfying him either as an ideal­
ist or as a realist, perhaps this is of no great importance. What 
is significant is that he was firmly convinced that mein had the power 
to define words- to suit his purpose.
Not only did Keynes believe this, he also practiced it.
Hie bearing of this view on the task of integrating psycho­
logical, ethical, and experiential material into a body of 
knowledge usable for economics is obvious. Here we find the 
first trace, the first general principle he employed. Quickly, 
surely, and successfully, he brought together ideas and facts 
which were later appreciated as belonging together. Fearless 
in combining ideas which to others seemed quite unrelated, 
he was unhampered by conventional terminology and traditional 
concepts. He used well his conviction that meaning is to 
some extent within our power to c h a n g e . 28
2&Two Memoirs by John Maynard Keynes: Dr. Melcholr, a Defeated
Enemy, and My Early Beliefs (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 19^9X
p. 28. Hereafter cited as Mg Early Beliefs.
2^Ramsey, quoted in Essays in Biography, p. 299.
28phillips, o£. cjt., p. 15.
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B. Epistemology
One is probably never completely justified In classifying a 
scholar either as an empiricist or as a rationalist. In most Instances 
it Is Impossible to do so for the simple reason that most scholars demon­
strate both empirical and rational tendencies. It follows, then, that 
the most scientific classification is one based on this dichotomy. Both 
the empiricist and the rationalist search for truth. But the difference 
between these two epistemologies does not rest in the objective; rather, 
it lies in the method or the procedure of ascertaining truth. For the 
rationalist, the truths of reason are all important. He is primarily 
concerned with formal, conceptual knowledge; his thought ideal is modeled 
after the type of knowledge found in mathematics. Deductive logic is 
his tool of analysis. Hie empiricist, on the other hand, is one who 
places emphasis on the truths of fact, who wants to find out the re­
lationships between observed matters of fact. Inductive logic is the 
basic tool of analysis for the empiricist.
Keynes' idea system lies somewhere between the two poles of 
empiricism and rationalism, but closer to the empirical than the 
rationalistic. His fondness for the empirical is shown clearly in 
his conception of the proper business of the economist. Certainly 
he was thinking in empirical terms when he formulated the methods 
by which his social goals could be achieved. A policy or program 
of action designed to influence practical affairs must, by its very 
nature, flow from an empirical attitude. For Keynes, the major func­
tion of the economist was to promulgate policy based upon empirical
data. In the Keynesian idea system, the economist makes value judg- 
« «
ments. Thus Keynes returned to the nineteenth century conception of
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what was the proper business of the economist. It was to describe 
the economy, predict future economic events, and formulate basic 
principles of economic policy. Robinson says that Keynes "never 
devised an economic tool purely for its own sake rather than to solve 
an immediate practical problem in the application to government of the 
methods of economic analysis; his absorbing interest in politics and 
government made Keynes, in the very best sense of those words, a po-
po
litical economist,"  ^ Robinson contends that in Keynes' work in the
India Office, he acquired a basic sympathy with the problems of the
public administrator who needs economic analysis in order to make
decisions concerning policy.
He learned there a great deal about the way the machinery 
of government operated, and in particular to see the prob­
lems of economics from the angle of the administrator, who 
must make the decisions, as well as from that of the aca­
demic, who must discuss the principles that underlie the 
decisions.30
Thus Keynes believed that the political economist must devote a largo 
share of his time to advising those who formulate economic policy for 
this was the goal and beacon li#vt of analysis. In other words,
Keynes designed his program of public policy, which was based upon 
quite realistic observations and then promulgated his body of theory 
to justify his program of action.
Further evidence of Keynes' empiricism was the position he 
took on the Malthus-Ricardo controversy. By supporting Malthus, he 
renounced all faith in the excessive deductive logic which character­
ized the Ricardian brand of economics. Keynes' own statements make
29Robinson, og. cit., p. 10. ^°Ibld., pp. 13, 1^.
22
this quite clear:
Malthus is dealing with the monetary economy in which 
we happen to live; Ricardo with the abstraction of a 
neutral money economy. . .If only Malthus, instead of 
Ricardo, had been the parent stem from which nineteenth- 
century economics proceeded, what a much wiser and richer 
place the world would be to-day.' We have laboriously 
to re-discover and force through the obscuring envelopes 
of our misguided education what should never have ceased
to be obvious.31
For Malthus had said:
I certainly am disposed to refer frequently to things 
as they are, as the only way of making one's writings 
practically useful to society, and I think also the 
only way of being secure from falling into the errors 
of the taylors of Laputa, and by a sligit mistake at 
the outset arrive at conclusions the most distant 
from the truth. . .A writer may, to be sure, make any 
hypothesis he pleases; but if ho supposes what is not 
at all true practically, he precludes himself from 
drawing any practical inferences frcm his hypotheses.^2
Both Malthus and Keynes gave the empiricist's emphasis to thought 
and its material usefulness. No one Bhould be greatly surprised to 
discover that Keynes held Malthus in very hi#i esteem. Their atti­
tudes and economic views were virtually identical.
Keynes demonstrated a keen interest in David Hume and this is 
still further evidence of his attitude toward empiricism. He shows in 
his Introduction to Hume's Abstract an appreciation for Hume's work 
that could only have come from thorough study:
It remains as good a brief introduction to the essence 
and original genius of the Treatise as can be found.
Hume has pointed with infallible finger to thoBe passages 
which, in the eyes of posterity as well as in those of 
the author, "shake off the yoke of authority, accustom 
men to think for themselves, give new hints, which men
31Essays in Biography, pp. 138, lW+.
^Malthus to Ricardo, January 26, 1817, in Ibid., pp. 139> l^O.
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of genius may carry further, and by the very opposition, 
illustrate points, wherein no one before Buspected any 
difficulty." . . .of the various passages in the Treatise 
tracing the origin of belief from custom none is more Humian 
than the following from the Abstract; "Tis not therefore 
reason which is the guide of life, but custom. That alone 
determines the mind, in all instances, to suppose the 
future conformable to the past. However easy this step 
may seem, reason would never, to all eternity, be able to 
make it."33
Not only had Keynes studied Hume, but there is evidence to support the 
conclusion that he was influenced by the writings of the great philoso 
pher. The fact that Keynes accepted Ramsey's nominalism and utilized 
it in his theorizing about economic data, and his statement that 
"Ramsey reminds one of Hume more than of anyone else"J show that he 
viewed Hume's analysis of causation and the role of reason in science 
with a great deal of admiration and sympathy.
The empiricism that Keynes embraced was not in a pure form; 
that is to say, he allowed at least two modifications and these are 
very important to his idea system. First, he included in his empiri­
cism the concepts of social change. The contemporary concept of the 
emergent nature of things— that is, the evolutionary process— perhaps 
had its intellectual beginning with Darwin and received great impetus 
by the philosophies of Bergson and Whitehead. The emphasis on evolu­
tion was simply a new theory of change which treated change as a
^Keynes and Piero Sraffa, "introduction" to David Hume; An 
Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 193&), pp. xxix-xxx" (Emphasis mine).
3^Essaya in Biography, p. 301. Because Schumpeter, on p. 8l 
(note 11) of The New Economics, took Keynes' essay on Ramsey to be 
indicative of Keynes' philosophy as well as of Ramsey's, I have cited 
both what Keynes said about Ramsey and what he quotes of him as ex­
pressing Keynes' own views.
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process by which new, unique forms appeared. This differed from the 
older concept of change which thou^it of change as the realization 
of forms already inherent in the nature of things. Now, on the basis 
of the new theory the jhilosophers and physical scientists viewed the 
physical world as being constantly in the process of being made. Keynes 
applied the same reasoning to the social system; that is, the social 
system was a dynamism constantly creating new institutions. Whitehead 
and Keynes were both making use of the new concept of change when 
Whitehead said that "Existence is activity ever merging into the fu­
ture," and Keynes said that "We have to invent new wisdom for a new 
oge."^ Keynes believed that change and its consequences must always 
be an important aspect of economic analysis. In the area of public 
policy, for example, he said "There can be no unique policy which the 
monetary authority will adopt in the long run." Thus Keynes regarded 
the flow of events as being more important and fundamental than sepa­
rate or individual happenings, not only for a better interpretation of 
history, but also as a basis for political economic action.
In my opinion there is now no place. . .for those whose 
hearts are set on old-fashioned individualism and laissez- 
faire in all their rigour--greatly though these contributed 
to the success of the nineteenth century. I Bay this, not 
because I think that these doctrines were wrong in the con­
ditions which gave birth to them. . .but because they have 
ceased to be applicable to modem conditions.
I criticise doctrinaire State Socialism, not because it 
seeks to engage men's altruistic impulses in the service 
of Society, or because it departs from laissez-faire, or 
because it takes away from man's natural liberty to make
^J. M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1932), p. 337.
360he Times (London, November 15, 1932), from a lecture given 
at Cambridge the previous day.
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a million, or because it has courage for bold experiments.
All these things I applaud. I criticise it because it 
misses the significance of vhat is actually happening.3 '
The second modification of Keynes' empiricism was his emphasis 
cxi the point that there was a basic difference between the whole and 
the part. He insisted that the very nature of the whole was essen­
tially different from that of the parts which comprised the whole.
•Die importance of this attitude lies in the analytical approach; 
that is to say, one must examine the whole; that is to say, gener­
alize about the whole rather than investigate its parts. By the 
time of Keynes, the atomism of the British empirical tradition, ac­
cording to which the whole was merely the sum of the parts, had been 
recognized to be largely superficial and faulty, chiefly by the German 
idealists. To be sure, Lord Lauderdale had refuted this doctrine in
■30
a very satisfactory manner at a much earlier date, but he, like 
Malthus, was engulfed in the Ricardian tidal-wave. As was pointed 
out earlier in this chapter, Keynes adopted this "holistic" point of 
view in insisting that the proper method of economic analysis was the 
"aggregate" or "macro" approach. In short, just aB one cannot add 
the happiness of each individual and arrive at the total happiness 
of the nation, Keynes believed that one could not add the supply 
curve for each firm in the economy and get an aggregate supply curve 
for the economy. Keynes' concept of the relationship of the whole 
to the part permeates all of his mature economic thought. One com­
mentator even considered this "aggregate" approach as being "the sum
^ Essays in Persuasion, pp. 329, 330.
38See Infra., p. 82 for a discussion of this.
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and substance of Keynes' heresy.
It would be an error to classify Keynes as a pure empiricist. 
He had rather strong tendencies toward the rationalistic point of 
view. First, despite his acceptance and use of the empirical method, 
he never adopted the irrationalism which is inherent in empiricism.
His attitude toward viewing the econany as an emerging process is a 
case in point. This point of view did not cause him to neglect ex­
amining and commenting upon what was occurring in the economy at a 
given time. Second, Keynes always believed that reason, as well as 
observation, must be used in economic analysis. Schumpeter saw this 
in Keynes when he remarked that Keynes' "intellectual affinity with
UoRicardo merits notice." Schumpeter was referring, of course, to the 
fact that Keynes did employ deductive logic in the manner of Ricardo, 
perhaps Schumpeter overstated the similarity in the methods of Keynes 
and Ricardo; nevertheless, there is much rationalism Implicit in the 
economics of Keynes despite his many explicit statements supporting 
the empirical method. Finally, Keynes was a theorist; and perhaps 
it is not assuming too much to say that Keynes would have admitted 
that all theory depends for its construction upon the use of reason 
as well-as observation. Certainly, reason and observation were used 
in his idea system.
Perhaps the best evidence that can be found in the works of 
Keynes to demonstrate his position on the empiricist-rationalist
39paul A. Samuelson, "The General Theory" in The New Economics, 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19**8), p. 151.
^Schumpeter, in Ibid., p. 9^ , (note 30).
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tigvtrope 1b the following:
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods 
of formalising a system of economic analysis. . .that they 
expressly assume strict independence between the factors in­
volved and lose all their cogency and authority if this hy­
pothesis is disallowed; whereas, in ordinary discourse, where 
we are not blindly manipulating but know all the time what 
we are doing and what the words mean, we can keep "at the 
back of our heads" the necessary reserves and qualifications 
and the adjustments which we shall have to make later on, in 
a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial differen­
tials "at the back" of several pages of algebra which assume 
that they all vanish.
Here is found the rationalist's concern for method, but it plays a 
secondary role to the empiricist's concern for the difficulty of ex­
pressing satisfactorily the complexity of experience.
Nor did Keynes minimize the importance of statistical method 
for the interpretation of economic data. So highly did he regard 
the contribution of statistics, that he formulated his theories in 
such a way that the possibility of applying statistics to the results 
of deduction was substantially Increased; he gave great impetus to the 
statistical approach to economics.
This examination of Keynes" episteraology shows that he de­
veloped his idea system within a definite framework of methodological 
principles. The basic principle was empiricism, but it was of such 
a nature that it contained the now idea of change and the new attitude 
toward the relationship of the whole to the part. And the principle 
was broad enoug$i to be friendly to a certain amount of rationalism. 
Having acquired all of this from the new philosophy, Keynes never 
wavered in his belief that it was the proper method for political
^^General Theory, pp. 297, 298.
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econ any.
C, Ethics
In presenting his fundamental ethical principles, Keynes re­
vealed quite clearly his philosophy of life and thought. With refer­
ence to his concept of human nature and of ri#it and wrong, his writing 
indicates that he was basically pre-Freudian and pre-Marxian. The 
ethical principles of Freud and Marx failed utterly to impress Keynes, 
although the modern world has yet to recover completely from the shock 
of those principles. Keynes, who was ultramodern in his economic views, 
held tenaciously to the ethical beliefs of an older period. Or better 
yet, perhaps, in attempting to enrich and modify the old beliefs, he 
succeeded only in reaffirming them.
Keynes attempted to explain in M£ Early Beliefs why he and some 
of his friends had "preserved the faith," why they had not succumbed to 
the wave of irrationalism, uncertainty, and pessimism which followed 
the Victorian period. This essay was read a few months before his 
death to the members of the club at Cambridge which had been in ex­
istence since his undergraduate days. And its content shows that he 
did not embrace the irrationalism of Freud and Marx. He said:
I see no reason to shift from the fundamental intuitions 
of the Principle Ethica; thou#i they are much too few and 
too narrow to fit actual experience, which provides a 
richer and more various content. . .the ways in which 
states of mind can be valuable are more various and also 
much richer than we allowed for.
. . .There was a thinness, a superficiality, both of 
Judgement and of feelings. . .we ignored certain powerful 
and valuable springs of feeling. . .It seems to me looking 
back that this religion of ours was a very good one to 
grow up under. It remains nearer the truth than any other 
I know, with less irrelevant, extraneous matter and nothing 
to be ashamed of. . .It was a purer, sweeter air by far
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than Freud cum Marx. It is still my religion under the
surface.^2
It is true, as Keynes stated, that no one today reads Moore. His 
Principle has joined that great body of literature which is read, 
and then only upon occasion, by the savant lost in the paths of 
serendipity. Moore's work, while it impressed the world of philoso­
phy to some degree at the time of its production, is hardly appli­
cable to any world but that of the late Edwardian and Victorian 
cultures.
Preaching a lucid brand of philosophical and moral anarchy, 
Moore's philosophy held the usual views of the anarchist: that men
were, in and of themselves, of such a nature that they naturally 
behave as rational, moral, beauty-seeking individuals. The action 
of the individual, and the individual alone, was extolled by Moore.
Ihe hipest action to which individuals could aspire was the con-
k o
templation of beauty. J
To those souls most capable of seeing beauty, the greatest 
good could and should accrue. To those lesser mortals, to whan beau­
ty was dimmed for whatever cause, the superior individual should act 
in such a way as to reveal beauty. Diis one duty, to behave accord­
ing to a general Utilitarian rule-of-beauty-contemplation, Moore 
discussed in one chapter. lhe rest of the book is a plea for the 
purest form of anarchy: the individual contemplation of states of
^gMy Early Beliefs, pp. 91, 92.
^George Edward Moore, Principle Ethica (Cambridge*. Cambridge 
University Press, 1903), pp. 5-33, 183-19^ '
^ Ibid., pp. 1U2-178.
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beauty. This action was definitionally "good," and the only "good"
which Moore's philosophy admits. This was Keynes’ religion.
Keynes' attitude toward life was primarily anthropomorphic.
Where I seem to differ from some of my friends is In 
attaching little importance to physical size. I don't 
feel the least humble before the vastness of the heavens.
The 8tars may be large, but they cannot think or love; 
and these are qualities which impress me far more than 
size does. . .My picture of the world is drawn in per­
spective and not like a model to scale. The foreground 
is occupied by human beings and the stars are all as small 
as threepenny bits. . .Humanity, which fills the foreground 
of my picture, I find interesting and on the whole- admira­
ble.^
Here is found clear evidence for what was perhaps his most basic ethi­
cal assumption: human problems are important and demand attention.
Keynes was concerned with man and man's problems; he was concerned 
with nature only so far as it aided in satisfying human needs.
The Keynesian group believed that man wa3 essentially rational 
and good. In discussing the group, Keynes said:
We were the last upholders of the eighteenth-century 
heresy of progress. . .by virtue of which the human 
race already consists of reliable, rational, decent 
people, influenced by truth and objective standards, 
who can be released from outward restraints of con­
vention and traditional standards and left to their 
own sensible devices, pure motives, and reliable in­
tuitions of the good.ko
This identification of virtue with knowledge was one of Keynes' guid­
ing limits. His faith was never shaken in the belief that all men 
had the capacity of acquiring knowledge and thus to be virtuous. It
^Ramsey, quoted in Essays in Biography, pp. 310, 311. See 
note 3k, above, for justification of this statement as indicative of 
Keynes' own views.
Early Beliefs, p. 89.
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was modified only when he felt obligated to explain social injustice 
as being a result of the failure of the rational faculty to develop 
properly because of the blindness of the wealthy and the unequal eco­
nomic opportunity afforded the poor.
Keynes ' club had found in Moore a prophet and savior, They
adopted his ethical intuition, according to which states of mind are
the only entities relevant to ethics, with great enthusiasm.
The goodness of states of mind was known by direct 
inspection, about which it was useless and impos­
sible to argue. Disagreement might arise. . .the 
two parties migvt not be talking about the same 
thing, not bringing their intuition to bear on pre­
cisely the same object, and by virtue of the prin­
ciple of organic unity, a very small difference 
in the object might make a large difference in the 
result. . .or it might be that some people had an 
acuter sense of judgement, just as some people can 
judge a vintage port and others cannot. . .Broadly 
speaking, thougi, we all knew for certain what were 
good states of mind. . .they consisted in communion 
with objects of love, beauty, and truth. Our appre­
hension of good was exactly the same as our apprehen­
sion of green and we purported to handle it with the 
same logical and analytical technique which was ap­
propriate to the latter.^7
The third trace of Keynes’ basic philosophy is found in the 
ethical principles in the 11 git of which he surveyed the contemporary 
scene. The bases of his judgnent of social and individual behavior 
were his belief in the supreme importance of man in the scheme of 
things, his belief in the essential goodness of man's states of mind, 
and his belief in man's individuality and uniqueness. Because he had 
faith in reason as the helper of knowledge and because he believed 
•in the capacity of men to be guided by rational formulation, he
^7Ibld.t p. 86.
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emphasized the importance of the role of ideas in history:
. . .the ideas of economists and political philoso­
phers, both when they are ri$vt and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world ia ruled by little else. Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from 
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves 
of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who 
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy 
from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I 
am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment 
of ideas. . .soon or late, it is ideas, not vested 
interests, which are dangerous for good or e v i l . ^8
Keynes insisted that unemployment and the sharp division between rich
and poor were the chief social evils of the time:
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are 
the fruits of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. It 
is because particular individuals, fortunate in situa­
tion or in abilities, are able to take advantage of 
uncertainty and ignorance, and also because for the 
same reason big business is often a lottery, that 
great inequalities of wealth come about; and these 
same factors are also the cause of the Unemployment of 
Labour, or the disappointment of reasonable business 
expectations, end of the impairment of efficiency and 
production.^9
.Because he believed the ends of life were spiritual and not material,
he loathed the overcalculation of utilitarianism and modem capitalism:
I do now regard the Benthamite tradition as the worm 
which has been gnawing at the insides of modem civi­
lisation and is responsible for the present moral 
decay.5°
. . .modem capitalism is absolutely irreligious, with­
out internal union, without much public spirit. . .51
^ General Theory, pp. 383, 38^.
^^Essays in Persuasion, pp. 317, 318.
Early Beliefs, p. 72. ^ Essays in Persuasion, p. 306.
33
Perhaps above all, he hated the Puritan ethics of rejecting present
enjoyment for the sake of a never-realized greater future enjoyment:
If mankind solves its economic problem, for the first 
time since his creation man will be faced with his 
real, his permanent problem— how to use his freedom 
from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure 
which science and compound Interest will have won for 
him, to live wisely and agreeably and well.
The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all 
of us along with them into the lap of economic abun­
dance. But it will be those peoples, who can. . . 
cultivate Into a fuller perfection, the art of life 
Itself and do not sell themselves for the means of 
life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when 
It comes. . .we hove been trained too long to strive 
and not to enjoy. . .The love of money as a posses­
sion— as distinguished from the .love of money as a 
means to the enjoyments and realities of life--will 
be recognized for what it Is, a somewhat disgusting 
morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological 
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the 
specialists In mental disease. All kinds of social cus­
toms and economic practices, affecting the distribution 
of wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which 
we now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and 
unjust they may be in themselves, because they are tre­
mendously useful In promoting the accumulation of capi­
tal, we shall then be free, at last, to discard.
I see us free, therefore, to return to some of the 
most sure and certain principles of religion and tra­
ditional virtue--that avarice is a vice, that the ex­
action of usury is a misdemeanor, and the love of money 
is detestable, that those walk most truly in the paths 
of virtue and sane wisdom who take least thought for 
the morrow. We shall once more value ends above means 
and prefer the good to the useful. We shall honour 
those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and the 
day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are 
capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the lilies 
of the field who toil not, neither do they spin.52
This was the goal, and Keynes believed it would be achieved. For
he said, "I still hope and believe that the day is not far off when
the Economic Problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and
5gEsaays in Persuasion, pp. 367-372.
that the arena of the heart and head will be occupied, or re-occupied, 
by our real problems— the problems of life and of human relations, of 
creation and behavior and religion. J
53jbid., p. vii.
CHAPTER III
KEYNES AND THE RECEIVED ECONOMICS
Since the time of Adam Smith there has been but one great 
cleavage In the fundamental method of economic analysis. That 
"break" with received economics was accomplished by the architects 
of the Austrian School of economics, Carl Menger, Friedrich von 
Wieser, and Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk.'1' Indeed, the cleavage was so 
wide and so deep that it is quite proper to refer to the Austrian 
school as the "New Economics."
By the time of Keynes, the two most important systems of
economic analysis were the "Classical," as developea primarily by
Adam Smith and David Ricardo and the "Austrian," as promulgated by
the economists named above. Keynes "received" theBe two bodies of
economic thought. John R. Commons was also an important anticipator
2
of one of Keynes' value theories.
The most important economic problem at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was one of production or how to make available
■^According to Lewis H. Haney, "The members of this school, 
for better or for worse, were deeply influenced by German economic 
literature, and that literature was rich in criticism of objective 
exchange value theories and in psychological analysis." Lewis H. 
Haney, History of Economic Thou git (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
Revised ed., 1933); p. 5^3.
2There are three theories of value in Keynes' works.
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a larger supply of goods. In short, the problem was one of economic 
scarcity. And this formed the basis for the classical method of 
analysis. To support this contention one needs only to recall Adam 
Smith's great concern with production, J. B. Say's Law of Markets, 
the Malthusian theory of population, and David Ricardo's rent theory. 
The Classicists assumed demand to be given and formulated their analy­
ses around the issue of supply.^
Later classical economics, especially In Its central and 
most controversial features, was an attempt to solve the problem 
of distribution, from the point of view of production, lhis analysis 
led to generalizations of great practical usefulness for a certain 
period. But as time went on the peculiar conditions, the specific 
proportion of economic factors that perhaps Justified the classical 
analysis, were passing away. Ricardian economics declined from the 
position of authority It had held for nearly half a century. The 
successors of the classical economists following J. S. Mill abandoned 
the wages fund theory. The labor value theory of Ricardo was adopted 
by Karl Marx In support of radical socialism. A destructive attack 
was made on English classical economics by the German historical school. 
Shortly after the age of Ricardo the rent of English farms declined. 
After 1870, with the opening up of the agricultural lands In the 
Mississippi Valley and In Canada the rent of English farms fell still 
lower. The birth-rate In the more advanced countries of the west
3
For Malthus, this applies only to his theory, of population. 
His principles of economics were formulated In terms of demand analy­
sis. This is discussed at length in Ch. IV.
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steadily declined. Population in France became stationary. In Ireland 
it actually decreased. Thus Ricardo's law of industrial progress as 
a universally valid formula was proved to be false. Wages rose and 
labor organizations grew in power in spite of the demonstrations of 
their futility by the classical economists. Bi the latter part of the 
nineteenth century English prosperity began to decline, even under a 
period of free trade. Large-scale industry began to develop in Germany 
and the United States. English industrialists began to feel the force 
of foreign competition. Production began to catch up with the world's 
demand for manufacture; and competition developed for foreign markets. 
The English manufacturers could no longer look forward to on unsatis­
fied demand for their products. With the rise of capitalism in other 
countries there developed a supply of capital from the United States, 
Germany, and France, so that capital accumulation on the part of the 
English enterpriser could no longer be assumed as inevitably an in­
hibitory factor. So there was a need for a new economic theory.
The Austrian economics was the answer to this obvious need 
for a reorientation of economic theory. The members of this school 
approached the subject of value and distribution from the point of 
view of consumption, of wants and feeling rather than from the point 
of view of the cost of production. In Bhort, the emphasis in economic 
analysis shifted from "supply" to "demand." Their subjective theory of 
value was really the first complete break away from the objective valua- 
tion theory of the classicists. According to Haney, "The 'Austrian
k
See Haney, op. cit., pp. 528-530 for a rather long list of 
anticipators of the Austrian School.
38
School1 so analyzes utility as to base a comprehensive theory of eco- 
nomic values upon subjective elements
For the classical economists, cost of production determined 
value, with labor cost predominating in the total cost of producing 
a commodity. A commodity sold in the market at a price based on the 
costs incurred in producing it. The utility of a commodity to the- 
user was recognized but it was taken for granted. Thus it is per­
fectly clear that the problem of valuation was approached from the 
supply side of the exchange transaction. The demand side of the 
equation was always considered to be sufficient and, therefore, de­
mand was also taken for granted. All of this, of course, was in 
keeping with the great emphasis which the early classical economists 
placed upon the problem of supply or scarcity, and also, it was in 
accordance with Say's Law of Markets,
For the Austrians, however, human wants or needs are the ori­
gin of economic value. These wants or needs are in the human mind; 
they are subjective judgnents of individuals. Value arises when 
people attach importance to limited quantities of things. Value 
comes at the margin--the utility to people of a little more or a 
little less. That is the central core of the Austrian marginal 
utility analysis. Value is measured by the least Important use of 
any one unit.
Wieser’s emphasis on maldistribution of wealth and income as 
a powerful factor causing a misdirected employment of productive 
resources is of great importance to the student of economic theory
5Ibid., p .  5^3 .
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and its h i s t o r y T h i s  alcne sets the Austrian school completely 
apart from Ricardian economics. It fits most snugly into that stream 
of economic thought that Includes the commanded value theory of 
Malthus, the underconsumption theory from Lauderdale to H. Gordon 
Hayes, the institutional economics of Veblen and Commons, and par­
ticularly, the economics of Keynes. It was in Wieser that the 
Austrian school reached its apex in the new demand approach to eco­
nomic analysis. Demand, particularly as it relates to value and pro­
duction, has ever since been the focal point of economics.
It is true that the Austrians did not make a complete "break" 
with received economics. The Austrians followed the classical tradi­
tion in Beveral ways. Their methodology included deductive reasoning. 
There was little attempt at statistical verification or critical analy­
sis of postulates. The basic assumptions of classical economics were 
largely accepted by the Austrians— static conditions, freedom of Industry, 
great mobility of capital and labor, a laissez-faire individualistic 
order, profit motivation, gain through adjusting production to a mar­
ket price, hedonistic human nature, and the entrepreneur as the
pivotal factor in industry and the class chiefly responsible for
7
industrial progress.'
Austrian economics thus developed into a static analysis of 
the problem of value and distribution. The assumption that the
‘ T'riedrich von Wieser, Natural Value (New York: G. E. Stechert
and Co., 1930 reprint), pp. 56-59. English translation by Christian A. 
Malloch and edited by William Smart.
^See Harvey W. Peck, Economic Thought and its Institutional 
Background (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1935)> P* 196.
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entrepreneurial function was the moat expansible factor was one In 
which the Austrians were In agreement with the later classicists.
Dlls Implied several other assumptions, which seem to have been the 
actual conditions of the time— an Individual economy, capital accumu­
lation based on Individual savings, Invention proceeding faster than 
the accumulation of loanable funds, and production In the field of 
manufactures not yet adequate to the world demand for manufactured 
products. Ihls again Implied— that which was actually existent—  
vast unexplolted natural resources, such as those of North and South 
America, South Africa, Australia, and Siberia; a growing world popu­
lation or mass of labor to be organized (the population of the world 
doubled during the nineteenth centuiy); and finally, an expansible or 
buoyant market for machinery or producer's capital.
The chief point of departure from classicism was the attempt 
of the Austrians to explain value by states of feeling or conscious­
ness rather than from the point of view of objective physical com­
modities. They approached the dubject of value and distribution 
from the point of view of consumption, of wants and feeling rather 
than from the point of view of the cost of production. But it was 
a fundamental departure and quite sufficient to form a new economics.
In what broad and general ways Is the economics of Keynes 
related to the Classical and Austrian Idea systems? There Is no 
intent on the part of the writer to labor this point. Consequently 
many of the apparent similarities between what Is referred to in 
this chapter as "received" economics and the economics of Keynes 
will not be discussed. The concern Is with only those broad contours 
of thought which are Important to the systems under examination, and
which, to a large extent, have either been ignored or denied by many 
writers in the area of economic theory and its history. The few 
writers who have concerned themselves with this subject have invari­
ably used terns such as "orthodox" or "traditional" to classify all 
economic thought before Keynes. That is to say, in their attempts 
to show what parts of the received economics influenced Keynes, they 
simply refer to orthodox or traditional economics. Using the terms 
in this fashion, it is impossible to know to what they have reference, 
Ih short, it is a grave error to refer to all economics from Smith to 
Keynes as orthodox or traditional economics. To "lump" together 
Classical, Austrian, and the later Marginal Utility economics is to 
misconceive the developnent of economic theory. Hence, in this attempt 
to assign to Keynes his proper position in the history of economic 
theory, care is taken to indicate throughout the discussion just what 
part of the received economics is under analysis.
Did Keynes make a major break with received economics when 
he refused to assume that the automatic functioning of the economy 
would result in full employment? As is well known, one of the more 
Important lessons to be learned from the General Theory is that under­
employment equilibrium is not only possible but characteristic of the 
capitalistic economy. It has generally been held that received eco­
nomics assumed full employment, allowing only for frictional unemploy­
ment.
Schumpeter says, ". . .1 repeat that the arguments that Keynes 
set forth against what he conceived to be the classical theory (in his 
Bense) are entirely irrelevant against any correct statement of the 
full-employment equilibrium theory and that his indictment that the
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classical theory knows no unemployment except a frictional one Is true 
only If the term frictional Is defined so widely as to rob the Indict-
Q
ment of all significance."
Many reflections have been made on the "classical assumption" 
of full employment. In the most recent statements of this view, no , 
quotation or reference is given in support of it; it has become a con­
ventional remark, which gives to the Keynesian "New Economics" the 
advantage of another supposed contrast with the past. Keynes* view 
Is strengthened when it is shown to be a fuller perception of ideas 
which were growing into their maturity, rather than when it is required 
to depend on the dangerous appeal to a new revelation. For example, 
the statement that "the point of departure (in the economics of Keynes)
is that the level of employment can be effectively raised by changes in
9
taxation, in the spending power of the government, or by other means," 
should not be contrasted with, but related to, Mill's proposition that 
"governments can create additional industry by laying on taxes and em­
ploying the amount productively," and that "public loans are justified 
if otherwise capital would not have been saved or would have been used 
wastefully."10 There is, however, a longer hiBtory than that of the 
antecedents out of which the doctrine of full employment haB grown.
Much of what is said in Chapter Five concerning the evolution of the
Q
°Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 195*0", p. 1177.
Economics of Full Employment, (Oxford Institute of Statistics, 
19^), P. 59.
10J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, I (London: John
W. Parker and Son, 1852), p. 547.
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doctrine of effective demand is relevant here also, but more special 
references have to be made at this point.
More justice should be done to Sir J. Steuart, a writer who 
came between the Physiocrats and Smith. He is not usually Included 
among the classical economists, although Say quoted him several times, 
and Marshall believed that.he made Important additions to economic 
theory.'1'1 Chapter Five indicates hew Steuart anticipated Malthus with 
respect to the principle of effective demand.
Steuart was perhaps the first among modern writers in the field 
of economics to regard the provision of full employment as a duty of 
the State. While Smith gave only subsistence and public revenue as the
I p
right objects of political economy, as the "science of a statesman,"
Steuart had held that the object of an economy was
to provide for the nourishment, the other wants, and the em­
ployment of every individual. That number of inhabitants is 
best which is compatible with the full employment of every one 
of them. Of what consequence is it to know how many people 
are in a country when the employment of them does not enter
into the inquiry? A free and perfect society implies full
employment for reciprocal and proportioned services between 
all who compose it. Whenever therefore anyone is found upon 
whom nobody depends, and who depends upon every one, as is the 
case with him who is willing to work for his bread, but who 
can find no employment, that is a breach of the social con­
tract and an a b u s e . ^3
Steuart then moved quickly to a program of action. He said:
■^Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed. (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 19^9)> P« 757.
■^Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Cannan ed. (New York; 
Random House, 1937), Bk. 4-.
13Sir James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of 
Political Economy (1767), p. 10.
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. . .There is a vibration of work and demand; either may 
fail to support the other, lhe case may arise when work 
augnents, and no more demand can be procured; it may then 
be expedient to diminish hands, by making soldiers of them, 
by employing them an public works or by emigration. When­
ever the competition stands too long upon either side, the 
statesman must endeavour to load the limiter scale. That 
is to say, he must act either on demand for goods, or on 
provision of work. Fran this principle flows the authority 
vested in all governments to load the country with taxes in 
order to advance the prosperity of the State, and this ob­
ject can be nowise better obtained than by applying the 
amount of them to the keeping of an even balance between 
work and demand, that is by the imposition of taxes and 
the right employment of them to retard or promote the 
consumption of every branch of industry. Under a frugal 
reign, numbers will diminish if the statesman does not 
open every channel which may carry off the superfluous 
products of Industry. Here is the reason; a diminution 
of expense at home is a diminution of employment. I1*
It goes without saying that Malthus is not among the classi­
cists who can be charged with an assumption of full employment, and 
the long final chapter of his Principles is referred to by Keynes.
There is nothing on the subject, between Steuart and Mill, which bears 
on this question. There is a good deal of reference to the fact of 
unemployment in Smith, Senior, Lloyd, and Merrivale, but the observa­
tions are casual. At that time, it was population and production, 
not employment, which was the prior concern. There is no argument, 
in this period, of a relation of wage-rates to full employment. Smith 
based the wealth of a nation on capital accumulation. There are pas­
sages in Smith which may be interpreted to mean that he did not believe 
that the accumulation of capital was automatic. If capital did not in 
fact accumulate at a proper rate, unemployment would result.^
111 Ibid., p. 1^.
!5por an analysis of the classical concepts of capital accumu­
lation, see Erskine McKinley, "Hie Problem of 'Underdevelopment' in the 
English Classical School," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, IXIX 
(May, 1955) PP. 235-252.
Thus, we come to Mill. It is a quotation from Mill which is 
often called Say's Law. In his Principles, Mill stated a general 
proposition that the means of payment for commodities is other com­
modities, and that "all sellers are inevitably and ex vi termini buy­
ers." If production were doubled "everybody would be able to buy
twice as much because everyone would have twice as much to offer in 
16exchange." He applied his limitation of this general case to the 
question of full employment in another place where he made it plain 
that the general rule can fail because of the division of labor. 
^Periods of brisk demand," he said, "are alBO the periods of greatest 
production; the national capital is never called into full employment 
but at these periods. The annual produce of a country is never any­
thing approaching in magnitude to what it migit be if all the capital 
were in full employment. This perpetual non-employment of a large 
proportion of Capital is the price we pay for the division of labour."
There is another line of thou git in Mill, when he says that 
"it would be possible for the State to guarantee employment at ample
wages to all who are bom," but only if it could control the birth-
1 ft
rate. Otherwise, he believed, the individual product may, by sheer
force of numbers, fall below the necessary subsistence wage, and there
would be unemployment. Here again full employment falls for an es­
sential reason, the lavs of population and diminishing returns. But
Ifoill, op. cit., p. 558.
^J. S. Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of political 
Economy (London; John W. Parker and Son, 18^0, P* 12.
l8Mill, Principles, p. 562.
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even if population could be controlled, the possibility of full em­
ployment vas made to depend by Mill on an action of the State vhich 
could create "additional industry" by laying on taxes and employing 
the amount of money secured in a productive m a n n e r . ^
It is therefore impossible to ascribe to Mill the opinion 
that full employment was a result of the free operation of the eco­
nomic system. It is not unusual, in any analysis, to indicate the 
limiting case, where conditions are ideal, and to introduce qualifi­
cations . The ideal must also be allowed for in the Keynesian analy­
sis j there, full employment will result from the government's policy 
only if its proposals work Ideally, if all the estimates of invest­
ment are correct, all the statistics faultless, and there are no dis­
turbances or Interferences.
Surely no one can read the statements written by Wieser con­
cerning dldtrlbutlon of wealth and maintain that the Austrlans assumed 
full employment. Wieser said:
. . .Production is ordered not only according to simple want, 
but also according to wealth. Histead of things which would 
have the greatest utility, those things are produced for 
which the most will be paid. The greater the differences in 
wealth, the more striking will be the anomalies of production. 
It will furnish luxuries for the wanton and the glutton, while 
it is deaf to the wants of the miserable and the poor. It Is 
therefore the distribution of wealth which decides how pro­
duction is set to work, and Induces consumption of the most 
uneconomic kind: a consumption which wastes upon unnecessary
and culpable enjoyment what mipfrt have served to heal the 
wounds of poverty.20
Anyone concerned with healing "the wounds of poverty" could not assume
full employment.
^Ibld. 20Wieser, og. cit., p. 58.
Thus, professional economic thought since before Smith has 
not supported a policy of public Inaction regarding unemployment 
nor has It assumed full employment. But the Keynesian analysis gains 
rather than loses authority If It recognizes, Instead of depreciating, 
the growth of Its ideas In the work of earlier writers.
Smith's contention that capital accumulation determined the 
wealth of a nation may be viewed in a different matrix. Throughout 
the history of capitalism, capital (goods) has been formed and ac­
cumulated by and through the Investment process; that is, the expendi­
ture of capital (funds) for the purpose of creating goods other than 
consumption goods. Thus, what Smith was In effect saying was that the 
welfare of the economy depended upon investment. And Keynes, in mak­
ing Investment, along with the consumption function, the determinant 
of effective demand, came to exactly the same conclusion as did Smith. 
For Keynes, employment could not increase unless Investment Increased. 
For Smith, the wealth of a nation could not increase; production could 
not increase; employment could not increase unless the quantity of 
capital goods Increased.
Many writers contend that Keynes embraced a labor theory of 
value. The writer agrees, with the qualification that Keynes also 
had an "expectation" theory of value, which is discussed later in 
the present chapter, and a "commanded" theory of value, which is 
examined in Chapter Five. Ae to Keynes' labor theory of value:
It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a 
yield over the course of its life in excess of its original 
cost, than as being productive. For the only reason why an 
asset offers a prospect of yielding during its life services 
having an aggregate value greater than its initial supply 
price is because it is scarce; and it is kept scarce because
U8
of the competition of the rate of interest on money. If 
capital becomes less scarce, the excess yield vill diminish, 
without its having become less productive— at least in the 
physical sense.
I sympathise, therefore, with the pre-classlcal doctrine 
that everything is produced by labour, aided by what used to 
be called art and is now called technique, by natural re­
sources which are free or cost a rent according to their 
scarcity or abundance, and by the results of past labour, 
embodied in assets, which alBo command a price according to 
their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard 
labour, including, of course, the personal services of the 
entrepreneur and his assistants, as the jsole factor of pro­
duction, operating in a given environment of technique, 
natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand.
Hiis partly explains why we have been able to take the unit 
of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our 
economic system, apart from units of money and of time.^1
One migvfc view this as a revolutionary doctrine were it not for the 
fact that Adam Smith and Bicardo and practically all their contempo­
raries looked at the economic process in much the same manner.
Hie elimination of the scarcity of capital assets along with
the advocacy of socialized investment led in quite logical fashion
to Keynes' conclusion that labor was the sole factor of production. 
Keynes' labor theory of value had something in common with Marx's 
value theory as well as with the value theories of Smith and Bicardo.
But this is more or less irrelevant for the purpose of this study.
Hie significant factor is to recognize that Keynes did not "break new 
ground" when he embraced the labor theory of value. This is but another 
way in which the economics of Keynes is related to the classical tra­
dition.
Ihis acceptance of a labor theory of value did not, however,
cause Keynes— as it had the classicists— to employ a "supply" approach
^^General Hieory, pp. 213, 21^. (Italics by Keynes).
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to economics. His Idea system throughout embraces and uses the "de­
mand" approach formulated so well by the Austrlans. Even his emphasis 
on Investment Is a demand and not a supply concept. Consumption, human 
want, and human need were not taken for granted by Keynes Just as they 
had not been assumed by the Austrlans. Quite the contrary, It vas the 
supply function that was taken as given by Keynes; then, he formulated 
his entire analysis around the demand function. As all economists know, 
even the marginal concepts--marginal efficiency of capital and marginal 
propensity to consume— are quite In keeping with the Austrian marginal 
utility concept.
Thus, with reference to assigning Keynes to his proper position 
in the history of economic theory, his Idea system flows frfim the 
Austrian method of analysis and not the classical. This was Keynes' 
"break" from classical economics, but the "break" was effected more 
than half-a-century before the appearance of the General Theory.
John R. Commons' Theory of Value and Keynes
The final task of this chapter Is to show the relationship 
between the "volitional" theory of value of John R. Commons and the
pp
"expectation" theory of value of Keynes.
For the classical economists, value had Its origin In labor,
Its time was In the past, and Its source was supply. For the Austrlans, 
value had Its origin In Hie mind, Its time was the present, and Its
^  Three "good" suramarlzatlanB of Commons appear In A. G. Gruchy, 
Modern Economic Thought (19^7); Joseph Dorftaan, The Economic Mind In 
American Civilization, HI, Ch. 13; and Sellg Pearlman, "John Rogers 
Commons," In the American Economic Review, XXXV, No. U (September,
19>*5), PP. 782-785^
source was demand. For the Volitional Theory of John R. Commons, 
value had its origin in the transaction, its time was the future, 
and its source was also the transaction.
Commons' theory of value was similar to the Austrians but it 
was not Hedonistic. Evaluation was an individual phenomenon in the 
Hedonic theory. But for Commons, evaluation involved collective 
action. He believed that the objective of economic study was the 
collective behavior of man-made institutions as they functioned around 
the institution of private property, codified laws, and court decisions. 
The very first sentence in his, Institutional Economics reads, "My 
point of view is based on my participation in collective activities,
from which I here derive a theory of the part played by collective
23action in control of individual action." The problem of economic 
study was "not to create a different kind of economics--'institutional' 
economics— divorced from preceding schools, but how to give to col­
lective action, in all its varieties, its due place throughout economic 
theory. In my Judgnent this collective control of individual transactions 
is the contribution of institutional economics to the whole of a rounded-
p ]1
out theory of Political Economy."c
Commons was critical of the value theory of classical economics 
because it failed to recognize the importance of collective action as 
determinants of value and price. Neither did the theory see and under­
stand the importance of private property or the impact of courts of
23John R. Commons, Institutional Economics (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 193*0 > P. 1.
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law as enforcing agencies of collective action. It was these faults 
in received value theory with which he grappled. And the result was 
a new theory of value.
For Commons, transactions took place in an institutional 
environment. Institutional conditions such as the open shop, labor 
unions, the closed shop, monopoly, etc. prevailed in the real world, 
and Commons refused to Ignore these in the formulation of his value 
theory. He was a pragnatist, a realist; he believed that it was hi#i 
time for economists to stop being so "pure" and start being more 
"functional." All of this is reflected in his theory of value. Basic­
ally, Commons was concerned with "reasonable value;" that is, how could 
reasonable value be.arrived at througi the transaction process. By 
this type of value, he meant a value that would be fair and equitable 
to everyone concerned in the transaction.
It will be recalled that Smith's niggardliness of nature, 
Ricardo's diminishing returns and rent theory, and Maithus' theory 
of population made scarcity the most important problem in economics. 
This, of course, evolved Into Say's Law of Markets. According to the 
classical thougvt, anyone who attempted to create scarcity, primarily 
by monopoly, should be eliminated. 3h the united States, this way of 
thinking led to the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and other 
anti-trust legislation.
Commons would have none of this type of thinking in relation 
to valuation problems. He believed that since transactions occurred 
between collective groups, those groups should have about equal bar­
gaining strength. If they did not, then, some institutional force 
must make it so or more nearly so. If the strength of the bargaining
groups were about the same, the result would be Just about as it should 
that is, reasonable value for all concerned would be realized. For 
Commons, the government should be the institutional force making for 
this equality of bargaining power or strength. Die government must 
formulate the rules governing the transactions and then act as umpire 
in the exchange process to see to it that the rules were followed. 
Commons was not Interested in equilibrium price because that price 
could be an exploitative one; that is, not a reasonable price.
Commons recognized that there were people who attempted to 
gain riches by increasing supply, but there were others who strived 
to enrich themselves by creating scarcity. It was the latter group 
that concerned Commons because scarcity, Itself, created value; and 
the transaction was largely between those who controlled the supply, 
that is, the scarcity. It was this recognition of the real world 
that caused Commons to insist that, if necessary, the government 
muBt act to equalize bargaining power. Governmental legislative 
and umpiring activities were Commons' program of action to protect 
the weak in the bargaining processes. This is what he meant by in­
dividual control by collective action. Thus, Commons would not at­
tack the problem of unequal bargaining power, monopoly, and scarcity 
with anti-trust legislation. He would not destroy the groups that 
tried to obtain wealth by creating scarcity, but he would try to 
equalize the bargaining processes. This would be his working rules 
of social action.
However, once the rules are established, reasonable value 
may still not be realized because of the slope of the demand curve. 
Suppose the demand curve is a highly elastic one but production is
In the nature of a monopoly. Nov assume that prices are Increased 
by 10 per cent. Demand would fall sharply as consumers shifted their 
expenditure to substitutes. Thus, there la no need to worry a great 
deal about consumers If the demand Is hlgily elastic and there are 
substitutes for the commodity available. Now assume hlgji Inelastic 
demand. Under this condition, sellers tend to raise prices higher 
and higher. Demand would not change much. It was under these cir­
cumstances that Commons Insisted on some new rules which would insure 
reasonable value. Perhaps these prices should be set as are the prices 
charged by public utilities. This demonstrates quite clearly that 
Commons' theory of value and his Ideas concerning economic policy 
were Inseparable.
McCracken sums up Commons' theory of value very neatly In the 
following words; “For Commons, man was not a hedonistic creature ar­
riving at vital conclusions with respect to value on the monetary 
sensations of pleasure and pain. But rather, man was a rational, 
calculating being, forcing himself by a volitional act of the will 
to make appraisals and evaluations, yet appraisals and evaluations 
desired to discover the present worth of future expectations. Value
I
Is a mental appraisal In the present of expected future uses or in- 
25comes." These appear to be the basic principles around which Commons 
constructed his idea system, particularly his theory of value. Thus, 
Commons' "futuristic"-"transactions" theory of value was a "break" 
of great importance with received economics.
25h . L. McCracken, "Economic Contradictions," In The Southern 
Economic Journal (XIII, No. 4, April, 19*+7)> P. 3^6.
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It has been shown that by the very nature of his analysis, 
Keynes embraced a labor theory of value. But perhaps his idea system 
vas too broad and general, after the fashion of the Wealth of Nations, 
to be contained in only one value theory. 3h any event, as was indi­
cated earlier, Keynes had three theories of value. In his Chapter, 
"Expectation as Determining Output and Employment," Keynes expressed 
the same concept of value that Commons had formulated some fifteen 
years earlier. It was the "futuristic" idea; Keynes referred to it 
as "expectations."
All production is for the purpose of ultimately satis­
fying a consumer. Time usually elapses, however— and some­
times much time— between the incurring of costs by the 
producer (with the consumer in view) and the purchase of 
the output by the ultimate consumer. Meanwhile the entre­
preneur (including both the producer and the investor in 
this description) has to form the best expectations he can 
as to what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is 
ready to supply them (directly or indirectly) after the 
elapse of what may be a lengthy period; and he has no choice 
but to be guided by these expectations, if he is to produce 
at all by processes which occupy time.
Biese expectations upon which business decisions depend, 
fall into two groups, certain individuals or firms being 
specialised in the business of framing the first type of 
expectation and others in the business of framing the second.
Hie first type is concerned with the price which a manufacturer 
can expect to gat for his "finished" output at the time when 
he commits himself to starting the process which will pro­
duce it; output being "finished" (from the point of view of 
the manufacturer) when it 1b ready to be vised or to be sold 
to a second party. The second type is concerned with what 
the entrepreneur can hope to earn in the shape of future 
returns if he purchases (or, perhaps, manufactures) "finished" 
output as an addition to his capital equipment. We may call 
the former short-run expectation and the latter long-term 
expectation.
H ius the behaviour of each individual firm in deciding its 
daily output will be determined by its short-term expectations - - 
expectations as to the cost of output an various possible scales 
and expectations as to the sale-proceeds of this output; though, 
in the case of additions to capital equipment and even of sales 
to distributors, these short-term expectations will largely
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depend on the long-term (or medium-term) expectations of 
other parties.26
Thus, for Keynes, the expectations of the enterprisers deter­
mine value, not only for consumers1 goods but for capital goods as well. 
It falls again to McCracken to neatly sum up Keynes' expectation theory 
of value.
According to him (Keynes), the present value of anything 
is the discounted present worth of all expected future annui­
ties . It matters not whether one Is thinking of a 3 per cent 
government bond maturing In 20 years, or an office building 
In a metropolitan area. It matters not what historical costs 
may have been according to an accounting statement or what the 
Incomes have been In previous years— except to the extent that 
past Incomes may supply a rational basis for future expecta­
tions. Any basic change In technology or permanent shift In 
demand automatically divorces future expectations from past 
experience and present values are adjusted accordingly.27
Then, McCracken says, "Many young economists have given Keynes
credit for this novel and modem idea. However, It was my privilege
to be exposed to this Idea as long ago as 1921 while pursuing graduate
work at the university of Wisconsin In the 'value and valuation'
Beminar of John R. Ccmmons. At that time he was working out a system
of economic thought which he chose to call the 'volitional theory of
value.'"2®
^ General Theory, pp. k6, U7.
27McCracken, Economic Contradictions, pp. 3^5> 3^6. See General 
Theory, Ch. 5.
2®Ibld., p. '3^ 6.
CHAPTER IV
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EFFECTIVE DEMAND
The doctrine of effective demand Is not a "new-comer" In the 
history of economic theory. Quite the contrary Is true. This prin­
ciple that demand cannot he assumed or taken as given, and that a 
deficiency of demand can and does lead to terrible economic conse­
quences has been present In the stream of economic theory since at 
least the very beginning of the eighteenth century.
The purpose of this chapter Is to examine this doctrine that 
has characterized the social thought of the economic "underworld" 
for more than two hundred and fifty years from the perspective of 
Its historical development. The names most closely associated with 
the doctrine of effective demand during this period are: Bolsgullbert,
Mandevllle, Steuart, Lauderdale, Malthus, Slsmondl, Aftallon, Hobson, 
and Foster and Catchlngs. These are the men we shall examine. These 
are the men who nurtured the doctrine for more than two centuries 
until a "KeyneB" appeared and caused It to burst Into full bloom.
Keynes, of course, recognized that the principle of effective 
demand had long been a part of economic theory. He expressed this 
when he wrote, "It Is no new thing, however, to ascribe the evils 
of unemployment to the Insufficiency of the propensity to consume.
But this explanation of the economic evils of the day. . .played a 
small part In sixteenth and seventeenth-century thinking and has
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only gathered force in comparatively recent t i m e s . H e  then pointed 
out that Laffemas, Petty, von Schrotter, Barbon, and Cary had emphasized
p
consumption, or effective demand, as early as the seventeenth century.
He also paid tribute to Mandevllle, Hobson, and of course, Malthus. 
Keynes' treatment of these three men Is presented In connection with 
the discussion of them.
Pierre le Pesant de Bolsgullbert
The study of the evolution of the doctrine of effective demand 
may properly begin with Pierre le Pesant de Bolsgullbert, a writer who 
has been largely Ignored by historians of economic thou^it.^ Those 
writers who have not completely neglected Bolsgullbert have associated 
him with antl-mercantlllsm, free trade, and agricultural primacy.
There Is no mention of Bolsgullbert In the General Theory, althou^i,
In Chapter 23, Keynes mentions Laffemas, Petty, von Schrotter, Barbon, 
Cary, and Mandevllle as men who made consumption or "effective demand" 
an Important part of their Idea systems. Bolsgullbert appeared between 
Cary and Mandevllle, and anyone who has studied his writings must con­
clude that he emphasized mass consumption as the fundamental source of 
national economic well-being to a far greater degree than did any of 
the writers mentioned by Keynes. In fact, one authority on Bolsgullbert 
wrote, "No modern writer adhering to the belief that economic Ills spring
•kjensral Theory, p. 358.
2See Ibid., pp. 358, 359 a brief statement by each of these 
men as quoted by Keynes.
^The reader's attention Is directed to Stephen L. McDonald, 
"Bolsgullbert: A Neglected Precursor of Aggregate Demand Theorists,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, IXVIII (August, 195^) PP. kOl-Ulh.
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in large part from underconsumption has put the case more strongly 
than Boisguilbert.',1+
As has been true with so many economists, the economics of 
Boisguilbert reflected the great economic and social problems present 
in France during the latter quarter of the seventeenth century. Hie 
major economic problem in France during this period was what would now 
be referred to as secular stagnation. From roughly 1665 to 1700, the 
economy of France had grown progressively weaker. Commerce and trade 
had declined greatly. Agriculture had become more and more depressed; 
population had declined until the rural areas were almost deserted and 
many villages abandoned; and people were starving to death, not only be­
cause they did not have sufficient purchasing power but also because there 
was an absolute shortage of food. France was nothing more than a great 
poorhouse, desolate and without provision.^ Vauban estimated in 1707
that one-tenth of the French population actually begged, while five-
6
tenths were "reduced almost to that unhappy condition."
Between 1695 and 1707, Boisguilbert published five short books 
and treatises, each of which was an attempt to explain to the public 
this terrible economic wretchedness that had befallen France. In 
addition, his writings contained programs, of action designed to cure
^Ihis statement is quoted by McDonald, op. cit., p. 401, and 
he cites "Hazel V. Roberts, Boisguilbert, Economist of the Heign of 
Louis XIV, p. 287."
5see Felix Cadet, Pierre de Boisguilbert, precurseur des 
economistes; 16U6-171U (Paris: Libraire Guillaumin, 1870), pp. 17, 18.
^Sebastien le Prestre Vauban, Projet d'une dime royale, reprinted 
in Eugene Daire, Ec on artistes financiers du 18 e sjgcle (Paris: Chez
Guillaumin et Cle., Libraries, 1851), p. 36T
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the basic economic ills of the nation.^
Like most great theoretical economists, Boisguilbert was con­
cerned with the wealth of the nation and the forces which determined 
it. He refused, as Adam Smith was to do nearly a century later, to 
accept the mercantilists idea that bullion was wealth. For
g
Boisguilbert, wealth was economic goods such as, "food and clothing" 
and "bread, wine, meat, or other commodities." He was very clear in 
his definition of true wealth. It consisted of ". . .a complete en­
joyment, not only of the needs of life, but even of all the super­
fluities and of all that can give pleasure to the sensuality, con­
cerning which the corruption of the heart invents and refines for­
ever."^ But mere quantity of goods and productive powers could not 
measure true national wealth. The important factors were the utili­
zation of a nation's powers of production and, even more important, 
the consumption of the goods. It was not enough that a nation have 
a large quantity of all of the means of production. Consumption 
wbb the key to the creation of wealth. Consumption set the means 
of production into motion and determined their employment. "All 
the most exquisite fruits of the earth and the most precious commodities
?See McDonald, og. cit., p. U03, for a very brief summary of the 
books and treatises. These five works are reprinted in Daire, og. cit., 
and all references to Boisguilbert's writings in this dissertation are 
to this edition.
^Boisguilbert, Dissertation sur la mature des richesses, de,
1'argent et des tribute, p. 373. Hereafter cited as Dissertation.
^Boisguilbert, Supplement au Detail de la France, p. 2^7. 
Hereafter cited as Supplement.
•dissertation, p. 383.
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are only manure when they are not consumed. Bolsgullbert took an
equally positive position with reference to money. It was only a
medium of exchange.
Gold and silver are not and never have been wealth In 
themselves, having value only relatively, and Insofar 
as they can procure the necessary things of life, with 
regard to which they serve only as a pledge and a measure.
It Is a matter of Indifference whether there Is more or 
less (of money), provided It can produce the same results.
Concerning wealth, money is only the means and the method, 
while the commodities useful to life are the end and the 
aim. ^
Boisguilbert argued that the quantity of money presented no
problem. Its velocity of circulation was important but this was a
function of the demand for goods. This functional relationship created
an effective elasticity to the supply of money. If the demand for goods
increased, the increase in the velocity of circulation of the medium
of exchange would create purchasing power despite the scarcity of
gold or silver. Here again, he stressed consumption.
Money is uniquely the slave of consumption, following step 
by step its destiny, and moving or stopping with it, cm 
ecu passing a hundred times in a day, when there are many 
sales and resales, and remaining for entire months in a 
single place when consumption is ruined.
And,
It is consumption which leads the march; money stops,
^Boisguilbert, Factum de la France, p. 271. Hereafter cited 
as Factum.
^Boisguilbert, I« Detail de la France, p. 170. Hereafter 
cited as Detail.
13Ibid., p. 198. 
l U
Factum, p. 320.
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dislodges, and runs along with consumption. Thus when there 
is very much consumption, a little silver, on account of its 
frequent appearances, passes for a great quantity of specie; 
consumption diminishing, silver stops immediately and causes 
it to be said that there is no more of it.^5
Even if the velocity of circulation of the medium of exchange were 
insufficient to facilitate trade and commerce, there was no reason 
for great concern. There was always the bill of exchange to supple­
ment and/or replace coin. According to Borsguilbert, much of the 
trading that occurred in a market was carried on with bills of ex­
change.^
It is not a question of there being much silver, but that 
it should march and circulate always, and of what this 
celerity consists, and what causes It. When this speed 
of movement of silver does not suffice for the number of 
masters it is obliged to serve, it produces an infinity of 
children, whom it clothes with all its authority. These 
are bills of exchange, or paper money, that is to say, 
inexhaustible matter provided there be enough workmen 
to coin it. These workmen are the merchants or courtiers 
of consumption.^
Thus it appears clear that Boisguilbert's concept of money 
and wealth wbb not merely an attempt to refute the mercantilistlc 
theory of wealth as so many writers have concluded. More important 
was the relationship between this concept and Boisguilbert's major 
argument that only by a program designed to create and maintain mass 
purchasing power at high levels could the people of France enjoy a 
higher standard of living. The basic theme which runs through all of
^Letter to Chamillart of July 1, 17<&, cited by Roberts, op. 
cit., p. 212,
^ Dissertation, p. 377.
^Letter to Chamillart of July 19, XJCk, quoted by Roberts, 
op. cit., pp. 1+7, U8. (Roberts' translation).
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his works was that effective demand, and not money nor its quantity, 
was the key to national and individual economic welfare. Economic 
stagnation and poverty resulted from a deficiency of effective demand. 
If effective demand failed, any supply of money would be totally in­
effective in preventing economic depression.
Having defined wealth as he did, Boisguilbert was quick to 
see a relationship between wealth and total demand. Aggregate money 
expenditure determined the income of a nation. Or better still,
xstotal consumption expenditure determined the wealth of a nation.
"It may be established as a principle," he said, "that consumption
and income are one and the same thing; and that the ruin of consump-
19tlon is the ruin of income."
Boisguilbert placed great emphasis upon the distribution of 
income; in fact, it was this that determined the level of consumption. 
He argued that the "little" people must have purchasing power to 
create a level of income comparable to full employment. These people 
spent their money and thereby created Income and employment. On the 
other hand, much of the money which flowed into the pockets of the 
rich was hoarded. There was no necessity for them to spend all of 
it to satisfy their needs and desires. Boisguilbert expressed the 
"Keynesian" concepts of the "propensity to consume" and the "propensity 
to save" in the following maimer:
^Boisguilbert did not always explain what he meant by the 
word "expenditure." In general, however, he used it to mean consumer 
spending. The French word "conscmmation," which he used, may be trans­
lated literally as "consumption" or "expenditure."
19petail, p. 183.
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An ecu with a poor man or a very small merchant has a hundred 
times more effect, or rather, causes more income, than with 
a rich man, because of the continual dally turnover that this 
modest sum experiences with the forner. This does not happen 
with regard to the other, in the coffers of which considerably 
greater quantities of money remain for months and entire 
years idle, and consequently useless, whether due to corruption 
of heart blinded by avarice, or to the waiting for a better 
market.
But, frcm thissaving, the king and the body of the nation 
obtain no utility, and this amounts to so much theft frcm both.
But this sum, such as a thousand ecus, distributed among a 
thousand people of small means, would pass one hundred thousand 
hands in less time than it occupied the coffers of this rich 
person, which would not be able to happen without consequently 
causing one hundred thousand ecus of consumption expenditures.20
Bolsgullbert understood that Investment spending created in­
come and employment. But he also realized that all saving did not flow 
immediately into investment. With reference to saving and not invest­
ing during a period of deflation, he said:
And what is said of the merchant is equally true of all persons 
who live on their (property) incomes, should it be from landed 
estates or invested funds.' Receiving their returns, they are 
not able to reinvest them for lack of security, because the 
most ordinary affectations being over the lands, the product 
of them diminishes every day before our eyes, due to the 
destruction of consumption. Also, they would rather lose 
the interest than risk the capital, retrenching to incur less 
expense, which is an Increase of disaster for the body of the 
republic.21
Even during better times, the rich, "dealing only in large affairs, 
wait long periods of time for their sum to be furnished. . .before 
sending forth their money, which is always prejudicial to the state,
. . .All of which shows what an interest a country has that its in­
habitants should not be in an obligation to spend less money than they
20Plssertatlon, pp. Uoi, Uce,
21Petall, p. 199,
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receive
In this manner, Boisguilbert promulgated a theory of income 
determination in terms of money flows. And thus in the broad contours 
of the developnent of the history of economic thought, he anticipated 
Keynes in great detail with reference to the doctrine of effective 
demand.
For Boisguilbert, both recurring crises and secular stagnation, 
which hod plagued France for so long, were the result of a failure of 
consumption. His explanation of the business cycle was not only unique 
but also ingenious at the time it was formulated. Bie theory appears 
in his Traite' des grains and briefly runs as follows:
The farmer, because of strong competitive price forces, must 
sell his wheat on the market at whatever price it would demand. In 
years of good crops, the price would be low because of the great sup­
ply. It was common for the price to be so low that the ordinary costB 
of production; that is, the costs of maintaining his family and paying 
his rent, could not be covered. This, of course, resulted in definite 
losses for the farmer. The immediate effect of this was a reduction 
in consumption on the part of the farm family. But that was not all.
His expenditures for such items as seed, fertilizer, and labor would 
decline. Under these conditions the farmer had two avenues open to 
him. First, he could leave the farm and seek employment elsewhere. 
Second, he could try to get his landlord to postpone the rent payments 
or to waive them entirely. Which course the farmer selects to follow 
is more or less immaterial. The significant factor is that the landlord
g2Ibld., p. 20e.
experiences a decrease in his lhccrae regardless of what course the 
farmer takes. This causes the landlord to reduce his demand for 
goods of all types. However/ his expenditures for luxury items will 
decline first. The effect of this is to reduce the income of the 
men who produce these goods. Then, they buy less of everything, 
particularly consumer goods. The final effect is that all those 
engaged in supplying consumer goods will suffer a decline in money 
income and this will be reflected by a drop in demand all around 
the place.There is a general reduction in purchasing power through­
out the economy. Of course, the decline in consumption has an adverse 
effect on investment. And this further reduces national income.
Thus,- frcm low grain prices there Btems "the ruin of the farmers 
of the lands, which entrainB that of their masters and of their credi­
tors, by a gradation that extends infinitely, and which owes all its
2bprinciple to the cessation of consumption." This may be classified 
as an agricultural-underconsumption theory. The crisis originates in 
agriculture and spreads throughout the economy through the factor of 
consumption.
The depression continues until grain prices start rising.
This inflation of farm prices resultBfrom a diminished supply. Be­
cause of the depressed prices of gjrain farmers abandon the land in 
large numbers. Furthermore, those who remain on the land are forced 
to use poor cultivation methods such as eliminating manure and tillage. 
Finally, supply will fall below demand at current prices, particularly
^^Boisguilbert, Tralte des grainB, pp. 333, 33^. 
^^Detail, p. 191-
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if a drought or plant disease causes output to be far below normal.
The rising prices will encourage reentry Into farming and Improved
25cultivation methods. Thus the cycle starts over again,
Bolsgullbert had a positive program which he believed would
eliminate the business cycle. His basic contention was that grain
prices must be stabilized. To accomplish this, he designed a pro- .
gram which called for the abolition of the mercantlllstlc policy of
prohibiting the export of grains. He was convinced that grain prices
and production could be partly stabilized by following a policy of
free export of grainB. And this stabilization would cause an Increase
In the production of grains and a better distribution of Income, nils
second effect would Increase mass consumption. But he did not place
complete reliance upon the free export policy. His program also called
for government price supports on grains, "to sustain the price which
26
grain has once contracted."
But Boisguilbert*s major reform was directed at secular stag­
nation. Ab we should now expect, he found the cause of the secular 
decline In national income to be the result of a deficiency in ef­
fective (consumer) demand. This failure of demand resulted directly 
from the French tax system. Certain types of taxes prohibited con­
sumption, while others made consumption Impossible.
Consumption has ceased because It has beccme absolutely 
prohibited and absolutely Impossible. It Is prohibited 
by the uncertainty of the Tallle, which, being entirely 
arbitrary, has no more certain Incidence than to be paid
^ Traite des grains, pp. 3^6, 3^7.
26Ibid., p. 369.
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hi^ier the more one is poor, and the more value is assigned 
to property owned hy defenseless persons. . .Finally, con­
sumption has become impossible by reason of the Aides and 
the Douanes on the exports and internal movements of the 
kingdom, which have put all the commodities at a point that 
not only are they transported outside no more than a quarter 
of what they were before, but they perish in the very places 
where they are produced, while in other places quite nearby 
they are valued at an exorbitant price.2?
Boisguilbert’s program called for a tax system that would not 
seriously reduce the nation's power to consume. He believed that 
taxes should be certain and not arbitrary and that they should be
pQ
easy to collect. He also argued that taxes should be universal and
levied in proportion to ability to pay.29
He argued that no person should be left off the tax rolls for
any reason. Nobles, clergy, officials, and other influential people
must pay their share of the tax burden. "And when God commanded to
pay tributes to the princes," he said, "He pretended to speak to
everyone, and not to the wretched and defenseless only, who would be
30
unable to exempt themselves from them." Moreover, taxes should be 
levied on the principle of ability to pay. "For tributes, like all 
sorts of debts, draw their quality of excessiveness or moderateness, 
not from the absolute amount of the sums demanded, but frcm the value 
of the property frcm which they are exacted."31
Boisguilbert did not diBcuss taxation in terms of progressive 
rates, but he certainly did imply that progressive taxation would aid 
in the economic welfare of France. For example, he said, "It is
27Petall, p. 172.
28Ibid.t p. 212. 29Ibjd., p. 208. 3°Ibid.
3lSupplement, p. 2^6.
68
certain that an Individual who pays 100 francs of Taille on a farm of 
1,000 llvres, would he far less charged In paying 200, If the farm 
could return 2,000 livres." He also pointed out that, "If then the 
rich understood their interests, they would entirely discharge the 
wretched of their taxes, which would form Immediately so many opulent 
people; and this, being Impossible without a great increase in con­
sumption, which spreads over all the mass of a state, would repay the 
rich three times their first advances."33
These were the general principles of Boisguilbert's reform pro­
gram. He hoped to prevent recurring crises by stabilizing grain prices 
and he believed that the secular decline in the national income of 
France could be halted by abolishing certain sections of the tax sys­
tem and reforming others. Underlying the entire program was hie firm 
conviction that the purchasing power of the "little" people of France 
had to be protected in the interest of national economic welfare.
For BoiBguilbert, just as it was to be for Keynes over two 
hundred yearB later, effective demand was the dynamic factor in de­
termining the level of national income and employment.
Bernard Mandevllle
Bernard Mandevllle, a Dutch immigrant to England, was neither 
an economist nor a philosopher but a doctor with considerable phil­
osophical talent. There seems to be no exact certainty about the 
date of his birth, but most writers estimate it to have been In 1670;
32Petail, p. 206.
^Dissertation, p. U02.
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he died in 1731.
Many writers in the area of economic theory and its history 
refer to Mandeville as a precursor of Adam Smith. They point out 
that the Fable of the Bees, published in 1711*, has pointed suggestions 
regarding self-interest and division of labor. It is true that 
Mandeville did clearly express the concept of division of labor and 
Illustrated the idea by showing how watches and clocks were produced. 
According to Haney, Mandeville was perhaps the first to use the words 
"divided" and "division" in this connection.31*
But the concern with Mandeville here is not in relation to 
Smith. He is examined in terms of his contribution to the doc­
trine of effective demand. Mandeville's work at first consisted of 
a poem of U00 lines entitled "The Grumbling Hive: or Knaves Turn'd
Honest," which was published as a pamphlet in 1705. Ih 171^ the 
poem was reprinted and accompanying it was a much greater amount of 
prose than appeared in the first edition. The 17lU product was called 
The Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices, Public Benefits; with an 
Essay an Charity and Charity Schools and a Search into the Nature of 
Society. Finally in 1729, Mandeville added a second part, nearly as 
large as the first, which consisted of a dialogue on the subject. The 
"grumbling hive," which was in reality a characterization of a human 
society, was described in the poem as prospering greatly so long as it 
was full of vice:
The worst of all the multitude
3^Lewis H. Haney, History of Economic Thought, Revised ed. 
(New York:’ The Macmillan Co., 19337, p. 19^.
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Did something for the common good.
This was the state's craft, that maintain'd 
The whole, of which each part complain'd:
This, as In muslck harmony,
Made jarrlngs In the main agree;
Parties directly opposite,
Assist each oth'r, as 'twere for spight;
And temp'ranee with sobriety 
Serve drunkenness and gluttony.
The root of evil, avarice,
That damn'd ill-natur'd baneful vice,
Was slave prodigality,
That noble sin; whilst luxury 
Bnploy'd a million of the poor,
And odious pride a million more:
Envy itself and vanity 
Were ministers of industry;
Their darling folly, fickleness 
In diet, furniture, and dress,
That strange rldic'lous vice, was made 
The very wheel that turn'd the trade.
Their laws and cloathe were equally 
Objects of mutability;
For what was well done for a time,
In half a year became a crime;
Yet whilst they altered thus their laws,
Still finding and correcting flaws,
They mended by inconstancy
Faults which no prudence could forsee.
Thus vice nursed Ingenuity,
Which join'd with time and industry,
Had carry'd life's conveniencies,
It's real pleasures, comforts, ease,
To such a height, the very poor 
Lived better than the rich before;
And nothing could be added m o r e . 35
The bees, however, were not happy living under these conditions
and grumbled so much that Jove abolished fraud from the hive. The bee
community became honest, frugal, and virtuous. The result was a great
reduction in expenditure which ruined trade and commerce. In his
"search Into the Nature of Society," Mandeville concluded:
^Quoted in Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New York: Random 
House, 1937), Editors Jhtroduction, pp. lii, liii, cited from Fable 
of the Bees, pp. 11, 13 in the ed. of 1705.
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After this I flatter myself to have demonstrated that 
neither the friendly qualities and kind affections that 
are natural to man, nor the real virtues he Is capable of 
acquiring by reason and self-denial, are the foundation of 
society: but that what we call evil In the world, moral
as well as natural, Is the grand principle that makes us 
sociable creatures, the solid basis, the life and support 
of all trades and employments without exception: that there
we must look for the true origin of all arts and sciences, 
and that the moment evil ceases the society must be spoiled,
If not totally dissolved.36
In a letter dated August 10, 1723, to the London Journal, Mandeville 
said, "That on the multiplicity of those wants depended all those 
mutual services which the Individual members of a society pay to 
each other: and that consequently, the greater variety there was of
wants, the larger number of Individuals raieJvt find their private In­
terest in labouring for the good of others, and united together, com- 
37pose one body.” In this one statement one finds expressed the prin­
ciples of aggregate demand, self-interest, division of labor, and the 
idea that one person's spending Is another person's Income.
Keynes believed that it was Mandeville's work more than any 
other that popularized the Idea that spending was a virtue and fru­
gality was a vice. He refers to the Fable of the Bees as a work 
"which stands out In the history of the moral sciences for its scan­
dalous reputation,” and mentions the fact that the book was "convicted 
as a nuisance by the grand jury of Middlesex In 1723.'
According to Keynes, "The text of the Fable of the Bees is an
Qu o t e d  In Ibid., p. 1111, cited from Ibid., pp. 1*27, 1*28 in 
2nd ed., 1723.
37Quoted In Ibid., pp. 1111, liv, cited frcm Ibid., p. 1*65 in 
ed. of 172k.
^ General Theory, p. 359.
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allegorical poem--'The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves turned honest,' in
vhich is set forth the appalling plight of a prosperous community in
which all the citizens suddenly take it into their heads to abandon
luxurious living, and the State to cut down armaments, in the interests
of Saving."39 Then he quoted the following parts of the poem:
No Honour now could be content,
To live and owe for what was spent,
Liv'ries in Broker's shops are hung;
They part with Coaches for a song;
Sell stately Horses by whole sets;
• And Country-Houses to pay debts.
Vain cost is shunn'd as moral Fraud;
They have no Forces kept Abroad;
Laugh at th1 Esteem of Foreigners,
And empty Glory got by Wars;
They fight, but for their Country's sake,
When Right or Liberty's at Stake.
"The haughty Chloe"
Contracts th' expensive Bill of Fare,
And wears her strong Suit a whole Year.
"And what is the result?— "
Now mind the glorious Hive, and see 
How Honesty and Trade agree:
The Shew is gone, it thine apace;
And looks with quite another Face,
For 'twas not only they that went,
By wham vast sums were yearly spent;
But Multitudes that lived on them,
Were daily forc'd to do the same.
In vain to other Trades they'd fly;
All were o'er-stocked accordingly.
The price of Land and Houses falls;
Mirac'lous Palaces whose Walls,
Like those of Thebes, were rais'd by Play 
Are to be let. . .
The Building Trade is quite destroy'd 
Artificers are not employ'd;
No limner for his Art is fam'd,
Stone-cutters, Carvers are not nam'd.
39Ibid., p. 360.
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"So 'The Moral' Is;"
Bare Virtue can't make Nations live 
In Splendour. Ihey that would revive 
A Golden Age, must be as free,
For Acorns as for Honesty. **0
In Keynes' view, "Two extracts from the commentary which
follows the allegory will show that the above was not without a
1*1
theoretical basis:" He quotes from Mandeville:
As this prudent economy, which some people call Saving,
Is In private families the most certain method to Increase 
an estate, so seme imagine that, whether a country be barren 
or fruitful, the same method If generally pursued (which 
they think practicable) will have the same effect upon a 
whole nation, and that, for example, the English mlffrt be 
much richer than they are, If .they would be as frugal, as 
some of their neighbors. Bils, I think, is an error. 2
"On the contrary, Mandeville concludes:"
Ihe great art to make a nation happy, and what we call 
flourishing, consists in giving everybody an opportunity 
of being employed; which to compass, let a Government's 
first care be to promote as great a variety of Manufactures, 
Arts and Handicrafts as human wit can invent; and the second 
to encourage Agriculture and Fishery In all their branches, 
that the whole Earth may be forced to exert Itself as well 
as Man. It is from this Policy and not from the trifling 
regulations of LavlshneBS . and Frugality that the greatness 
and felicity of Nations must be expected; for let the value 
of Gold and Sliver rise or fall, the enjoyment of all So­
cieties will ever depend upon the Fruits of the Earth and 
the Labour of the People; both which joined together aro 
a more certain, a more inexhaustible and a more real Treasure 
than the Gold of Brazil or the Silver of Potosl. 3
One could probably pursue the whole of economic literature
frcm Mandeville to the present and not find a more exact expression of
Keynes' theory of spending and his concept of the role the government
should play in maintaining full employment.
^°Ibld., pp. 360, 361. ^Ibld., p. 361. ^ Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 361, 3.62.
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After paying tribute to the several vriters who had concerned
themselves with the problem of effective demand, Keynes said;
No wander that such wicked sentiments called down the 
opprobrium of two centuries of moralists and economists 
who felt much more virtuous In possession of their austere 
doctrine that no sound remedy was discoverable except In 
the utmost of thrift and economy both by the Individual 
and by the state. Petty's "entertainments, magnificent 
shews, triumphal arches, etc." gave place to the penny- 
wlsdom of Gladstonian finance and to a state system which 
"could not afford" hospitals, open spaces, noble buildings, 
even the preservation of its ancient monuments, far less 
the splendours of music and the drama, all of which were 
consigned to the private charity or magnanimity of Im­
provident individuals.^
According to Keynes, "the doctrine did not reappear in respectable
circles for another century, until in the later phase of Malthus
the notion of the insufficiency of effective demand takes a definite
place as a scientific explanation of unemployment."^ Keynes did
not mention Sir James Steuart or Lord Lauderdale.
Sir James Steuart
The relationship of the economics of Keynes to the Mercantil- 
istic thought of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries Is well 
known. Keynes himself pointed to it. ° He said much in praise and in 
defense of mercantilistic theory and policy and against arguments pre­
sented by its classical critics.
However, it would not advance the purpose of this study to 
investigate in detail the relationship between the Mercantilistic-
^ Ibid., p. 362. Ibid.
^ Ibid., p. 333 ff. For Keynes' formulation of the main con­
clusion of the Mercantilists, see Ibid., pp. 336, 338, 3^0. Keynes 
seemed to assume that Mercantilism can be used to support his ideas, 
especially regarding the stimulation of business activity.
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h7Keynesian theories of employment. But it is necessary to show that 
the theory of Mercantilism--at least in the writing of one who em­
braced that doctrine--contained the concept of effective demand.
Sir James Steuart (1712-1780) is generally regarded as the 
"last of the mercantilists." He was not only the last but possibly 
the ablest of the eighteenth century writers before Smith. .His two- 
volume work, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, 
published in 1767, was a systematic study, but it attracted little 
attention. Although the book appeared only nine years before the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith ignored it.
Steuart clearly anticipated Malthus in the significance as 
well as in the statement of effective demand. His thought is con­
tained in the following statements:
It is the effectual demand, as I may call it, which 
makes the husbandman labour for the sake of the equiva­
lent. Hie demander must have an equivalent to give; it 
is this equivalent which is the spring of the whole ma­
chine. Every transition of money from hand to hand for 
a valuable consideration Implies some service done, some­
thing wrought by man, or some consumption of something 
produced by his labour. The quicker, therefore, the cir­
culation of money is in any country, the more strongly 
may it be inferred that its inhabitants are laborious.
This doctrine of the equivalent was the central theme in his Inquiry.
My principal point in view is, to find out a method for 
enabling those to buy who at present cannot, because 
they can give no equivalent. **9
^7por a discussion of the relationship between John Law and 
Keynes with reference to "easy-maney", Bee Albert Hahn, The Economics 
of Illusion (New York: Squier Publishing Co., 19^9), PP. 108-114.
^®Steuart, oj>. cit., I, p. 21*-.
^Ibid., p. 8.
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And he held it to he the duty of the statesman to maintain the cir­
culation of money If It appeared liable to stagnate, when the "pro­
pensity of the rich to consume" was not In proportion to the "dis­
position of the poor to be Industrious."5° ftiese were his only direct 
statements concerning effective demand. However, he treated the sub­
ject matter of the five books which made up his Inquiry— Population 
and Agriculture; Trade and Industry; Money and Coin; Credits and Debts;
and Taxes— in terms of the Importance of maintaining effective demand.
51
Since Steuart*8 public policy has already been discussed, it 
is sufficient to simply mention here that he endorced the traditional 
mercantilistlc policy that the government should develop a grand scheme 
of economic mobilization and frame the necessary laws and regulations 
to compel the citlzons of the country to do those things which the 
government believed to be conducive to national economic prosperity. 
There Is little, If any, difference between Steuart'a program of action 
and Keynes' program of socialized Investment and public manipulation 
of the interest rate. They both would involve a tremendous amount of 
governmental Interference In the economy.
Lord Lauderdale
Lord Lauderdale (1759-1838) has been recognized by many authors 
as having been one of the great minds In the history of economic theory. 
For example, Haney says, "Lauderdale's emphasis of consumption and de­
mand, and his shrewd observations on the effects of varying distribution
5°Ibld., p. 301. 
5-*See Supra, pp. 43,
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of wealth, are remarkable. He was far in advance of his contemporaries 
in these matters. In his discussion of accumulation and consumption, 
he may be dubbed the father of the overproduction idea."^2
Althou^it the emphasis in this chapter is upon the doctrine 
of effective demand and how it has developed, it would be doing 
Lauderdale a great injustice if his theory of the nature and origin 
of public wealth were not examined in sane detail. Primarily, this 
involves a presentation of his value theory which so clearly antici­
pated the commanded theory of Malthus, the Austrians, and Keynes. In 
other words, the commanded theory of value is an integral part of the 
doctrine of effective demand.
Lauderdale treats the subject of value and its measurement in
53Chapter One of his book. He begins by simply stating a refutation of 
Smith’s embodied labor theory of value.^ "The term Value," he said, 
"whatever might have been its original sense, as it is used in common 
language, does not express a quality inherent in any commodity. There 
is nothing which possesses a real, intrinsic, or invariable value. The 
possession of no quality, however important to the welfare of man, can 
confer value; for water, the' most necessary of all things, seldom pos­
sesses i t . T h u s ,  for Lauderdale, no embodied concept could explain
5%aney, o£. cit., p. 350.
53lord Lauderdale, An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of 
Public Wealth, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1819).
^Since the first edition of his bode appeared in 180*1, which 
antedated the works of Ricardo and Mill, Lauderdale aimed his criti­
cisms directly at Smith. Of course, Lauderdale’s argument may be used 
equally as well against Ricardo and Mill.
^Lauderdale, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.
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value.
For an item to have value, It must be "demanded" and It must 
be "scarce" relative to the demand. In Lauderdale's words, "To confer 
value, therefore, two things appear requisite: 1. That the commodity,
as being useful or dell$itful to man, should be an object of his de­
sire; 2. That It should exist In a degree of scarcity."-^
Concerning the manner by which the value of goods could vary, 
Lauderdale said:
With respect to the variations In value, of which every 
thing valuable Is susceptible, If we could for a moment 
suppose that any substance possessed Intrinsic and fixed 
value, so as to render an assumed quantity of it constantly, 
under all circumstances, of equal value; then the degree of 
value of all things, ascertained by such a fixed standard, 
would vary according to the proportion betwixt the quantity 
of them and the demand for them, and every commodity would,
of course, be subject to a variation lri Its value from four
different circumstances.
1. It would be subject to an increase of Its value, from a 
diminution of its quantity.
2. To a diminution of its value, from an augmentation of Its 
quantity.
3. It mi#it suffer an augmentation In Its value, from the 
circumstances of an Increased demand.
Its value ml&it be diminished, by a failure of demand.
But for Lauderdale, no good could possess fixed and intrinsic value;
hence, there was no commodity that could be used to measure the value
of economic goods. Thus, not only is value determined by demand and
supply, but also Its measurement Is calculated in the same manner.
The four circumstances Involving increases and decreases in demand
58
and supply express and measure the value of any given commodity.
Ums he said;
The value of every thing is so completely dependent upon
56Ibld., p. 11. 57Ibld., PP. 11, 12* 58Ibid., p. 13.
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the proportion betwixt the demand for it and the quantity of 
it, that the possession of no quality, whatever excellence 
it migjit add to a canmodity, could produce any material al­
teration in its value, if it did not affect either the de­
mand for it, or the quantity of it.59
And after giving several illustrations of this thesis;
Thus we may perceive, that the existence of value is 
perfectly independent of any inherent characteristic in the 
commodity itself; that there is no such thing as intrinsic 
value; and that alterations in the degrees of value are not 
dependent upon any change of quality, but always on seme 
change of proportion betwixt the quantity and the demand for 
a commodity;— a sure proof of which is, that we cannot ex­
press value, or a variation of value, without a comparison 
of two commodities; and every variation in the expression 
of value, must depend upon some alteration in the propor­
tion betwixt the quantity of and demand for, m e  or other 
of the commodities compared.
For example, if the price of grain is to be expressed 
in silver, it migjit vary, in consequence of the circumstance 
of the alteration of the proportion betwixt the quantity of 
the grain and the demand for it; it might also alter, in'con­
sequence of the variation betwixt the proportion of silver 
and the demand for it. It may happen, too, that alterations 
might take place in both those proportions; which must like­
wise generally produce a variation in the expression of 
value. For though it is possible that there should exist 
alterations in both, and that the relative proportion be­
twixt the quantity and demand for each should still be pre­
served, yet it is higity improbable, that, under such cir­
cumstances, this equilibrium should be maintained.
Lauderdale made a direct attack on Smith's labor theory of
value. He believed that Smith had "struggled most" to formulate
the concept that labor was the source of value. According to
Lauderdale, Smith made the mistake of believing that labor was a
constant value and hence could be used to measure the value of all
commodities. But, for Lauderdale, nothing had a constant value, least
of all labor.
59lbid., pp. 15, 16. ^°Ibld., pp. 19> 20.
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To those who understand any thing of the nature of value, 
or on what its variations depend, the existence of a perfect 
measure of value must at once appear Impossible: for as noth­
ing can be a real measure of magnitude and quantity, which is 
subject to variations in its own dimensions, so nothing can be 
a real measure of the value of other commodities, which is con­
stantly varying in its own value. But as there is nothing 
which is not subject to variations, both in its quantity and 
in the demand for it, there can be nothing which is not sub­
ject to alteration in value. *■
Lauderdale accused Smith of not using "reasoning" with reference to
Smith's statement that labor was the only commodity that did not vary
in value, and considered this as being "extraordinary because labour
is the thing most subject to variation in its valuo, and is, of course,
of all others that could have been selected, the worst calculated to
62
perform that duty." In support of this statement, Lauderdale used 
Smith's own arguments concerning the variation in the value of labor. 
Lauderdale argued that Smith demonstrated that labor was not only sub­
ject to all the forces causing a good to vary in value, but also that 
labor was the only commodity which possessed the "characteristic of
varying (in value) at the same time find place." Then he quotes at
61+great length from Smith to show that Smith had held that the value of 
labor could vary during the same year, during periods longer than a year, 
in different countries, and in different parts of the same country.
But Lauderdale was not throu^i. He said:
It is, indeed, most extraordinary, that the author of 
the Wealth of Nations should ever have considered labour 
as an accurate measure of value; for in Book II. Chap. iii. 
of his work, he treats of productive and unproductive labour, 
and therein announces an opinion, which forms one of the
6lIbidt, pp. 2k, 25. 6gIbld., p. 25. 63Ibld., p. 27.
^Ibid., see pp. 27-33 and 35.
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most striking features of his theory, that a great portion 
or description of labour is totally unproductive: yet it is
evident, that a proposition, holding forth a mathematical 
point as a measure of dimension, would not be more absurd , 
than proposing any thing unproductive as a measure of value. *
And he concluded this chapter of his book with the following remarks:
Great, therefore, as the authorities are who have regarded 
labour as a measure of value, and who by so doing have contra­
dicted that view of the nature of value which has been here 
given, it does not appear that labour forms any exception to 
the general rule, that nothing possesses real, fixed or in­
trinsic value; or that there is any solid reason for doubting 
the two general principles we have endeavoured to establish: —
1. That things are alone valuable in consequence of their 
uniting qualities, which make them the objects of man's de­
sire, with the circumstance of existing in a certain degree 
of scarcity.
2. That the degree of value which every commodity possesses, 
depends upon the proportion betwixt the quantity of it and 
the demand for it.°°
This was the beginning of the true commanded theory of value. Malthus
was to make it the core of his Principles. According to McCracken,
", . .Malthus and Lauderdale stood quite together on the problem of
effective demand, because they thought in terms of commanded value
instead of embodied value and feared the short-run evils which might
67come from maladjusted production and consumption." '
Lauderdale protested most vigorously against the received doc­
trine of his day that wealth and money were synonymous and that the 
wealth of a nation was the sum total of the wealth of the individuals 
in the nation. He said:
The terns we use, in talking of the wealth of a nation, 
or of the riches of individuals, are in all languages ex­
actly the same. They denote, that private riches are
65Ibid., pp. 33, 3^. 66Ibld., pp. 35, 36.
6?H. L. McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, 2nd ed, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 128.
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universally considered in no other ligvt than as a portion 
of national wealth. The sum total of the riches of those 
who form the community, is thus regarded as necessarily 
conveying an accurate statement of the wealth of a nation; 
and this idea has become so universally prevalent, that, 
even by philosophers, exchangeable value has been announced 
as the basis of wealth.°8
Biat public wealth, however, ought not to be considered as 
merely representing the sum of individual riches, is undoubted; 
and that much of obscurity, and even of error, has existed in 
economical reasoning from confounding them, will be made ap­
parent.^9
0
Later he says, "it is, however, impossible to subscribe to the idea,
that the sum-total of individual riches forms an accurate statement
of public wealth. Biougi the opinion has been universally prevalent,
it must be deemed false and unfounded by every man who considers the
subject, after having formed, and familiarized himself to, an accurate
and distinct opinion of the nature of value.
Lauderdale made a distinction between public wealth and private.
riches. The former he defined as "to consist of all that man desires,
as useful or delightful to him, and individual riches "to consist
of all that man desires as useful or delightful to him; which exists
72in a degree of scarcity."' Thus, scarcity was the factor which 
created a distinction between the two types of wealth. Scarcity 
was a fundamental characteristic of private wealth and essential 
to value, which was the measure of private wealth.
He contended that private wealth or riches changed as their 
demand and supply relationships changed, but public wealth was
^Lauderdale, og, cit., p. 6. ^Ibid., pp. 7, 8 .
^QIbld., p. In. See also pp. kl-52. Ibid., p# 57.
^Ibid., p. 58.
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dependent solely on its supply. And the relationship between public
and private wealth was Inverse: "In proportion as the riches of
Individuals are Increased by an augnentation of the value of any
commodity, the wealth of the society is generally diminished; and
In proportion as the mass of Individual riches is diminished, by
the diminution of the value of any commodity, its opulence is gen-
erally increased."78
Lauderdale was utterly convinced that Smith had made a grave
error in assuming that parsimony or individual savings was the chief
714-means of increasing the wealth of a nation.1 Biis, for Lauderdale, 
was a fallacy which, "if persisted in, must infallibly ruin the 
country that adopts or preserves it."7-* Quite the contrary, "a sud­
den demand for any consumable commodity, by increasing its value, 
encourages an augnented production, and tends, therefore, to in- 
crease wealth. . ." He contended that parsimony "does not augnent
opulence; it only changes the direction in which the labor of a com-
77munity is exerted."' But, parsimony in reality meant that a forgoing 
of consumption by the consumer, in turn, had its bad effects on so­
ciety. Dius, "the wealth of a society never can be increased by a 
system of continual parsimony, this abstinence from expenditure in 
consumable commodities, and consequent accumulation, may evidently 
be higxly injurious to its progress."7®
73Ibid., p. 1*9.
7USee Wealth of Nations, pp. 321, 322, 32**, 578, 632.
75Lauderdale, op. cit., p. 201. 7®Ibid., p. 213.
77Ibld., p. 210. 78Ibid., p. 215.
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Lauderdale was firm In his argument that the needs of the 
country should dictate the supply of capital. His main argument 
against parsimony was not against saving per se; It was against too 
much saving, because that would lead to an overproduction of capital. 
He held that labor and capital supplemented one another in the pro­
ductive process, and the real problem was to find new uses for both 
labor and capital which would result in the production of wealth.
The concept of too much saving has been a major principle in the 
underconsumption theory since Lauderdale. Furthermore, Lauderdale 
saw no logic in the argument that saving would result in more con­
sumption in the future by virtue of an increase in the quantity of 
capital. He was primarily concerned with the short-run and said:
. . .If the abstraction from expenditure of a sum equal 
to what is added to the capital of the community, causes a 
diminution of production to that extent; parsimony must be 
considered as a means of creating capital, at the expense 
of sacrificing a revenue as great as the capital created; 
and it does not appear, that a more ruinous operation in all 
its bearings can be devised, than that of disposing of an 
annual income, (for example, of a million,) for the purpose 
of acquiring a capital to the same amount.
If, indeed, the mercantile system of political economy 
has justly been deemed objectionable, and is now universally 
exploded, because it exclusively regarded money as wealth, 
the system that holds parsimony to be the great means of 
increasing wealth, seems equally objectionable, because it 
exclusively considers capital as wealth. The former system 
could alone be maintained by its followers teaching mankind, 
in estimating Ihe benefit derived from trade, to overlook, 
as a matter of indifference, the goods sacrificed to obtain 
money; whilst the latter can alone be maintained by its ad­
herents habituating mankind to show a similar indifference 
for revenue, by disregarding that diminution in the production 
of consumable commodities, which parsimony must inevitably 
create.79
Here Lauderdale expresses Keynes' concept that investment and
79Ibld., pp. 217, 218. See also pp. 3^-3^9.
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consumption are complementary activities and not in opposition with 
each other.
Finally, Lauderdale was quite aware of the relationship which
existed between the distribution and the production of goods.
. . .The distribution of wealth in all societies must 
ultimately regenerate the formation of wealth. . .The distri­
bution of wealth not only regulates and decides the channels 
in which the industry of every country is embarked, and, of 
course, the articles of production of which it excels; but 
a proper distribution of wealth insures the increase of opu­
lence, by sustaining a regular progressive demand in the 
home market, and still more effectually, by affording to 
those whose habits are likely to create a desire of sup­
planting labour, the power of executing it.80
With reference to the function of the government in relation to the
wealth of the country, Lauderdale believed that the surest way to
increase national wealth was to make public expenditures, and the
01
quickest way to decrease it was to accumulate a large sinking fund.
Urns, Lauderdale had the overproduction-underconsumption 
theory in every detail. Since capital accumulated, consumption hod 
to be maintained, else there would be an overproduction because of 
underconsumption. This called for the maintenance of a proper balance
g o
between saving and consumption.
One cannot fail to wonder what the course of economic theory 
and economic history would have been had the teachings of Lauderdale 
been followed. But, as is so well known, he, along with Malthus, was 
buried underneath the Ricardian avalanche. Die commanded theory of
8oIbld. pp. 311*, 31*9, 350. 8lIbid. See pp. 235-268.
®2For an excellent treatment Bee F. A. Fetter, "Lauderdale's 
Oversaving Theory," American Economic Review, XXXV, No. 3 (June, 19*1-5)•
86
value with its emphasis on demand lay virtually dormant until the 
Austrlans breathed new life Into It.
Thomas Malthus
Thomas Malthus (I766-I83U) was one of the first to challenge 
the doctrine that production automatically financed consumption; that 
with adequate supply, demand would care for Itself. Again, as with 
Lauderdale, the treatment of Malthus Is confined to his theory of 
value and his concepts relating to the doctrine of effective demand.
Since the discussion to follow Is In some respects a com­
parison between Malthus and Ricardo, It perhaps is Important to note 
one general and major difference between the theories of these two 
economists. Ricardo centered his attention primarily on long-run 
trends and long-run phenomena. Malthus, on the other hand, concen­
trated his analysis on the short-run period. By the short run Malthus 
meant a time period approximately the length of an ordinary business 
cycle. Malthus did not deny the existence of long-run trends, but 
he minimized their significance. He was of the opinion that what 
was likely to occur In the long run was of no particular significance 
because that time never arrived. In short, Malthus' position was 
that man lived in these short-run periods. It is Interesting to note 
that Keynes, a century later, expressed the same Idea when he said, 
“this long run Is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long 
run we are all dead. Economists set for themselves too easy, too 
useless a task If In tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that
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when the storm is long past the ocean Is flat again."83
Of course the great difference between Malthus and Ricardo and 
Smith with which we are primarily concerned was Malthus' substitution 
of the demand and supply principles for the cost (primarily labor) 
principles both in the analysis of value determination and in the 
explanation of the distributive shares. Ricardo and Smith dis­
tinguished between market and natural price, with market price de­
termined by the forces of supply and demand, and natural price 
determined by costs of production, primarily labor cost. In general, 
that was also true of their explanation of the distributive shares.
As a consequence, Ricardo, particularly, gave very little attention 
to demand. Malthus, on the other hand, held that costs of production 
affected value only as they affected supply and that demand was an 
equally active factor with supply in determining prices. Malthus 
always expressed the relationship between demand, supply, and price 
in very clear terms. For example, "When prices are said to be de­
termined by demand and supply, it is not meant that they are determined 
either by the demand alone, or by the supply alone, but by their rela- 
tlon to each other." And in more emphatic terms, he said, "If the
terms demand and supply be understood. . .there is no case of price,
whether temporary or permanent, which they will not determinej and 
in every instance of bargain and sale, it will be perfectly correct 
to say, that the prices of commodities will depend upon the relation
83j. M. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1923)7 P* 8o.
8**Thcmas Robert Malthus, Principles of Political Economy,
1st. ed. (London: J. Murray, 1920), p. 65.
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of the demand to the supply; or will vary as the demand (that Is,
85the money ready to be offered) directly, and the supply Inversely." J 
In analyzing the way in which cost of production affected value in 
regulating the supply of commodities, he recognized that labor cost 
had an effect upon price, yot at the time that exchange actually oc­
curred "no circumstance affects it but the relation of the supply to 
the demand." Since "all objects of human desire are obtained by the 
instrumentality of human exertion" it was necessary that labor be so 
remunerated in the value of objects given in exchange that the sup­
ply of the goods would be adequate, that goods would be supplied 
continually, and that there must be adequate materials as well as 
food .for the .laborer. These conditions must be met by every society 
in order that the greater number of its wants may be satisfied. The 
price of the commodities entering into exchange is therefore made up 
of "that which pays the labourer employed in its production; that 
which pays the profits of capital, . .and that which pays the rent of 
land, . .the price of each of these component parts being determined
exactly by the same causes as those which determine the price of the 
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whole." Adam Smith called this the "natural price," but Malthus 
chose to call it the "necessary price" because it more nearly expressed 
the importance of supply. He added, "It will be the price necessary,
in the actual circumstances of society, to bring the commodity regu-
flv
larly to the market." This, of course, was very similar to Alfred 
Marshall's "supply price" concept.
85lbid., p. 70. 86Ibid., p. 83. 87Ibid.
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Ricardo defined demand in such a way that it could not have
an effect on the equilibrium level of prices. For Ricardo, demand was
the quantity of a commodity purchased with no reference to price. Thus,
demand increased as a greater quantity of a ccmmodity was offered for
sale irrespective of price. Malthus, on the other hand, defined demand
in terms of the intensity of demand. By this he meant the will of the
purchasers to purchase plus their ability .to purchase. His definition
of demand corresponds quite closely with most definitions found in
elementary texbooks today. After presenting his concept of demand,
Malthus compares Ricardo's definition with his own;
Demand in this sense is obviously quite different from the 
sense in which Mr. Ricardo had before used the term. The 
one (Ricardo) is a demand in regard to extent, the increase 
of which implies a greater quantity of the ccmmodity pur­
chased; the other (Malthus) is demand in regard to inten­
sity, the increase of which implies the will and power to 
make a greater sacrifice in order to obtain the object 
wanted. It is in the latter sense, I think that the term 
is most frequently applied; at any rate, it is in this latter 
Bense alone that demand raises prices.®®
In a footnote to this statement Malthus pointed out that, "Of course 
it must often happen that an increased intensity of demand, and an 
increased extent of demand go together. In fact, an increased in­
tensity of demand, when not occasioned by an increased difficulty of
production, is the greatest encouragement to an increase of produce 
89and consumption.'' ^ Thus for Malthus, an increase in demand meant an 
increase in the intensity of demand and would be evidenced by an
®®Thomas Robert Malthus, Principles of Political Economy; 2nd. 
ed. 1836 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Inc., 1951), p7 557
®^Ibid. All future references are to this edition unless 
otherwise indicated.
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Increased quantity demanded at the same price. Ricardo would say that 
demand had increased when the quantity demanded had increased. Malthus 
would say, however, that demand had remained the same. An increase in
demand for Malthus would be represented by a complete shift in the de­
mand curve. And such an increase in demand would raise the price.
As to the determinants of the supply, Malthus held that supply 
was determined by the entrepreneur's costs of production. He in­
cluded all costs of production plus a normal return on investment.
Price, then, was determined by the forces of demand and supply at
the point of equilibrium.
In summary form, then, according to Malthus, the determinants 
of demand were: (1) the number of demanders, and (2 ) the number of
wants they had plus purchasing power. Costs of production deter­
mined supply, The forces of demand and supply determined both market 
and natural price. There must be a change in the relation of the 
demand to the supply to bring about a change in price, either natural 
or market price.
Malthus1 theory avoided all the pitfalls that Ricardo en­
countered in his labor cost theory. For example, Malthus w b b able to 
explain the value of all commodities with only one theory, whereas 
Ricardo was forced to distinguish between two different types of com­
modities. More important perhaps was the fact that Malthus' theory 
eliminated the problem of the varying organic composition of capital 
with which Ricardo grappled without much success. Furthermore, his 
theory enabled Malthus to give a much more realistic explanation of
90lbld., see pp. 70-73.
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profits, and the distributive shares in general, than Ricardo was able 
to accomplish with his embodied labor theory of value.
It may be stated once more that for Ricardo, the value of a 
good was derived from the labor required to produce it. 'thus, if 
more labor were used to produce a commodity its value would increase, 
but riches would not. An increase in value generally meant a de­
crease in riches, i.e., if more and more labor were required to pro­
duce a commodity its value increased, but the riches produced by the 
labor remained the same. In short, Ricardo concluded that in general 
value and riches varied inversely. Malthus contended that the wealth 
of a nation consisted of the want-satisfying powers of its production; 
that is, the use values of the commodities produced in the country.
Thus, Malthus differed from Ricardo's analysis of value and riches 
for two reasons. First, Malthus had a different concept of use 
value; and second, he had a different theory of value determination 
and value measurement.
With reference to use value, Malthus anticipated later theories 
because he had a psychological concept of utility; that is, the utility 
(use value) arose out of a relationship between the goods and human 
wants. And he had the concept of diminishing utility. The use value 
of a commodity per unit becomes less as its quantity increases. There­
fore, for Malthus, if wealth consisted of the want-satisfying powers 
of the production of the nation, value could not increase in proportion 
to the increase in physical output but in less than proportion. Malthus 
carried the analysis further. He pointed out that if goods should be 
produced in such quantities as to satisfy all wants for them, then, 
they would cease to have use value. Hence, Malthus disagreed with
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Ricardo that an increase in the physical quantity of goods was
91synonomous with an increase in use value.
Malthus also disagreed with Ricardo as to the measure of 
value. For Ricardo, value was measured by the quantity of embodied 
labor in the product. For Malthus, value was measured by the quanti­
ty of labor the ccmmodity could command in exchange. "The labour 
which a commodity will command is not the cause of its value, but 
it will appear in the next chapter to be the measure of it."^2 Hence, 
the value of a commodity increased if it commanded a greater quantity 
of labor in exchange irrespective of the quantity of labor required 
to produce it. How much labor a good would command in exchange de­
pended upon the wages of labor. Taking the standard-of-living theory 
of wages, any given quantity of wage goods would always command in 
exchange the same quantity of labor and hence would have the same 
value. That meant that an increased quantity would command in ex­
change more labor and would have as a consequence more exchange and 
use value. Thus, Malthus concluded that in fact use and exchange 
value generally varied directly rather than inversely as Ricardo 
maintained.
Ricardo contended that wealth increased if the quantity of 
goods were increased, Malthus pointed out that it was Impossible 
to determine when this occurred or to measure by how much wealth 
had increased in terms of output itself because the goods were
^ Ibid. See pp. 299-308 for Malthus' distinction between 
value and wealth.
^ Ibld., p. 83 note.
incommensurable in physical terms. For Malthus, the goods in a 
country at a given time vere of such an infinite variety that sum­
ming them up was an Impossibility. He believed the only way one 
could measure the wealth of a nation was by reducing all of the com­
modities to a common denominator. Thus, Malthus used the labor com­
mand theory of value as a common denominator as a means of wealth 
measurement. He maintained that there was a very close connection 
between value and wealth because it was value alone that stimulated 
the production of wealth. The existence of wealth was absolutely 
dependent upon the existence of value in the commodities that con­
stituted wealth. Thus, if one asserted that the wealth of a nation 
had increased, one could only mean that the value of the commodities 
that constituted the wealth had increased.
With this discussion of Malthus' theory of value as a basis, 
attention may now be directed to his ideas directly related to the 
doctrine of effective demand. This primarily takes the form of 
Malthus' criticism of the classical theory of capital formation.
All the classical economists prior to Malthus had made eco­
nomic progress depend exclusively upon capital accumulation. Smith had 
written that the nature and cause of a nation's wealth depended upon 
capital accumulation and the rate of the increase of wealth to depend 
upon the rate of accumulation. Althou^i he did not state it aB ex­
plicitly, Ricardo reached the same conclusion. This meant that the 
level of output and the level of real income depended upon the pro­
ductive capacity of the nation; that is upon conditions of supply. 
Productive capacity, in turn, bb Smith noted, depended upon the num­
ber in and the efficiency of the labor force; hence upon population
vhich itself depended upon the quantity of capital accumulated because 
it was capital that set labor in motion, and natural resources. Any 
increase in the quantity or efficiency of any one of these factors 
would result in an increase in output, an increase in total absolute 
real income, and an increase in the nation's wealth. But since natural 
resources were given, economic progress depended fundamentally upon 
capital accumulation. An increase in employment could result only 
from an increase in capital; hence, economic progress had depended 
upon an increase in the quantity and/or the efficiency of the factors 
of production and ultimately upon the capital accumulated; that is to 
say, upon conditions of supply, not upon the extent of the market for 
output and not upon the extent of demand.
For Ricardo, as for the other classical economists, there 
could never be a deficiency of markets in which output could be sold 
at profitable prices. This, of course, followed from Say's Law of 
markets. Hence, markets expanded along with supply; in fact, the 
expansion of markets was dependent upon an increase in the supply. 
Demand was dependent upon and was determined by supply.
It was precisely this principle that Malthus attacked in Book 
II of his Principles. He raised exactly the same question that had 
concerned Smith. What were the causes of the wealth of a nation?
But he arrived at a different answer from that of Smith and Ricardo.
He labeled the book "On the Progress of Wealth" and opened Chapter 
One, "There is scarcely any inquiry more curious, or, from its im­
portance, more worthy of attention, than that which traces the causes 
which practically check the progress of wealth in different countries,
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and stop it, or make it proceed very slowly, while the power of pro­
duction remains comparatively undiminished, or at least would furnish
go
the means of a great and abundant increase of produce and population."^ 
In this statement he made quite clear that he did not agree that the 
wealth of a nation depended on supply, on production. He considered, 
one after the other, the various causes of the wealth of a nation which 
his predecessors had listed.
Malthus raised the question: Does on increase in population
in itself cause an increase in the wealth of a nation? He said,
"Many writers have been of the opinion that an increase of population 
is the sole stimulus necessary to the increase of wealth, because 
population, being the great source of consumption, must in their 
opinion necessarily keep up the demand for an increase of produce,
oli
which will naturally be followed by a continued increase of supply.' ^
To this position, Malthus countered:
That a continued increase of population is a powerful and 
necessary element of increasing demand, will be most readily 
allowed; but that the increase of population alone, or, more 
properly speaking, the pressure of the population hard against 
the limits of subsistence, does not furnish an effective 
stimulus to the continued increase of wealth, is not only 
evident in theory, but is confirmed by universal experi­
ence. . .
But those who are acquainted with the nature of effec­
tual demand, will be fully aware that, where the rigxt of 
private property is established, and the wants of society 
are supplied by industry and barter, the deBire of any 
individual to possess the necessaries, conveniences and 
luxuries of life, however intense, will avail nothing 
towards their production, if there be no where a recipro­
cal demand for something which he possesses. A man whose 
only possession is his labour has, or has not, an effective 
demand for produce according as his labour is, or is not. 
in demand by those who have the disposal of produce. . .95
93ibid., p. 309. ^ Ibid., p. 311. 95ibid., pp. 311, 312.
96
And then:
To suppose a great and continued Increase of population 
Is to beg the question. We may as veil suppose at once an 
Increase of vealth; because such an Increase of population 
cannot take place without a proportionate or nearly pro­
portionate Increase of wealth. The question really Is, 
whether encouragements to population, or even the natural 
tendency of population to Increase beyond the funds des­
tined for Its maintenance, will, or will not, alone furnish 
an adequate stimulus to the Increase of wealth. And this 
question, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and 
many other countries In Europe, together with nearly the 
whole of Asia and Africa, and the greatest part of America, 
distinctly answer In the negative.96
Malthus believed that the wealth of a nation depended upon effective
demand. One must not only have the will to consume but also the
power. Entrepreneurs were Induced to produce not because people
wanted goods but because they were able to pay for them. People
were not b o m  with purchasing power.
Having disposed of the concept that population was responsible 
for the wealth of a nation, Malthus turned his attention to an Investi­
gation of the relationship between saving and capital accumulation with 
reference to Increasing the wealth of the nation. Because he always 
kept uppermost in his mind the issue of effective demand, Malthus 
wondered how all goods could be sold If production exceeded consumption 
and the difference was saved. For Malthus, this situation would In 
fact be a failure of demand, commodities would fall In value compared 
with labor, profits would decline, production would be reduced, and 
the result would be a general glut of the market. Malthus explained;
It has been thought by some very able writers, that 
although there may easily be a glut of particular
^ Ibld., pp. 313, 31^.
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commodities, there cannot possibly be a glut of commodities 
in general; because, according to their view of the subject, 
commodities being always exchanged for commodities one half 
will furnish a market for the other half, and production 
being thus the sole source of demand, an excess in the supply 
of one article merely proves a deficiency in the supply of 
some other, and a general excess is Impossible.97
Malthus denied the validity of this view;
This doctrine, however, as generally applied, appears 
to me to be utterly unfounded, and completely to contradict 
the great principles which regulate supply and demand.
It is by no means true, as a matter of fact, that com­
modities are always exchanged for commodities. An immense 
mass of commodities is exchanged directly, either for pro­
ductive labour, or personal services: and it is quite ob­
vious, that this mass of commodities, compared with the 
labour with which it is to be exchanged, may fall in value 
from a glut Just as any one commodity falls in value from ^  
an excess of supply, compared either with labour or money.
Malthus believed that Say, Ricardo, and Mill, in formulating 
the principle that "supply created itB own demand," had made three 
fundamental errors. "In the first place," Malthus said, "they have 
considered commodities as if they were so many mathematical figures, 
or arithmetical characters, the relations of which were to be com­
pared, instead of articles of consumption, which must of course be 
referred to the numbers and wants of the c o n s u m e r s . "99 For Malthus, 
this was neither logical nor realistic. He contended that:
If commodities were only to be compared and exchanged 
with each other, then indeed it would be true that, if 
they were all increased in their proper proportions to any 
extent, they would continue to bear among themselves the same 
relative value; but, if we compare them, as we certainly 
ougjvt to do, with the means of producing them, and with the 
numbers and wants of the consumers, then a great increase 
of produce with comparatively stationary numbers or with 
wants diminished by parsimony, must necessarily occasion 
a great fall of value estimated in labour, so that the same
97Ibid., p. 315. " ibid., pp. 315, 316. " ibid., pp. 316, 317.
98
produce, though it might have coBt the same quantity of 
labour as before, would no longer command the same quantity; 
and both the power of accumulation and the motive to accumu­
late would be strongly checked.10°
As a general principle, Ricardo held that it was Impossible for capital 
to be redundant. He allowed only one exception--and that a temporary 
one--to this principle. He admitted the possibility of general over­
production in one paragraph in his chapter cm the effects of accumu­
lation of capital on profits. If every capitalist should decide that 
there was no reason why he should live any better (consume more) than 
the laborer, and if all capitalists should reduce their consumption to 
the level of the laboring class, then, demand would bo so narrowly re­
stricted that the output could not be purchased. A general glut would 
result. "If men ceased to consume, they would cease to produce. This 
admission does not impugn the general principle."'1,0'1' Malthus quoted 
thiB paragraph from Ricardo and replied rather sharply:
It appears to me moat completely to Impuf^i the general 
principle. Even if we suppose with Mr. Ricardo, what is not 
true, than an increase of population would certainly remedy 
the evil; yet as from the nature of a population, an increase 
of labourers cannot be brought into the market, in consequence 
of a particular demand, till after the lapse of sixteen or 
eighteen years, and the conversion of revenue into capital 
by saving, may take place much more rapidly; a country is 
always liable to an increase in the quantity of the funds 
for the maintenance of labour faster than the increase of 
population. But if, whenever this occurs, there may be an 
universal glut of commodities, how can it be maintained, as 
a general position, that capital is never redundant; and 
that because commodities may retain the same relative values,
lOOlbid., p. 317.
101Ibld., p. 319. David Ricardo, Die Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation, Everyman's Library ed. (New York: E. P. Dutton
and Co. Inc., 19^8), pp. 19^> 195*
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102a glut can only be partial, not general? 
lhe central core of his argument here seems to be that whether the 
supply of a commodity creates the demand for another commodity de­
pended on whether or not the consumer wanted the good. If it is 
not wanted the mere production of it would not create a demand for 
any other good.
Ihe principle that supply creates its own demand involved 
the assumption that no one withholds goods or money from the market.
On this point, Malthus held that the process of saving reduced the 
demand for consumer goods; it reduced the ability of a given quantity 
of consumer goods to command other goods in exchange. If the income 
that has been saved were invested it was indeed a demand for capital 
goods, but the increased quantity of capital goods further increased 
the supply of consumer goods. Ihus, increased productive capacity 
as a result of capital accumulation may make it Impossible to use that 
capacity in production because the demand for the goods produced by 
that capacity may not be large enough to clear the markets. He also 
was of the opinion that Say's law was weak because people could hoard 
money. Money had functions other than its ability to serve as a medium 
of exchange. Since it could be hoarded, it was also a store of value. 
If individuals sought to make provision for future contingencies, 
there was no way to accomplish this more effectively than to hold 
money. In this, Malthus was stating what Keynes was to later call 
the "precautionary motive for liquidity."
Die second error Malthus found in the theory of Say, Ricardo,
^O^Malthus, op. cit., pp. 319* 320.
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and Mill was their assumption that human wants were insatiable. Uiey
did not take "into consideration the influence of so general and im-
103portant a principle in human nature, as indolence or love of ease." J 
Malthus contended that human wants were quite limited. Individuals 
would generally prefer more leisure than more goods beyond a certain 
level. Thus, beyond that level of consumption there would be no 
further demand for goods. This, of course, was a crude statement of 
the law of diminishing utility, and also it was an anticipation of the 
movement of the propensity to consume with changing levels of income. 
Demand, then, could be deficient for lack of desires. Malthus said:
It has. . .been said, that there is never an indisposition 
to consume, that the indisposition is to produce. Yet, what 
is the disposition of those’master manufacturers, and mer­
chants who produce very largely and consume sparingly? Is 
their will to purchase commodities for their consumption 
proportioned to their power? Does not the use which they 
make of their capital clearly show that their will is to 
produce, not to consume?!0*4-
The third error in the doctrine of capital accumulation, ac­
cording to Malthus, was the assumption that all of that part of income 
that was saved would be invested; that is, saving was automatically 
followed by investment. Malthus contended that this was a pointless 
and hence an impossible procedure, for in order that it be true, 
capitalists would have to be willing to invest at zero profits, or 
that the demand for output caning fran the laborers who were employed 
in the process of investment would have to be sufficient to induce the 
investment to be made, and this would require that their wages be suf­
ficient to enable them to buy the output that was produced by the
103Ibid., p. 320. 10^Ibld., p. 322.
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investment. Ibis, of course, was impossible. If they received the 
total value of the output there would be no profits. Malthus believed 
this to be "practically the most important of the three"^0^ errors.
In his words the error "consists in supposing that accumulation en­
sures demand; or that the consumption of the labourers employed by 
those whose object is to save, will create such an effectual demand
106for commodities bb to encourage a continued increase of produce."
He explained:
If, in the process of saving, all that was lost by the
capitalist was gained by the labourer, the check to the pro­
gress of wealth would be but temporary, as stated by Mr.
Ricardo; and the consequences need not be apprehended.
But if the conversion of revenue into capital pushed beyond 
a certain point must, by diminishing the effectual demand 
for produce, throw the labouring classes out of employment, 
it is obvious that the adoption of parsimonious habits be­
yond a certain point, may be accompanied by the most dis­
tressing effects at first, and by a marked depression of 
wealth and population afterwards.107
He went on to state:
What is wanted. . ., prior to the increase of capital 
and population, is an effectual demand for commodities, that 
is, a demand by those who are able and willing to pay an ade­
quate price for them. . .1°®
And he concluded;
Ihou$i it may be allowed therefore that the laws which 
regulate the increase of capital are not quite so distinct 
as those which regulate the increase of population, yet they 
are certainly Just of the same kind; and it is equally vain, 
with a view to the permanent increase of wealth, to continue 
converting revenue into capital, when there is no adequate 
demand for the products of such capital, as to continue en­
couraging marriage and the birth of children without a demand 
for labour and an increase of the funds for its maintenance.109
1°5Ibid. lo6Ibld. 107Ibid., p. 326. lo8Ibid., p. 328.
l°9lbld., p. 330.
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In brief, then, Malthus refuted the classical theory of capital 
accumulation by demonstrating the invalidity of Say's Law of Markets, 
and by destroying the classical assumptions that human wants were in­
satiable and that savings were automatically invested.
Malthus1 exact concept of the role of saving and hew it could' 
be accomplished without causing a reduction in value and wealth has 
been considered by many economists— particularly since Keynes--as 
a major contribution to economic theory. Malthus, as Keynes was to 
write a century later, held that savings must derive from an increase 
in production if the nation were to avoid a decline in value and 
wealth. It was perhaps at this point that Malthus reached the apex 
of his general aggregative approach in his analysis, and it was his 
concept of saving as related to capital formation that will forever 
link his economics to the idea system of Keynes. To be sure, there 
are other important similarities between the two idea systems, but 
the same concept of saving held by both economists is perhaps the 
most dramatic because it is so contrary to general economic orthodoxy. 
For Malthus, saving almost always occurred:
. . .in consequence of a previous increase in the value of 
the national revenue, in which case a saving may be effected, 
not only without any diminution of demand and consumption, 
but under an actual increase of demand, consumption and value 
during every part of the process. And it is in fact this 
previous increase in the value of the national revenue which 
both gives the great stimulus to accumulation,end makes that 
accumulation effective in the continued production of wealth.
And,
The fortune of a country, though necessarily made more slow,
13-°Malthus, o£. cit., pp. 365) 366.
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is made in the same vay as the fortunes of individuals in 
trade are generally made,--by savings, certainly; but by 
savings which are furnished from increased gains, and by 
no means involve a diminished expenditure on objects of 
luxury and enjoyment.111
In these statements, one finds perfectly expressed Keynes' concept 
that saving was a residual; that is, a function of the national in­
come and that it is production that creates savings rather than vice 
versa.
It is necessary now to consider what Malthus believed to be
the real causes of economic progress. Of course, supply was a basic
prerequisite for wealth, and "the three great causes most favourable
to production are, accumulation of capital, fertility of soil, and
1 TPinventions to save labour."
When Malthus• view on accumulation of capital was examined 
it was learned that effective demand was the pivot upon which capital 
formation turned. With reference to fertility of the soil, his argu­
ment was identical. The fertility of the soil created a potential for 
an increase in wealth, but whether or not that potentiality would be 
used depended upon the existence of adequate demand. Malthus* argu­
ment throughout was that mere productive capacity did not insure that 
the capacity would be used. Whether or not it would be depended upon 
effective demand. Productivity itself did not increase the effective 
demand. Here, of course, is Keynes' "under-employment" equilibrium 
concept developed to a very high degree. For Keynes, it was character­
istic of capitalism that the economy functioned at a level below full 
employment because of a deficiency of effective demand. According to
111Ibid., p. 367. 112Ibid., p. 360.
Malthus "Diou$i the land might he rich, it might not suit the pro­
duction of the materials most wanted." ^3 jje examined the conditions 
of poverty In Ireland and New Spain, despite the great fertility of 
the soil in those countries, and concluded the section on fertility 
of the soil with the following observations:
. . .the power of employing labour on the part of land­
holders may often exist to a much greater extent than the 
will;
. . .the necessity on the part of labourers of employing 
only a small portion of time in producing food does not 
always occasion the employment of a greater portion of 
time in procuring conveniences and luxuries;
. . .the deficiency of wealth in a fertile country may 
be more owing to want of demand than to want of capital;
. . .in general,. . .the fertility of the soil alone 
is not an adequate stimulus to the permanent increase of 
wealth.
In his discussion of inventions or technological progress,
Malthus held firmly to his idea of effective demand. To be sure, he
had the greatest respect for inventions of new machinery, but he said:
In the actual state of things. . .there are great advantages 
to be looked forward to, and little reason to apprehend any 
permanent evil frcm the increase of machinery. Die presunption 
always is, that it will lead to a great extension both of 
wealth and value. But still we must allow that the pre­
eminent advantages derived fran the substitution of machinery 
for manual labour, depended upon the extension of the market 
for the commodities produced, and the increased stimulus 
given to consumption; and that, without this extension of 
market and increase of consumption, they must be in' a con­
siderable degree diminished. Like the fertility of land, 
the invention of good machinery confers a prodigious power 
of production. But neither of these great powers can be 
called fully into action, if the situation and circumstances, 
or the habits and tastes of the society prevent the opening 
of a sufficient market, and an adequate increase of con­
sumption. 115
Diere were two points, however, in his analysis of inventions with
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reference to wealth creation, that deserve mention. Malthus1 ex­
planation of technological improvements In relation to production 
contained the concepts of elastic and Inelastic demand. To the 
knowledge of the writer, Malthus was the first to use the concept 
of elasticity. The effect a technological improvement would have 
depended upon the elasticity of the demand for the product. Malthus 
pointed out that the effect on aggregate employment and wealth de­
pended upon whether the demand for the commodity was elastic or in­
elastic. If the demand were elastic; that is, if the quantity 
demanded increased more than proportionately to the decrease in 
price, then it would be true that after the introduction of the im­
provement the aggregate value of the output would be greater. This, 
for Malthus, would be an increase in wealth and the volume of em­
ployment may be greater than it was before. He used the cotton 
industry as an illustration. Technological improvements brought 
about a great reduction in the price of cotton products, and since 
the demand for tho products was elastic, the aggregate employment 
and the aggregate value of the products increased. This would not 
occur, however, in the case of a product for which the demand was 
inelastic. The improvement would reduce its cost and its price, but 
the price would fall more than proportionately to the increase in 
the quantity demanded so that the aggregate value of the output would 
be less than it was before.
For Malthus, these three forces of production "all act in the 
same direction; and as they all tend to facilitate supply, without
ll6Ibid. See pp. 352-355.
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references to demand, it is not probable that they should either 
separately or conjointly afford an adequate stimulus to the contin­
ued increase of wealth."117 Wag necessary that there be "a union
of the powers of production with the means of distribution in order
liftto ensure a continued increase of w e a l t h . M a l t h u s  said:
We have seen that the powers of production, to whatever 
extent they may exist, are not alone sufficient to secure 
the creation of a proportionate degree of wealth. Some­
thing else seems to be necessary in order to call these 
powers fully into action. This is an effectual and unchecked 
demand for all that is produced. And what appears to con­
tribute most to the attainment of this object, is, such a 
distribution of produce, and such an adaptation of this pro­
duce to the wants of those who are to consume it, as con­
stantly to increase the exchangeable value of the whole 
mass.
In individual cases, the power of producing particular 
commodities is called into action, in proportion' to the in­
tensity of effectual demand for them; and the greatest stim­
ulus to their increase, independent of improved facilities 
of production, is a hi#i market price, or an increase of 
their exchangeable value, before a greater value of capital 
has been employed upon them.
In the same manner, the greatest stimulus to the con­
tinued production of commodities, taken altogether, is an 
increase in the exchangeable value of, the whole mass, before 
a greater value of capital has been employed upon them.11^
Always and everywhere, for Malthus, "General wealth, like particular
portions of it, will. . .follow effectual demand,"120
What precisely did Malthus mean by distribution? He said,
"It is that which effects the best adaptation of the supplies of
produce, both in quantity and quality, to the actual tastes and wants
of the consumers, and creates new tastes and wants by means of greater
facilities of intercourse .',XCJ- Malthus concerned himself with three
^ Tlbid., p. 360. ll8Ibid., p. 361. ll9Ibid.
lg0Ibid., p. 363. lglIbjd., p. 371.
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distributive factors: (1) Division of landed property, (2) Internal
and external commerce, and (3 ) The maintenance of unproductive consumers. 
These vere the factors, vhich in connection vith the factors of pro­
duction, determined the wealth of a nation.
Production and distribution are the two grand elements of 
wealth, which, combined in their due proportions, are capa­
ble of carrying the riches and population of the earth in 
no great length of time to the utmost limits of its possible 
resources; but which taken separately, or combined in undue 
proportions, produce only, after the lapse of many thousand 
years, the scanty riches and scanty population, which are at 
present scattered over the face of the g l o b e . 122
Let us examine briefly Malthus' three distributive factors. 
Malthus1 belief that a hi#i concentration of ownership of land was 
deterrent to the wealth of a nation was based directly on his con­
cept of effective demand. He noted that the consuming power of the 
landed gentry in England was restricted somewhat because of the rela­
tively hi$i degree of concentration of land ownership, and he care­
fully pointed out that a wider distribution of landed property would 
increase the consuming power of the class of landed proprietors. 
According to Malthus, "A very large proprietor, surrounded by very 
poor peasants, presents a distribution of property most unfavourable 
to effectual demand. Thirty or forty proprietors, with incomes 
answering to between one thousand and five thousand a year, would 
create a much more effectual demand for the necessaries, conveniences, 
and luxuries of life, than a single proprietor possessing a hundred
12-3
thousand a year." And he continued this underconsumption thesis by 
saying, "Practically it has always been found that the excessive wealth
^ Ibid. lg3xbid., pp. 373, 37^.
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of the few is in no respect equivalent, with regard to effectual demand,
12bto the more moderate wealth of the many."
In the final analysis, however, economic progress waB a matter 
of proportions. "It will be found, I believe, true that all the great 
results in political economy, respecting wealth, depend upon propor­
tions . He explained this in the following statements:
But thou$i it be true that the division of landed property, 
and the diffusion of manufacturing and mercantile capital to a 
certain extent, are of the utmost importance to the increase 
of wealth; yet it is equally true that, beyond a certain ex­
tent, they would impede the progress of wealth as much as they 
had before accelerated it. Hiere is a certain elevation at 
which the projectile will go the farthest: but if it be di­
rected either hi$ier or lower, it will fall short. With a 
comparatively small proportion of rich proprietors, who would 
prefer menial servants, retainers and territorial influence 
to an excessive quantity of manufactured and mercantile pro­
ducts, the power among capitalists of supplying the results 
of productive labour would be much greater than the will to 
consume them, and the progress of wealth would be chocked by 
the want of effectual demand. With an excessive proportion 
of small proprietors both of land and of capital, all great 
Improvements on the land, all great enterprlzes in commerce 
and manufactures, and most of the wonders described by Adam 
Smith, as resulting from the division of labour, would be 
at an end; and the progress of wealth would be checked by a 
failure in the powers of supply.
. . .there is no part of the whole subject, (political 
economy) where the efficacy of proportions in the production 
of wealth is so strikingly exemplified, as in the division 
of landed and other property; and where it is so very obvious 
that a division to a certain extent must be beneficial, and ~ 
beyond a certain extent prejudicial to the increase of wealth.
The second method of maintaining effective demand in relation 
to supply and thereby causing value and wealth to increase was through 
the extension of both internal and external commerce. Malthus' argu­
ment here was based upon his idea or assumption that human wants were
lgl|Ibid., p. 375. ^Ibld., p. 376. lg6Ibld., pp. 375, 376.
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satiable. For Malthus, commerce or trade always increased value be­
cause that good received in exchange must have greater value than the 
good surrendered in the exchange. If this were not true; that is, if 
both parties to an exchange did not gain, no trade would occur. Here 
again Malthus had a utility concept.
In the case of external commerce, he explained that if a nation 
did not secure from abroad certain goods, they would not be produced 
internally because the costs of production would be too great. Thus, 
less would be spent on consumption because of the satiation of human 
wants if a nation's population was entirely dependent on home pro­
duction.
With reference to his utility concept, Malthus said:
Every exchange which takes place in a country, effects 
a distribution of its produce better adapted to the wants 
of the society. It is with regard to both parties con­
cerned, an exchange of what is wanted less for what is 
wanted more, and must therefore raise the value of both 
the products.
If indeed it did not tend to increase the value of the 
national produce, it would not be carried on. It is out of 
this increase that the merchants concerned are paid; and if 
some London goods are not more valued in Glasgow than in 
London, and sane Glasgow goods more valued in London than 
in Glasgow, the merchants who exchange the articles in which 
these towns trade, would neither be doing themselves any 
good, nor any one else. . .The giving one article for another 
has nothing to do with effectual demand, unless the canmodity 
received so far exceeds In value the labour employed on the 
commodity parted with, as to yield adequate profits to the 
capitalists concerned, and to give them both the power and 
the will to set fresh labour to work in the Bame trade. 27
Malthus saw a direct relationship between capital formation and a
widening of the market. He stated in very emphatic terms:
^Ibld., pp. 382, 383, 38^ .
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No country with a very confined market, internal as veil as 
external, has ever been able to accumulate a large capital, 
because such a market prevents the formation of those wants 
and tastes, and that desire to consume, which are absolutely 
necessary to keep up the market prices of canmodities, and 
prevent the fall of profits. The distribution of commodities 
occasioned by internal trade is the first step towards any 
considerable increase of wealth and capital.328
The same conditions in a capitalistic economy that caused internal
trade to be necessary in order that a proper balance could be achieved
and maintained between supply and effective demand, or production and
consumption, also dictated that a nation engaged in external trade.
Thus:
The motives which urge individuals to engage in foreign com­
merce are precisely the Bame as those which load to the inter­
change of goods between the more distant parts of the same 
country, namely, a desire to increase or keep up the market 
prices of the local products; and the increase of profits 
thus made by the individual, or the prevention of that fall of 
profits which would have taken place if the capital had been 
employed at heme, must be considered as a comparative increase 
in the value of the national produce. ^ 9
Malthus was particularly eager for the reader to understand that foreign
commerce increased exchange value. He said:
It will readily be allowed that an increase in the quantity 
of commodities is one of the most desirable effects of foreign 
commerce; but I wish particularly to press on the attention of 
the reader that in almost all cases, another most important 
effect accompanies it, namely, an increase in the amount of 
exchangeable value. And that this latter effect is so neces­
sary, in order to create a continued stimulus to productive 
industry, and keep up an abundant supply of commodities, that 
in the few coses in which it does not take place, a stagnation 
in the demand for labour is immediately perceptible, and the 
progress of wealth is checked.130
Malthus * third and final method of increasing the value and 
wealth of a nation, and at the same time maintaining a proper balance
128Ibid., p. 388. 129Ibid., pp. 388, 389. 13°Ibld., p. 393.
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between production and consumption, was the maintenance of consumers 
who were unproductive. It is Important here to state Malthus* defi­
nition of wealth. He says, "I should define wealth to be the material 
objects, necessary, usoful, or agreeable to man, which are voluntarily 
appropriated by individuals or nations.production, then, was the 
creation of material goods for sale in the market. Those persons who 
produced personal services were unproductive.
Malthus believed that in a country which had great powers of 
production, there was a need for the existence of a group of consumers 
who did not participate in the productive process. This need was based 
primarily upon the fact that the productive groups in the econany did 
not appreciably increase their consumption, particularly during those 
periods when they were increasing their savings in order to form 
capital. But the matter of creating the proper proportion between 
productive and unproductive laborers presented a problem that political 
.economy could not solve. Tho correct proportion depended upon many 
circumstances, "particularly upon the fertility of the soil and the 
progress of invention in machinery. A fertile soil and an ingenious 
people can not only support without injury a considerable proportion 
of consumers not directly productive of material wealth, but may ab­
solutely require such a body of demanders, in ordor to give effect to 
the powers of production. While, with a poor soil and a people of 
little ingenuity, an attempt to support such a body would throw land 
out of cultivation, and lead infallibly to impoverishment and ruin."^32
Another important factor which caused difficulty in arriving
131aia., p. 33. 13gIbid., p. 399.
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at a proper proportion between productive and unproductive workers,
"is the difference in the degree of consumption which may prevail
133among the producers themselves."
Perhaps it will be said that there can be no occasion for 
unproductive consumers, if a consumption sufficient to keep 
up the value of the produce takes place among those who are 
engaged in production.
With regard to the capitalists wh'o are so engaged, they 
have certainly the power of consuming their profits, or the 
revenue which they make by the employment of their capitals; 
and if they were to consume it, with the exception of what 
could be beneficially added to their capitals, so as to pro­
vide in the best way both for an increased production and 
increased consumption, there mi^it be little occasion for 
unproductive consumers. But such consumption is not consis­
tent with the actual habits of the generality of capitalists. 
The great object of their lives is to save a fortune, both 
because it is their duty to make a provision for their fami­
lies, and because they cannot spend an income with so much 
comfort to themselves, while they are obliged perhaps to 
attend a counting-house for Beven or eigjit hours a day.*3*
Malthus contended that there were three factors necessary to make 
demand effective, namely, desire, purchasing power, and an incli­
nation to use it. If any one of these were absent from a given 
market at a given time, effective demand would not be present. For 
Malthus, then, the situation was clear. Many capitalists and master 
producers desired to save more than they desired to spend for con­
sumption purposes. They had the power but not the will to maintain 
effective demand. On the other hand, the moss of the population 
desired to spend for consumption rather than save. These people had 
the will but not the power to maintain effective demand. This situ­
ation caused supply and effective demand to become improperly balanced. 
The result was general overproduction and a decline in value and wealth.
133Ibld. 13^Ibld., pp. 399, *00.
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Thus, economic progress was hampered by the fact that the rich volun­
tarily refused to consume and the poor Involuntarily refused to consume. 
It was this situation that Malthus* unproductive consumers was supposed 
to remedy.
There must therefore be a considerable class of persons 
who have both the will and power to consume more material
wealth than they produce, or the mercantile classes could
not continue profitably to produce so much more than they 
consume. In this class the landlords no doubt stand pre­
eminent. . .^ -35
To the class Malthus would add menial servants, and public aervant'3 
such as statesmen, soldiers, Judges, lawyers, clergymen, teachers, 
etc.
Malthus believed that workers should be well paid because this
was not only important to the wealth of the nation, but also because
well-paid workmen created happiness for the mass of society. But he
sounded a warning. "But as a great increase of consumption among the
working classes must greatly increase the cost of production, it must
136lower profits, and diminish or destroy the motive to accumulate." -*
On the other hand, unproductive workers "are paid from revenue, not 
from capital. They have no tendency to increase cost and lower pro­
fits. On the contrary, while they leave the cost of production, as 
far as regards the quantities of labour required to obtain any par­
ticular commodities the same as before, they increase profits by oc­
casioning a more brisk demand for material products, as compared with 
the supply of them."^37
135jbid., p. hOO. See also p. ^Ok. ^ ^Ibjd., p. 1*05. 
137Ibid., pp. U08, U09.
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Malthua had positive ideas concerning public policy. With 
reference to a national public debt, he believed that a slow retire­
ment of it would be more beneficial to the country than paying it off 
quickly. He was a strong advocate of public works to rid the economy 
of unemployment. His tax program was closely related to his government 
sponsored work for the unemployed. Taxation should create a public 
fund to finance the public works. "In our endeavours," he said, "to 
assist the working classes in a period like the present (depression), 
it is desirable to employ them in unproductive labor, or at least in 
labor, the results of which do not come for sale into the murket, such 
as roads and public works."•L^ ® To the knowledge of the writer, Malthus 
was the first to state this idea in economic literature.
Malthus was never very specific concerning his attitude toward 
taxation. However, he did indicate strongly that heavy taxation might 
be necessary to maintain prosperity; that is to say, he was willing 
that a goodly portion of the national income be Bpent by the govern­
ment to support effective demand sufficiently higja to enhance economic 
progress.
Let. us briefly summarize Malthus' major points. The produc­
tivity of labor on the land set an ultimate limit to the increase of 
wealth. Wealth and value depended upon the extent of effective demand 
and not on the productivity of labor. A nation of fertile soil mlf$it 
still be a country of little wealth because of lack of markets for the 
output that could be produced on that fertile land. Population and 
technological improvements were important to supply tut had little
^^Malthus, (1st. ed.), op. cit., p. 395.
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relationship to effective demand. Proper distribution was necessary 
to create and maintain economic progress. Malthus argued that it was 
true that the laborers worked in order to make a living, but it was 
not true that capitalists invested for the sole purpose of making a 
living. The capitalists wanted more exchange values, not more use 
values. They wanted more capital and profits, not more goods for 
consumption. The disposition of the capitalist was not to consume, 
but to invest. Thus, whether they would invest or employ labor de­
pended upon the prospects of making profits and forming capital. 
Profits could be realized only if there were markets in which goods 
could be sold at prices that exceeded the entrepreneur's costs of 
production; that is, only if the extent of the effective demand for 
output was such that it would maintain prices above costs. If effec­
tive demand were not sufficient to accomplish this, the productive 
process ceased for lack of a motive. No matter how great the need 
for a good--poverty in the midst of plenty--the need itself did not 
constitute effective demand, and hence would not result in increased 
production.
It was very important to Malthus, in terms of effective demand, 
to understand the distribution of goods and money. Because producers 
had the power to consume but not the will; laborers had the will but 
not the power.
Malthus' general position was precisely the argument put forth 
by Keynes. They were in perfect agreement with reference to effective 
demand. They also agreed that the capitalistic economy operated in 
such a manner that it tended to make effective demand insufficient.
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They both refuted Say's Lav of Markets and the classical theory of 
capital formation. These have alvays been the tvo major pillars of 
the classical system. Had Malthus1 teachings been followed, the 
classical tradition perhaps would hove ended more than a century be­
fore Keynes attacked it. Both Malthus and Keynes held that money was 
more than a medium of exchange; it could be used as a store of value. 
Althou^i Keynes developed more fully the concept of expectations as 
one of the motivating forces for investment, this principle was defi­
nitely a part of Malthus| idea system. Malthus contended that the 
savings of the capitalist would be invested if the rate of profit 
were sufficiently attractive. Thus, over-saving was possible for 
Malthus just as with Keynes. Finally, they both embraced the com­
manded theory of value. On this point, McCracken says, "Without 
formal commitment or verbal definition Keynes consistently utilizes 
the commanded value concept. Even the purchasing power of gold is 
determined, not by cost of production or labor embodied, but, to 
some extent at least, by central banking policies. The embodied 
value theory of Ricardo cannot be fitted into his system of economic 
thought."^39 of course, this was the Keynes of A Treatise on Money. 
But Keynes indicated no change from this in his later writings, in­
cluding the General Theory. Thus it appears that Koynes vaB a true 
descendant of Malthus. "With respect to the importance of the 'short- 
run forces'. . .we observe that Keynes Joins the swelling ranks of 
those economists who insist that major attention, in the face of 
business instability, should be given to those short-run forces to
13^cCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, p. 177.
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lUOwhich Malthus alluded a century ago."
There is, of course, one major difference in the works of 
Malthus and Keynes. Keynes' criticism of the underconsumption theory, 
of which Malthus was a representative, was that it assumed that con­
sumption expenditures were an autonomous factor independent of the 
level of income and determining the level of income. Keynes' idea 
of consumption ran precisely to the contrary. For Keynes, con­
sumption was a dependent variable, depending on the level of income 
and not determining it; that is, the effect of income, not a cause.
The propensity to consume was a cause, for it determined how much 
income would be spent on consumption out of a given level of income. 
Thus, a variation- in the propensity to consume would cause a variation 
in income. Consumption would vary when and if incomo v a r i e d . T h i s  
however, is perhaps not of great importance when the complete idea 
systems of both men are considered. For example, Keynes said,"Thus 
our argument loads towards the conclusion that in contemporary
^llf, in fact, the level of employment and income depended 
upon the current level of consumption, then any saving would be depress­
ing on the economy, because whatever the current level of consumption 
may be, the economy obviously is equipped to produce that output and 
no additional capital goods are required. If out of current income 
any portion should be saved--not spent for consumption--demand would 
be inadequate to absorb current output of consumers' goods at current 
prices, and losses would be incurred by producers. The underconsumption 
theory, then, must necessarily find that any saving whatsoever is de­
pressive on the economy unless Bcme external factor can be found to 
offset the effect of saving. This was exactly the function performed 
by Malthus' unproductive consumers. Later underconsumptionists who 
have been unwilling to accept the concept of unproductive consumers 
have been forced to look for some other way out of this dilemma. For 
example, H. Gordon Hayes uses extraneous factors--opening of new ter­
ritories and markets, new inventions, etc.
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conditions the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the 
abstinence of the rich, as Is commonly supposed, is more likely to be 
impeded by it. One of the chief social justifications of great in- 
equality of wealth is therefore, removed."A This statement could 
have very well appeared in Malthus' Principles. It embodies the 
major principles of the doctrine of effective demand to which both 
men held so tenaciously. If the two idea systems are considered from 
this broad point of view, the fact that Malthus made consumption the 
dynamic factor of effective demand, whereas Keynes made new invest­
ment the dynamic factor of effective demand is of little Importance.
In the final analysis, what is significant is that they both assumed 
a capitalistic economy in their respective analyses. This was actually 
the fundamental "break" from Ricardian economics. Ricardo assumed a 
self-subsistence economy. Anyone who assumes the basic nature of the 
capitalistic process, must, if he is logical in his argument, arrive 
at much the same theoretical conclusions as did Malthus and Keynes. 
Perhaps it is this assumption that has set the "heretics" apart from 
the orthodox tradition for more than two hundred years, lhis is the 
link which has served to connect the "effective demand" theorists 
from Boisguilbert to Keynes. In short, the doctrine of effective 
demand based upon a true realization of the capitalistic process has 
been and continues to be the common denominator for these theorists.
In concluding the discussion of Malthus, it is proper to 
note the tribute paid to him by Keynes. He pointed out in the General 
Theory that Malthus used a deficiency of effective demand "as a
•^General Theory, p. 373.
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scientific explanation of unemployment. "Il+3 jie qUOtes passages
from two letters which Malthus wrote to Ricardo to support his state­
ment. Perhaps there is no better way to show the relationship be­
tween Malthus and Keynes than to quote these passages;
We see in almost every part of the world vast powers of 
production which are not put into action, and I explain this 
phenomenon by saying that from the want of a proper dis­
tribution of the actual produce adequate motives are not 
furnished to continue production. . .1 distinctly maintain 
that an attempt to accumulate very rapidly, which necessarily 
implies a considerable diminution of unproductive consumption, 
by greatly impairing the usual motives to production must 
prematurely check the progress of wealth. . .But if it be 
truo that an attempt to accumulate very rapidly will occasion 
such a division between labour and profits as almost to de­
stroy both the motive and the power of future accumulation 
and consequently the power of maintaining and employing an 
increasing population, must it not be acknowledged that such 
on attempt to accumulate, or that saving too much, may be 
really prejudicial to a country?1^
The question is whether this stagnation of capital, and 
subsequent stagnation in the demand for labour arising from 
increased production without an adequate proportion of un­
productive consumption on the part of the landlords and 
capitalists, could take place without prejudice to the country, 
without occasioning a less degree both of happiness and wealth 
than would have occurred if the unproductive consumption of 
the landlords and capitalists had been so proportioned to the 
natural surplus of the society as to have continued uninter­
rupted the motives to production, and prevented first an un­
natural demand for labour and then a necessary and sudden 
diminution of such demand. But if this be so, how can it be 
said with truth that parsimony, though it may be prejudicial 
to the producers, cannot be prejudicial to the statej or 
that an increase of unproductive consumption among landlords 
and capitalists may not sometimes be the proper remedy for 
a stete of things in which the motives to production fail.A ?
l43Ibld., p. 362.
• ^ Ibid., pp. 362, 363. Keynes cites; "A letter fran Malthus 
to Ricardo, dated July 7, 1821."
^ Ibld., p. 363. Keynes cites; "A letter from Malthus to 
Ricardo, dated July lo, 1821."
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Of course Keynes said nothing about unproductive consumers in his 
theory, but one must assume that he supported the doctrine in prin­
ciple. Furthermore, could it be that Keynes’ "make-work" programs 
was a twentieth century expression of Malthus' unproductive con­
sumers?
More to the point perhaps was the fact that Keynes quoted 
the following passages from Malthus' Principles:
Adam Smith has stated that capitals are increased by par­
simony, that every frugul man is a public benefactor, and 
that the increase of woalth depends upon the balance of pro­
duce above consumption. That these propositions are true 
to a great extent is perfectly unquestionable. . .But it is 
quite obvious that they are not true to an indefinite extent, 
and that the principles of saving, pushed to excess, would 
destroy the motive to production. .
Of all the opinions advanced by able and ingenious men, 
which I have ever met with, the opinion of M. Say, which 
states that, un produit consomme ou detruit est un debouche 
ferme' (I. i. ch. 15), appears to me to be the moot directly 
opposed to Just theory, and the most uniformly contradicted 
by experience. Yet it directly follows from the new doc­
trine, that commodities are to be considered only in their 
relation to each other,--not to the consumers. What, I would 
ask, would become of the demand for commodities, if all con­
sumption except bread and water were suspended for the next 
half-year? What an accumulation of commodities: Quels
debouches! What a prodigious market would this event oc- 
casion.'^T
One could not find better evidence to demonstrate the close relation­
ship between the theories of Malthus and Keynes. Perhaps H. Gordon 
Hayes, a current underconsumptionist, was guilty of a sli®it exag­
geration when he wrote, "Keynes was the first academic economist of
l^jbid., p. 363. Keynes cites; "Preface to Malthus's 
Principles of Political Economy, pp. 8, 9."
^ ^ Ibid., pp. 363, 36U. Keynes cites: "Malthus*s Principles
of Political Economy, p. 3&3> footnote."
121
high professional repute since Malthus to attack the doctrine that the
economic forces of a private-property economy tend to bring about the
1UA
employment of all who wish to work at the prevailing wage rates." 
Nevertheless, the statement is to the point discussed in this chapter 
and shows again the relationship between Malthus and Keynes. And it 
seems perfectly safe to state that Keynes believed it was he who rescued 
Malthus1 doctrine of effective demand from the economic "underworld,"^49 
Perhaps he did, but there were others who concerned themselves with 
effective demand at the time of or after Malthus and before Keynes.
The writers remaining to bo examined with reference to effec­
tive demand are Sismondi, Chalmers, Moffat, Hobson, Aftalion, and 
Foster and Cntchings. It will not be necessary to examine these 
authors as extensively a3 Malthus was treated. It was Malthus, fol­
lowing the rather faint trail left by Boisguilbert, Mandeville, Stcuart, 
and Lauderdale, who elevated the doctrine of effective demand to a 
high pinnacle. The writers to be discussed kept it there until a 
"Keynes" appeared to send it soaring even higher. To be sure, these 
econanist3 based their idea systems upon the concept of effective 
demand, but the idea did not dominate their thought as it did Malthus' 
theory. In fact, it is quite easy to demonstrate the attitude of 
these writers toward effective demand and its importance to economic 
activity by carefully selecting and quoting a few passages from each.
•^H. Gordon Hayes, Spending, Saving, and Employment (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 19^5), P. 133.
lJ|9one should read the essay on Malthus by Keynes in his Essays 
in Biography (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933)  ^ PP. 95-150.
On page l^k Keynes clearly shows that he thought Chapter I in Book II 
of Malthus' Principles was a neglected basis of what migit have been 
a better development of economic thought than what actually took place.
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This, the writer believes, is sufficient to show that there was a 
continuous development in the effective demand principle from Malthus 
to Keynes. This, along with the fact that each of these authors has 
been quite adequately examined by other writers, justifies the brief 
treatment of them here.
Jean Charles Sismondl
Sismondi (1773-I8k2) was a contemporary of Malthus. In fact,
two of his more Important works appeared before 1820, which was the
publication date of the first edition of Malthus' Principles. One of
Sismondi's first books, De la rlchesse commorclale, was published in
1803. His two-volume work, Nouvoauz prInclpos d'^conanle politique,
ou de la rlchesse dans seB rapports avec la population, first appeared
in 1819, and it came forth in a second edition in 1827. One of hiB 
/ *
latest works, Etudes sur 1'Economic politique, was published in 1838.
According to Schumpeter, "Sismondi's reputation as an economist
rests on his Nouveaux Principes d'oconcmlo politique. , .which appeared
in 1819. But we know that the essentials of this work had actually
been written by 1815 for an article that Sismondi contributed to
Brewster's Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, thou#i this article was not
published until after the Nouveaux Principes. By then--at the latest--
he was in possession of all the elements of doctrine that are associated
/ ✓
with his name. His later works, such as his Etudes sur l'Economie
politique, emphasized and developed the main points--and his claims--
150but do not add anything essentially new." ^
A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 195*0, P. ^93. See pages £93^96 and 7*+0-7^2
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Although Sismondi has been justly criticized by many able 
writers for his theory of economic crises, his reputation in the 
history of economic thou$it rests upon his concept of economic in­
stability. And this idea was based upon his thinking along the lines 
of overproduction as a result of underconsumption or Inadequate demand.
Sismondi first developed a theory of partial overproduction and then
151formulated his thesis of a general economic glut. ' Sismondi's theory 
of markets was his theory of crises, lhe cause of the crisis in eco­
nomic activity was the direct reault of inadequate consumption, which 
was the result of the poverty of the masses. The mass market simply
could not absorb the output of modern industry when it operated at 
152full capacity. This was the central theme of Sismondi's theory, 
and it characterizes all underconsumption theory.
Sismondi looked with nostalgic eyes back to the days when 
society was organized along rather primitive lines with each family 
regulating its own economic needs. In such a society, progress wus 
retarded but "wherever are found peasant proprietors are also found 
that ease, that security, that independence, that confidence in the 
future, which assure at the same time happiness and virtue. The
for Schumpeter'8 treatment of Sismondi.
A clear presentation and evaluation of Sismondi's idea system 
is to be found in McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 1^-36.
See also Tugan-Baranowsky's criticism of Sismondi in Alvin E. 
Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income (New York: W. W. Norton,
1951), P. 2&0.
•'■^ee McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 16-28.
^-^SiBmondi, Nouveaux Principes d 'economie politique, I (Paris; 
Delaunay, 2nd ed., 1827). See Hansen, op. cit., p. 280.
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peasant who, with his children, does all the work on his little in­
heritance. who neither pays rent to anyone above him, nor wages to 
anyone below him, who regulates his production by his consumption. . . 
care3 little about knowing the price of the market; for he has little
to sell and little to buy and is never ruined by the revolutions of 
153commerce. . ." But the Industrial Revolution had broufdit to an 
end this happy and stable society, lhe result of machine-capitalism 
was that:
lhe proletarii are cut off from all the benefits of civili­
zation; their food, their dwellings, their clothes are in­
salubrious; no relaxation, no pleasures except occasional 
excesses, interrupt their monotonous labours; the introduc­
tion of the wonders of mechanics into the arts, far from 
abridging their hours of labour, has prolonged them; no time 
is left for their own instruction or for the education of 
their children; no enjoyment is secured to them in those 
family ties which reflect their suffering; it is almost 
wise in them to degrade and brutalize themselves to escape 
from the feeling of their misery; and that social order 
which threatens them with a worse condition for the future, 
is regarded by them as an enemy to combat and destroy.
This is not all; whilst their own distress is increasing, 
they see society overcome, as it were, by the weight of 
its material opulence; they are in want of everything, and 
on all sides their eyes are struck with what is everywhere
superabounding.15^
The new industrial economy had greatly enhanced output, but 
the great mass of the workers did not share in this increase in pro­
ductivity. The capitalist received income in surplus amounts; the 
laborer received just enoufh for subsistence. The result of this
^3sismondi, Etudes sur les Sciences Sociales, II, pp. l69-l'70, 
or Political Economy and the Fhilosophy of Government, arranged and 
translated by M. Mifgrjet. See McCracken, Value Theory and Buslness 
Cycles, p. 15.
■^Sismondi, Political Economy and Philosophy, (Faris; Delaunay,
let?), p. 199.
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inequality in income distribution was that the mass of the population 
could not bring into the market effective demand above the absolute 
necessities of life. There was room in Sismondi's system for reason­
able profits, but not for exaggerated profits. In Bhort, a proper 
balance between profits and wages in order to maintain effective de­
mand for the output of Industry was Sismondi's solution to the problem.
In his attuck on Say's Law that supply created its own demand, 
Sismondi held that demand was independent of production and was a 
function of the needs of the buyers, and the moans by which they had 
to pay for goods, he virtually dismissed the concept of human needs 
as a determinant of demand und concentrated his argument on the lack 
of purchasing power on the part of the workers. This was the cause 
of overproduction and underconsumption. Sismondi believed that most 
of the men engaged in production were not able to exchange the pro­
ducts which their labor created for those goods which they desired.
The workers received only a small portion of the selling price in 
exchange for their labor--a portion all too small to permit them to 
absorb the entire supply of merchandise. The manufacturers compete 
with each other in placing upon the market a constantly increasing 
quantity of products. But the ability of the workers--who constitute 
the great bulk of the population--to buy is diminished. Demand con­
tracts to the degree that supply expands.
This raised an issue with which economists have wrestled 
throughout the history of modern capitalism. This issue has been 
and still is; Does it really make any difference how purchasing 
power is apportioned so long as enough is distributed to take off
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the market all the goods produced? lhe manner in which an economist 
answers this question Identifies him either on the side of Say's Law 
and Ricardian economics or on the side of commanded value and "hereti­
cal" economics. Needless to say, the writers being examined in this
chapter placed themselves on the side of the latter. Of course, this
vould also be true of the Austrians. Perhaps it has been this atti- •
tude, as much or more than anything else, that links together the
"heretics" from Boisguilbert to Keynes.
Sismondi's position with reference to this issue was very 
clear. In his analysis, overproduction could not be avoided,
because the objects of prime necessity, the chief objects 
of manufacture, are consumed to a very limited degree by 
the wealthy, lhe rich desire those expensive and rare 
things which single them out from among the crowd, i.e., 
objects of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous waste.
They encourage the industries de luxe, the industries which 
do not have a wide market and appeal to a restricted clien­
tele. As soon as any article is produced in abundance and 
is found to be consumed by the vulgar, it is no longer 
dignified for them. Therefore the rich will not permit 
an excess of supply from the industries de luxe, industries 
which they call exceptional. Hence, labor is always con­
centrated in those factories which create necessities for 
the masses, and overproduction results.
By an inherent contradiction in modem economic con­
ditions, while their great wealth push the wealthy to build 
vast factories, their riches also exclude the products of 
these very great factories from the consumption of the rich. 
Those who receive the selling price of the merchandise, 
those who benefit from fabrication, are not the same as 
those who consume them. The production thus goes on ac­
cumulating while consumption is restrained. Overproduction 
is a fatal effect of contemporaneous economic organisation. 25
Thus for Sismondi, economic crises were inevitable. They were a direct
result of the Industrial Revolution and the capitalistic system.
^■25siBmondi, Nouveaux Principes d'economic politique, I, p. 3^1.
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T. Chalmera, R. 5. Moffat, J. A. Hobson
lhe three men primarily responsible for keeping alive the 
doctrine of effective demand for the remainder of the nineteenth 
century were Thomas Chalmers, whose Folltical Economy was published 
in 1832; R. S. Moffat, who published lhe Economy of Consumption in 
1878; and J. A. Hobson, whose Physiology of Industry appeared in 
1689. Of these three, Keynes noticed only Hobson, but they fash­
ioned important links in the argument of the importance of effective 
demand.
Chalmers distinguished between capitalistic accumulation and
consumers' accumulation. "It is true of every single capitalist,"
he said, "that he i3 all the richer by saving than by spending. But
it is not true that capitalists collectively will become richer by
156
saving than by spending." Ibis was true, Chalmers believed, be­
cause the rate of profits was reduced by over-investment. But con­
sumers' accumulation by not spending accentuated the losses of capi­
talists. If consumers saved and did not buy, capitalists could not 
sell and make profits. Thus, savings resulted in a loss of effective 
demand, which caused production to fail. Chalmers basic thought was 
that, "Spending and trading mu6t be in due relation to each other,
or there will be general glut and depression. Ihose who say that
157
this cannot happen are called the 'new economists." J Chalmers was 
referring here, of course, to the new Ricardian school of economics.
•^Sihcmas Chalmers, Political Economy (London: William
Pickering, 1832), p. b2.
^ Ibid.
Moffat's argument was that consumption had not been given its 
due place, and that the distribution and habits of consumption were 
as important as the volume of production was to Smith. It was a 
fallacy to generalize saving as a way of increasing wealth; one per­
son may profitably save, but not all. "A general increase of parsimony 
would evidently diminish the demand for commodities, lessen the need 
for production, and reduce the amount of capital which could be held 
in organic relation to industry. lhe hoarding of the community is 
limited; the hoarding of the individual is practically not limited."^® 
For Moffat, capital accumulation was not made by saving out of con­
sumption. Industry itself formed capital on the basis of consumer 
buying; that is, it was consumer buying and not consumer saving that 
stimulated industry to accumulate capital. "Effective demand is the 
demand rendorod effective by industry itself. Abstinence itself gives 
no reward; the critical word is investment. In order that the profit 
motive may not gorge markets by over-investment, the buying power of 
labour must be maintained, in relation to its producing power."^59 
According to Hansen, "After reading Lauderdale and Malthus, 
one gains relatively little frcm Hobson's work. Hobson does indeed 
make clearer than his predecessors the role of growth--changes in 
technique and increase in population--in opening investment outlets.
But with respect to consumption, his treatment is less penetrating 
than that of Malthus. " ^ 0
^•58pe s t Moffat, lhe Economy of Consumption (London: Longnans
Green and Co., 1878), p. 36.
159xbid. ^^Jansen, og. cit., p. 255.
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Hobson repeated the proposition of Chalmers and Moffat that 
separate persons mi^vt save too much, while a community, or a Crusoe, 
would regulate saving. Every Increase in saving and capital, in 
order to be effective, required a corresponding increase in immediately 
future consumption. An increase in production did not force an in­
crease in consumption bocause people wished to save as well as to con­
sume. "lhe desire to save may lead them to increase their production 
independently beyond the desire for present or immediately future 
consumption.Ihere was enou#i income, according to Hobson, to 
buy all the product, and replace the capital, if all the final pro­
duct were consumed soon after production. But "depression and ex- 
cesaive thrift describe phases of the same phenomenon." ' Insufficient
demand falls especially, "by backward incidence, on the requisite of 
production which is, in any country, the limiting requisite, in least 
elastic supply. In Britain that requisite is labour, since capital 
can adjust itself, and the use of land depends on Import. So that the 
East End problem, with its concomitants of vice and misery, is traced 
to its economic cause, and this economic cause is the most respectable 
and hi^ily extolled virtue of thrift." ^ 3 
According to Hobson,
It is sometimes assumed that any proportion of the income 
of a community can advantageously be saved. But this is not 
the case. An industrial community cannot usefully save more 
than a certain proportion of its income: that proportion is
■^J. A. Hobson and A. F. Mummery, Physiology of Industry 
(London: Longmans Green and Co., 1889), p. 10. For an explanation
of why this book was written see General Theory, pp. 3^5> 3^6.
162Ibid., p. 13. l63Ibid., p. 17.
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never accurately known, and it is always shifting with changes 
In the arts of production and consumption. . .It Is only by 
taking the partial standpoint of an individual or a group of 
Individuals, or some other part of the industrial whole, that 
it seems plausible to hold that there is no limit to effi­
cacious saving. 161*
Then he concluded,
There exists at the present moment, a right proportion between 
saving and spending. . .Industrial progress, or the economi­
cal working of the industrial system, consists largely in the 
ascertainment of this proportion and the adjustment of industry 
to it. . .The right proportion of saving to spending at any 
given time depends upon the present condition of the arts of 
production and consumption, and the probabilities of such 
changes in modes of work or living as shall provide social 
utility for new forms of capital within the near or calculable 
future. The proportion of its income which could be saved 
for conversion into new forms of capital must depend upon 
the state of the industrial arts upon the one hand, and the 
standards of consumption upon the other. . .the increased 
demand for final commodities which a rising consumption of 
a growing population will create in the calculable future. 
Beyond these growth requirements, saving would defeat its 
purpose, creating more forms of capital than were wanted 
and than would actually be used.l°5
Hobson foresaw the propensity to consume concept when he wrote, 
"A greater equalization of incomes, either by the successful pressure 
of the workers for a larger share of wealth or by the taxation of 
'surplus1 for purposes of public expenditure” would increase demand 
and employment, and so "validate at least as large an absolute quan­
tity of saving as before, thoufpi a smaller proportion of saving to 
166spending.” Hobson had reference hero to what would now be called 
an upward shift in the propensity to consume or consumption function.
As was noted earlier, Keynes paid a great tribute to KobBon.
•^J. A. Hobson, The Industrial System (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., Rev. ed., 1910) p. 33.
l65lbid. 166Ibid., p. 39.
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It bears repeating here. "Theories of under-consumption hibernated 
until the appearance in I889 of The Physiology of Industry, the first 
and m03t significant of many volumes in which for nearly fifty years
Mr. Hobson has flung himself with unflagging, but almost unavailing,
ardour and courage against the ranks of orthodoxy. Thoutfi it is so 
completely forgotten to-day, the publication of this book marks, in 
a sense, an epoch in economic thought,"
Keynes, in six pages devoted to Hobson, quotes several pas­
sages from The Physiology of Industry, and explains what he believes 
to have been Hobson's major analytical error. Keynes says that, "In 
this early work Mr. Hobson with his collaborator expressed himself 
.with more direct reference to the classical economics (in which he 
had been brought up) than in his later writings; and for this reason,
as well as because it is the first expression of his theory, I will
quote from it to show how significant and well-founded were the 
authors' criticisms and intuitions. They point out in their preface 
as follows the nature of the conclusions which they attack:"
Saving enriches and spending impoverishes the community 
along with the individual, and it may be generally defined 
as an assertion that the effective love of money is the root 
of all economic good. Not merely does it enrich the thrifty 
individual himself, but it raises wages, gives work to the 
unemployed, and scatters blessings on every side. Fran the 
daily papers to the latest economic treatise, from the pulpit 
to the House of Commons, this conclusion is reiterated and 
re-stated till it appears positively impious to question it. 
Yet the educated world, supported by the majority of economic 
thinkers, up to the publication of Ricardo's work strenuously 
denied this doctrine, and its ultimate acceptance was exclus­
ively due to their inability to meet the now exploded wages - 
fund doctrine. That the conclusion should have survived the
^^general Theory, PP. 3<&, 365. 168Ibid., p. 366.
132
argument on which it logically stood, can be explained on 
no other hypothesis than the commanding authority of the great 
men who asserted it. Economic critics have ventured to attack 
the theory in detail, but they have shrunk appalled from touch­
ing its main conclusions. Our purpose is to Bhow that these 
conclusions are not tenable, that an undue exercise of the 
habit of saving is possible, and that such undue exercise im­
poverishes the Community, throws labourers out of work, drives 
down wages, and spreads that gloom and prostration throu^i the 
commercial world which is known as Depression in Trade. . .
Hie object of production is to provide "utilities and con­
veniences" for consumers, and the process is a continuous one 
from the first handling of the raw material to the moment . 
when it is finally consumed as a utility or a convenience.
Hie only use of Capital being to aid the production of these 
utilities and conveniences, the total used will necessarily 
vary with the total of utilities and conveniences daily or 
weekly consumed. Now saving, while it increases the existing 
aggregate of Capital, simultaneously reduces the quantity of 
utilities and conveniences consumed; any undue exercise of 
this habit must, therefore, cause an accumulation of Capital 
in excess of that which is required for use, and this, excess 
will exist in the form of general over-production.170
Keyne3 • emphasis on investment and his "expectations" theory 
of value caused him to make the following remarks concerning the 
above quoted passages from Hobson. "In the last sentence of this 
passage," Keynes said, "there appears the root of Hobson's mistake, 
namely, his supposing that it is a case of excessive saving causing 
the actual accumulation of capital in excess of what is required, 
which is, in fact, a secondary evil which only occurs through mis­
takes of foreBif^vt; whereas the primary evil is a propensity to save
^This concopt that the productive process is a continuous 
one is of great importance for a true understanding of the capital­
istic system. It has always been clearly understood by those who 
approach economic analysis from the demand side that there is no 
"beginning" or "ending" of the productive process. It is a "belt­
like" movement with no "starting" or "stopping" points. Consumption 
can very well be the "beginning" instead of the "end".
17°0ener&l Hieory, pp. 3&>, 3^7. Keynes cites* "Hobson and 
Mummery, Physiology of Industry, pp. iii-v."
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in conditions of full employment more than the equivalent of the 
capital which is required, thus preventing full employment except 
when there is a mistake of foresight, A page or two later, however, 
he puts one half of the matter, as it seems to me, with absolute 
precision, though still overlooking the possible role of changes in 
the rate of interest and in the state of business confidence, factors 
which he presumably takes as given:
We are thus brought to the conclusion that the basis on 
which all economic teaching since Adam Smith has stood, viz. 
that the quantity annually produced is determined by the 
aggregates of Natural Agents, Capital, and Labour available, 
is erroneous, and that, on the contrary, the quantity pro­
duced, while it can never exceed the limits imposed by these 
aggregates, may be, and actually is, reduced far below this 
maximum by the check that undue saving and the consequent 
accumulation of over-supply exerts on production; i.e. that 
in the normal state of modern industrial Communities, con­
sumption limits production and not production consumption.
Although Keynes did not mention many of the names who have contributed
heavily to the development of the doctrine of effective demand, his
recognition that Hobson was a Keynesian antecedent perhaps demonstrates
that he--much more so than seme of his ardent followers--knew his "place"
in the history of economic thoupjit.
Albert Aftalion
Using the subjective value theory and the principle of dimin­
ishing utility developed by the Austrians, Aftalion formulated an 
economic analysis that greatly enhanced the "demand" approach to
1 ^ General Theory, pp. 367, 368.
• ^ Ibid., p. 368. Keynes cites "Hobson and Mummery, oj>. cit.,
p. ix."
^■^More evidence of this is shown in Chapter Five.
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economics. The purpose of this chapter does not dictate, however, 
that Aftalion be examined in any great detail, lhe treatment of this 
economist will be confined here to a few statements concerning his 
attitude toward consumer wants and diminishing marginal utilities. 
Aftalion used the principle of diminishing utility to refute Say's 
Law of Markets.
Aftalion based his analysis upon the dynamics of human wants. 
He believed it va3 this element in the economy which determined and 
caused fluctuations in the rate of investment. Capitalists based 
their investment decisions upon their expectations of final consumer 
demand for their products. In short, the value of the final consumer 
goods determined the value of the capital good9 used to produce them. 
This, of course, was the derived demand concept. Aftalion did not 
believe that technological progress caused capital to be formed unless 
the new techniques promised to more fully satisfy consumption wants. 
'Jhus, consumption was the end of all production. Fundamental to 
Aftalion's analysis, then, was the principle that the demand for 
capital goods could be explained only in terms of those forces which 
controlled human wants and the demand which resulted from these wants.
For Aftalion, it was an excess of capital goods and not a 
scarcity of them that brougit a period of prosperity to a close.
During a bocm period capital accumulates quickly. Eventually the 
output of capital goods exceeds consumer demand as a result of 
"glutting of wants." When this occurred the inducement to create 
still more capital goods came to an end.
Hansen explains that Aftalion's principle of diminishing 
marginal utilities is the result of two factors: (1) as the stock
135
of capital goods on hand becomes larger and larger, the possibility 
of substituting capital for the other productive factors diminishes, 
and (2) the value of consumers' goods--relative to the cost of capital—  
diminishes as they become more abundant, lhe construction of houses 
is a case In point. During a period of prosperity, net investment in 
houses increases. As a result, the rate of return (marginal utility) 
on each new house constructed declines, lhe Immediate result of this 
is a reduction of rents and a fall in the value of houses relative to 
the cost of construction. The end result is a decline In the demand 
for new houses, and the construction of new houses falls sharply.
As consumers' goods become more abundant, their marginal 
utilities decline. Producers of consumers' goods experience a fall 
in their prices. As consumers' goods become less valuable, the value 
of the capital goods used to produce them declines relative to the 
cost of capital goods, lhe solution of this problem is an ever- 
increasing demand for consumers' goodB. If this can be achieved, 
the marginal utilities of consumers' goods will not decline; further­
more, the increasing consumer demand will create new capital invest-
17k
ment opportunities. Although caused by somewhat different forces, 
this position of Aftalion is almost identical with Keynes' concept 
that the marginal efficiency of capital showed great instability in 
the long-run. Keynes emphasized the role of interest in determining 
the rate of investment more than did Aftalion. And for Keynes, it 
was a low propensity to consume rather than diminishing marginal
^Hansen, oip. cjt., p. 3^9.
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utilities that was a source of difficulty.
This concept of a diminishing intensity of desire to satisfy
human wants was the very heart of Aftalionfs analysis. Furthermore,
he did not believe this to be in conflict with the fact that human
wants are insatiable. The whole point is that persons experience
a decline in their intensity of desiring goods as they increase their
ability to satisfy their lesser needs. Because of this factor, "the
decreasing utility of goods is in perfect harmony with the insatiability 
175of human wants." According to Aftalion, then, if human wants or de­
sires are viewed properly, the fact that wants are insatiable does not 
prevent a general overproduction of economic goods and glutted mar­
kets.1^
Bi commenting upon Aftalion's use of the principle of dimin­
ishing utility, McCracken explains that, "Aftalion definitely rejects
the Ricardian theory of embodied value and joins the Malthusian group
177and Austrian School of 'commanded value.'"
In concluding this brief treatment of Aftalion, let us see
how he used the principle of diminishing utility to refute Say's Law
of Markets. According to McCracken:
Aftalion next directs his attention to the classic doctrine 
that goods exchange against goods, creating a law of two
Aftalion, "La Realite des surproductions gen^rales," in 
Revue d'economie politique, XXIII (1909), pp. 86, 87. ThiB was one 
of a series of articles. The major elements of his analysis were 
presented in the March, 1909, issue, pp. 201-229. Aftalion expanded 
his main thesis in his two volume work, Lea Crises periodiques de 
surproduction (Paris, Marcel Rivere et Cie, I913J.
176Ibid., p. 87.
■^^McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, p. 132
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supplies, making impossible a general overproduction. The 
most that could happen would be maladjusted production or 
partial overproduction. In reply, Aftalion says it is of 
little import to say that one's power to acquire increases 
proportionately with his production. "Intensity of desire 
for goods is not identified with the power of acquisition.
It may be that my ability to buy cloth depends upon how much 
wheat I produce. But the strength of my desire for cloth 
is not a function of ray wealth of wheat. It diminishes with 
the increased abundance of cloth, since this abundance will 
permit only of the satisfaction of a lesser need. Wheat and 
cloth may be mutually exchangeable but if production is carried 
to the point where increased consumption satisfies a less 
intense desire then the value of both will fall." Thus it is 
with the total ensemble of products. If supplies are in­
creased quite generally, they meet on the demand side a dimin­
ished intensity of desire. But as general intensity of de­
sire flees away, so does value. Prices will no longer cover 
cost of production. We still have general overproduction, 
even if consumers have the power to clear the market but be­
cause of diminished intensity of desire refuse to do so.-1^
It seems quite clear fran this analysis that supply could not create 
its own demand because of a voluntary failure of demand. Aftalion's 
concept of voluntary failure of demand was of course the same as 
Malthus' producers who had the power but not the will. This sets 
Aftalion apart from the "pure" underconsumption theory. The under- 
consuraptionist holds that demand is deficient bocause of an invol­
untary failure of purchasing power based upon maldistribution of 
income. Shis is the same as Malthus' worker who had the will but 
not the power to demand goods. Malthus wa9 the fountainhead for 
both concepts.
Perhaps it is quite correct to give Aftalion credit for de­
molishing Say's Law of Markets, However, it is perhaps more correct 
to state that it is the concept of commanded value which destroyed it.
^Ibld., p. 131.
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And many economists, Including Malthus and the powerful Austrian trio, 
embraced this value theory. In short, one cannot give to any one person 
the credit of completely refuting the principle that supply creates 
its own demand, Keynes, in his attack on Say's Lav, merely added the 
vei#it of his prestige to a bitter struggle that had been running for 
over two centurieB.
W. T. Foster and Waddill Catchings
And now the trail of the doctrine of effective demand is 
brou^it very close to Keynes in the writings of Foster and Catchings. 
Here is found the underconsumption theory, based upon the principle 
of involuntary failure of demand, in full bloom.
These writers believed that the objective of economic activity 
was to keep the economy operating at full capacity at all times in 
order that the population could enjoy as hi$i a real income as was 
possible with existing technology. Their analysis and their public 
policy were derived directly from this belief.
They pointed out that, "First, that there is no possibility 
of attaining the economic goal upon which all are agreed unlesB con­
sumers somehow obtain the money, year in and year out, to buy the 
goods about as readily as they are produced; second, the present money 
and profit economy does not enable consumers long to obtain the re­
quired money; third, there is consequently no possibility of sustained 
economic progress, and extreme alternations of prosperity and depression 
are inevitable.Perhaps no writer has ever expressed the
■^Foster and Catchings, Profits (New York: Houston Mifflin
Co., 1925), P. 231.
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underconsumption theory with more exactness than this.
For Foster and Catchings, consumption was the regulator of 
production, "since it is always possible to produce far more than
IpA
we consume, consumption regulates production." In more emphatic 
terms, "There could not possibly be a serious setback' of business 
in general if consumption regularly kept pace with production. Sus­
tained business depression accompanied by adequate consumer-demand
xdi
is no more possible than drought accompanied by heavy rains."
They ask an allimportont question, "Why do we ever curtail production
in general--reduce crop acreage, bank furnaces, shut down mills, throw
men out of work?" And their answer was simple and direct, "Because
we cannot get our products consumed, which means that we cannot sell
them to the people who want to use them, at prices that make continued
7 AP
production possible." They were firmly convinced that, "The one 
thing needed above all others to sustain a forward movement of business 
is adequate consumer purchasing power. Sunshine campaipis may start 
business, but only consumers' dollars can sustain it,"'*'®8 "A willing 
buyer does not have to wait long, but a willing seller may have to 
wait forever. Adequate consumer-demand would do more than any other 
means now within human control towards increasing wealth, abolishing 
poverty, maintaining employment, solving labor problems, increasing
i QJ)
good will among men generally, and maintaining the peace of the world."
l8oFoster and Catchings, "The Dilemma of Thrift," Atlantic 
Monthly, (April, 1926), pp. 10, 11.
l8lIbld. 182Ibid. l83profits, p. 239.
l8^"The Dilemma of Thrift," p. 23.
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Foster and Catchings were impatient with any analysis which
stated that production and consumption would balance in the long-
run. "To keep business free from extreme fluctuations, production
and consumption must balance within a sufficiently short period of
185time. Time is the essence of the problem." People are unemployed 
and factories are idle in the short-run. It was repugnant to these 
writers to even think of waiting for the long-run to run its course 
and bring about hi$i economic activity. Their attack against Say’s 
Law of Markets was quite simple. They held that it was obsolete and 
fallacious in a money and credit economy.
"What a mess we get into.'," they said, "We work hard to pile 
our shelves high with what we most desire, and then we have to stop 
working because we are unable to take these things off the shelf and 
enjoy them." The two writers explain that, "production must slacken, 
and thus render increased consumption impossible, unless products find 
their way to consumers about as rapidly as they are produced. This 
condition prevails, obviously as long as there is close and continuous 
correspondence between the dollar-sales of consumers' goods and the
1A7
output of these goods measured in dollars at prevailing prices." 
However, saving by individuals upsets this balance and glutted markets 
result.
When producers save and invest, "Money that 1b used once to 
bring about the production of goods is again used to bring about
J-Q^ Profita, p. 2L8,
l86,tThe j3iiemraa 0;f» thrift,"pp. 5, 6. 
l87Profits, p. 279.
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the production of goods, before it is used to bring about the con­
sumption of goods. In other words it is used twice in succession 
to create supply."-1-08 Again, overproduction is the result. Thus, 
a lack of effective demand is a direct result of savings and profits.
Hie major points in the theory of Foster and Catchings may 
be summarized in the following manner. Society does not spend all 
its income. Some part of it is bound to be saved. Some of this 
saving is carried out by industry itself, for not all the value pro­
duct of industry is distributed in incomes; part is retained to add 
to productive equipment. Of that which is distributed in incomes, 
acme part also is saved. These savings, via banks and security issues, 
find their way back to industry where they are invested; that is to 
say, they are used to purchase productive equipment, the means to 
produce more goods.
On the face of it, this volume of consumer and business 
saving would seem to create a deficiency of buying power in respject 
to goods offered for sale. It does thi3 in the end, but not im­
mediately. No deficiency arises immediately, for all the savings 
thus apparently taken out of incomes, and therefore out of purchasing 
power, are, by the process of investment, being paid out to wage 
earners (and other factors of production) engaged in the capital- 
producing industries. Hence the total volume of purchasing power 
is not affected by savings, since what is given up by one group is 
transferred to another.
Yet this situation of adequate pjurchaBing power is temporary
108Ibid.
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and short-lived. In due time, the productive facilities on which 
savings are being spent are ready for operation, and, after the 
lapse of a further period, the goods they are capable of producing 
are ready for the market and added to the existing supply. When this 
finally happens, then purchasing power is inadequate to buy both the 
original and the additional flow of goods at the existing levels of 
prices; or, more exactly, it is inadequate to do so unless the total 
volume of money is increased, either by incoming gold or by the in­
flationary action of banks.
To suppose that banks can continue to meet this situation 
is to misconceive the lessons learned from experience. The truth 
is, they cannot continue to do so; sooner or later, the state of 
reserves calls a halt or imposes some restriction on the rate of 
increase of the money supply. When this time comes, the ultimate 
results of the process of saving can no longer be postponed. The 
deficiency of purchasing power, put off for a while by an increase 
in the supply of money through the banking system, is finally here; 
and the crisis begins. It follows that it is impossible for a 
society to save without causing crisis and depression. But in a 
capitalistic society, savings are in fact made. Thus, depressions 
are inevitable.
There has been no attempt made in this chapter to include 
all those writers who have contributed to the doctrine of effective 
demand. To do so would have been impossible in a work of this type.
■^See McCracken, Value Theory and Business Cycles, pp. 1^7-151, 
for an appraisal and criticism of Foster and Catchings.
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Following the trail as It was blazed by the more Important authors 
was the only concern of this chapter. This was the trail, these 
were the economists who fashioned it, which led In an unswerving 
line to the General Theory In 1936. Faced with this picture of the 
evolution of the doctrine of effective demand, Inadequate as It may 
be, it seems quite clear that the economics of Keynes should never 
be referred to as "revolutionary" or "the new economics." The writers 
presented in this chapter were the main stem of the argument on ef­
fective demand In relation to saving, which was Integrated Into a 
system by Keynes, lhe system Is new, which was no mean accomplishment, 
but the Ideas go far back.
In summary form, theBe ideas were, first, the Incomes of 
all people depend on the expenditure of other people. Second, if 
all the Incomes are spent in one way or another, the whole Income 
will be maintained, and also the employment which created it, If 
general prices are steady. Third, money which Individuals save must 
therefore re-enter the circulation by the borrowing and spending of 
other persons, public or private, failing which the whole income will 
fall. Fourth, there Is a gap between saving and Bpending, since the 
saver Is not the same person as the spender of borrowed money; this 
gap should therefore bo quickly closed by the Investment of savings. 
Fifth, if savings are invested, they will maintain both the income 
out of which they have come, and will themselves be exactly maintained 
so that the investment will in a sense be self-financed. The effective 
demand of the nation will thus be maintained, but it will require a 
public intervener to do it, if private enterprise does not rapidly
take up private savings. There must either be public investment, 
or policies to increase private enterprise or private consumption. 
Saving must be offset by some kind of spending, in order that full 
expenditure may maintain full employment, and vice versa. Idle 
savings limit the income they might have maintained, and clog the 
whole effective demand. These ideas forged into a system by Keynes 
constitute the economics of Keynes.
CHAPTER V
MONETARY HERESY AND FINANCIAL CAPITALISM
The significant basis of uniformity in the monetary heresy 
tradition resides in a common practical attitude which ascribes the 
existence of unemployed resources to tho prevailing financial insti­
tutions. According to this system of thought, money and credit 
reprosent a monopoly which embodied itself in the financial structure 
and developed alongside modern industrial enterprise. These finan­
cial institutions are viewed as important inhibitions to the on-going 
capitalistic process. They prevent the full employment of community 
resources, lead to an inadequacy of effective demand, and result in 
an artificial scarcity of capital assets. The central argument is 
that the financial structure of capitalism must be changed in such 
a manner that will eliminate its undesirable consequences. A dis­
tinguishing characteristic of the theoretical argument is the in­
tegration of money and credit theory into the general body of economic 
principles. Criticism of the orthodox point of view centers around 
the classical theory of interest.
The monetary heretics attribute interest to the private owner­
ship of money held as a store of value, and attack all income derived 
from the mere ownership of property. Labor cost becomes the sole 
social cost of production. Income consists of labor income plus
IU5
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scarcity rents from land and capital. .With regard to class structure, 
a characteristic feature of this attitude is the condemnation of the 
rentier class because of its non-functional role in production and 
exchange. Income from private entrepreneurship, as contrasted with 
income from private ownership, is justified from the social point of 
view on functional grounds because the entrepreneur is regarded as 
indispensable to industrial progress and to the exercise of individual 
Initiative.
Keynes' theoretical and policy arguments fit neatly into this 
system of thoupfrt. The general reference of this chapter is to the 
history of these ever-persistent theories of monetary reform. The 
specific investigation attempts to trace the monetary aspects of 
Keynes' General Theory back to two important antecedents, P. J.
Proudhon and Silvio Gesell.1 Why these two men? There are two reasons.
That which is called in this study the Keynes-Gesell-Proudhon 
tradition extends much further into the history of capitalism and is 
much broader in the contemporary world than the particular thread which 
is being pursued in this chapter. It was perhaps the most important 
type of reform in the early history of industrial capitalism prior to 
the age of mass production, which began approximately in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. After 1850 there was a shift in emphasis among 
European social reformers, away from proposals fdr financial and ex­
change reforms toward programs calling for the collective ownership of 
property used in production.
In the early nineteenth century the attack on money and banking 
institutions was implemented by an appeal to the labor theory of value. 
Attempts were made, with the sanction of the theory that price should 
equal cost, to organize systems of exchange which were intended to 
'eliminate interest and middlemen's charges. In England the Ricardian 
socialists pointed out that since all income is produced by labor, there 
can be no social justification for the receipt of incane by money lenders 
and land owners.
Robert Owen put such a system into practice when in 1832 he estab­
lished the National Equitable Labour Exchange, which was an attempt to 
bring producer and consumer into direct contact throu$i the use of labor- 
notes or labor-tickets. In this way all non-labor income would be
1U7
First, of course, in a study of this type a writer is limited in the 
material that he can examine. It would be Impossible to make a com­
prehensive analysis of all the antecedents of Keynes' monetary reform 
proposals. Fortunately, that is not necessary to achieve the general 
objective of the dissertation, which is to assign Keynes to his proper 
position in the history of economic thought. Second, and a more im­
portant reason, is that Keynes in the General Theory^ expresses sym­
pathy and admiration for both the technical theory and the social 
premises of Gesell's most important work, The Natural Economic Order.^ 
Keynes refers to Gesell as "the strange, unduly neglected prophet. . . 
whose work contains flashes of deep insight and who only Just failed 
to roach down to the essence of the matter.According to Keynes:
The purpose of the book (The Natural Economic Order) as a 
whole may be described as the establishment of an anti- 
Marxian socialism, a reaction against laissez-faire built 
on theoretical foundations totally unlike those of Marx in 
being based on a repudiation instead of on an acceptance 
of the classical hypotheses, and on an unfettering of com­
petition instead of its abolition. I believe that the 
future will learn more from the spirit of Gesell than from 
that of Marx.5
eliminated. The plan operated less than two years. The Ricardian 
socialists designed similar schemes. And programs of a related nature 
were attempted in France, Germany, and the United States. The common 
characteristic of all these programs was a frontal attack on financial 
and marketing institutions. There was no justification for using gold 
as money and for the existence of interest. Furthermore, they chal­
lenged J. B. Say's law of markets because of the inflexible and monopo­
listic financial organization which prevented "supply" from creating 
its own "demand."
^General Theory, pp. 32, 371, 379* See also pp. 353-358.
^published in two parts, Money Part and Land Part (San Antonio, 
Texas: Free-Economy Publishing Co., 193*0. Translated from the sixth
German edition by Philip Pye.
^General Theory, p. 353. 5Ibid., p. 355,
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With respect to governmental intervention and free competitive 
enterprise, Keynes recorded his approval of Gesell in the following 
manner:
Hius I agree with Gesell that the result of filling in the 
gaps in the classical theory is not to dispose of the 
"Manchester System," but to indicate the nature of the 
environment which the free play of economic forces requires 
if it is to realize the full potentialities of production.6
While expressing disagreement with certain aspects of Gesell's tech­
nical analysis, especially with its incompleteness, Keynes was for the
most part sympathetic toward his theory. He says, "the idea behind
7stamped money is sound."
Gesell unstintingly acknowledged Proudhon as the only economist 
prior to himself whose investigations into the theory of capital and 
interest had suggested a workable solution for the reform of capital-
Q
ism. The passage from Proudhon which he quotes and paraphrases time 
and time again i3 this: "Money is a sentinel posted at the entrance
of the markets, with orders to let no one pass. Money, you imagine, 
is the key that opens the gates of the market (by which term is meant 
the exchange of products); that is not true--money is the bolt that 
bars t h e m . The durable (and therefore hoardable) character of money, 
the monopoly of credit, and the propensity to hoard money, are, for 
Gesell, Proudhon, and Keynes, respectively, the strategic factors in 
the explanation of the conflict between wealth and welfare in the
^General Theory, p. 379* ^Ibid., p. 357.
Q
°Gesell, op. cit., see esp. Money Part, p. 3.
^Cited by Gesell, o]3 • cit * ^ p * 7 . Sgs also pp• 9*7^ 112  ^ 132 ^ 
182, 271, 272.
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social economy.
To Proudhon'b insist into the theory of capital and interest
Gesell attributes the former's suggestion for eliminating unearned
income without socialization of productive property.10 Gesell's
clearest statement of his relation to Proudhon in this connection
is contained in the introduction to the Natural Economic Order.11
He begins with a citation from Proudhon's What is Property? and in
the course of the introduction he commends Proudhon while castigating
Marx in a series of comparisons:
Hie abolition of unearned income, of so-called surplus value, 
also called interest and economic rent, is the immediate 
economic aim of every socialistic movement. The method 
generally proposed for the attainment of this aim is 
Communism in the shape of nationalization or socialization 
of production. I know of only one socialist— Pierre Joseph 
Proudhon— whose investigations into the nature of capital 
point to the possibility of another solution of the prob­
lem. . .No one, except Proudhon, was able to conceive that 
the preponderance now manifestly on the side of property 
can be shifted to the side of the dispossessed (the workers), 
simply by the construction of a new house beside every ex­
isting house, or a new factory beside every factory already
established.12
These observations indicate the basis for the contention that 
Keynes was a follower of Proudhon as well as Gesell. The acknowledg­
ments of Keynes to Gesell and Gesell to Proudhon relate to matters 
which appear to be fundamental to their social outlooks as well as 
their technical analyses.1  ^Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes reacted 
similarly to relatively similar issues, thougfc there were wide
10Gesell, o£. clt., Money Part, p. 3.
U Ibid., pp. 3-1*+. ^ Ibld., p. 3.
■^Keynes makes no mention of Proudhon in the General Theory.
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differences In the chronology and geography of their environments. 
Proudhon wrote In France during the hectic years of the revolution 
of I8*f8 . Gesell early In life moved from Europe to Argentina, where 
he lived during the financial, commercial, and industrial crises of 
the late 1880's and 1890*8. Keynes developed gradually to his posi­
tion of the General Theory under the Influence of such post-war prob­
lems as International indebtedness, prolonged economic depression,
lU
financial crisis, and mass unemployment.
First, Proudhon's theories will be investigated; second, 
Gesell's argument will be examined; and finally, the similarities of 
the idea systets of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes will be reviewed.
A. Proudhon'8 Idea System '
Despite his voluminous writings,^ proudhon did not develop 
a systematic body of economic theory. His central concern and pre­
occupation was with a system of gratuitous credit. This major interest 
stimulated him to explore and come to definite conclusions about the 
theory of interest and capital, and the theory of a specie standard.
The periodic recurrence of the association of theoretical 
ideas with a criticism of financial institutions has interesting 
implications, not only for the nature of economic theory, but also 
for a study of capitalism as a type of economic organization whose 
characteristic structure gives rise to similar problems in different 
times and different places.
15His most important publications werej Qu'est-ce que la 
propriety? (l8Uo), SystSme des contradictions economlques (l8£677 
Organization du credit et de la circulation et solution du problbnu 
social (1848), Blsurnd* de la question soclale, banque d '£change 
(18^8), les Confessions d 'on rSvolutionnaire (181+977 Iht6r6t et 
principal (1850), De la justice dans la revolution et dans l'Sglise 
(1858), la Guerre et la paix (l86l), and De la capaclttf politique 
des classes ouvribres*Tl865).
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This was his method of attacking financial capitalism. Proudhon's
Idea system will be examined In terms of these major aspects of his
economic theory.
Proudhon's theory of Interest and capital has been classified
as an "exploitation theory," and this classification is justified
because he looked upon labor as the sole creator of economic goods and
services and thou^it of capital as being unproductive insofar as it
did not contribute anything to net current output. "Capital can be
17exchanged," he says, "but cannot be a source of Income." On the
basis of this labor theory of value, interest, for Proudhon, was a
monopolistic income which flows to the privileged owners of money-
capital and was in sharp contrast with the income received by the
owners of legitimate productive wealth, which was quite permissable
and logical for the creation and maintenance of individual enterprise.
Proudhon defined capital in a typical socialistic manner.
For him capital was "Every settled value, whether in land, machinery,
merchandise, provisions, or money, serving or capable of serving in 
1 ft
production." And he drew a sharp distinction between what he termed 
"free" and "engaged" capital. Capital was free when it took the form 
which "can be regarded as realized or immediately realizable— that is,
■^See Eugen von Bbhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest (New York: 
Stechert and Co., 1932), p. 321. See also pp. 375-377.
"^Proudhon, What is Property? (Princton, Massachusetts: Tucker, 
1876), p. 123. Translated from the French by Benjamin B. Tucker.
1®Proudhon, Solution of the Social Problem (New York: Vanguard
Press, 1927), p. 1&2. Commentary and exposition by Charles A. Dana and 
William B. Greene, edited with introduction by Henry Cohen.
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converted into such other product as may be desired; in this case the
form that capital most readily assumes is that of m o n e y . A n d ,
"capital is said to be engaged. . .when the value that constitutes
it is employed definitely in production; in this case it assumes all 
PO
possible forms."
Interest was the payment which was necessary to induce the
owners of "free" capital to "engage" it in productive use. Ohus by
Proudhon's definition and Keynes' terminology, interest was a money
reward paid to the owners of liquid-wealth for parting with the
liquidity for a given period of time. In Proudhon's words:
Values created by net product are classed as savings and 
capitalized in the most highly changeable form, the form 
which is freest and least susceptible of depreciation. . . 
the form of specie, the only constituted value. Now if 
capital leaves this state of freedom and engages itself,-- 
that is, takes the form of machines, buildings, etc.,1— it 
will still bo susceptible of exchange, but much more ex­
posed than before to the oscillations of supply and demand. 
Once engaged, it cannot be disengaged, without difficulty;
. . .Exploitation alone is capable of maintaining engaged 
capital at its nominal value;--Interest is the insurance 
premium paid on the capital.
' Proudhon's many statements on interest and capital theory are 
sometimes seemingly contradictory and never too clearly formulated, 
but the statement quoted above was the central emphasis of his argu­
ment. It is quite evident that Proudhon believed that interest 
originated and was possible because of the peculiar characteristics 
of conventional money. Hiere is virtually no difference between
19lbid., p. 1U3. . g0Ibid.
21Proudhon, System of Economic Contradictions (Boston: Tucker,
1888), p. 291. Italics by Proudhon. Translated from the French by 
Benjamin B. Tucker.
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this theory of interest and Keynes1 view that interest is a payment 
to money-holders for not hoarding money.
Proudhon did not believe that capital was productive. For
him, the concept of "productivity" of capital was sheer fiction.22
Of course, this attitude toward capital was a part of his labor theory
of value. He reasoned that if interest were a non-functional form of
money income resulting from a system of private monopolized credit
institutions (the Bank of France and its branches), the activity of
the money lenders could not be classified as productive because it
was not associated with the actual creation of economic goods.23 He
did not deny that labor working with capital was more productive than
labor working without capital. He maintained, however, that labor
itself was the creator of capital and that this capital was consumed
ok
by labor in the process of production. And, he argued, that this 
was entirely different from the view that capital itself was productive. 
As a matter of fact, Proudhon did not give to any one factor of pro­
duction the credit for being the sole productive force. In his First 
Memoir he was hi$ily critical of some of his predecessors with refer­
ence to this issue. He disagreed with Quesnay and earlier economists 
because they imputed productivity to land; he criticized Smith’s and 
Ricardo’s labor theory of value; and he did not believe that J. B. Say 
and his followers had stated the thesis correctly when they imputed
22proudhon, Oeuvres completes, Nouvelle ed, (Paris: Riviere,
1923), p. 160. Notes and unpublished documents under the direction 
of C. Bougie and M. Mousset.
^Solution of the Social Problem, pp. 123, 1^6.
2UIbid., p. 1U9.
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productivity to land, labor, and capital. "The truth is," he says, 
"that neither land nor labor nor capital is productive. Production 
results from the cooperation of the three equally necessary elements, 
which, taken separately, are equally sterile."2^ Unfortunately, this 
argument that production is a function of the total social process 
was not developed in a rigorous or consistent manner, and the reader 
is left with an unsatisfied hunger.
In the final analysis, Proudhon argued, interest was not a 
payment for the use of existing money funds but a monopoly payment 
made to the banking system to induce it to manufacture bank credit. 
And since this creation of credit involved no sacrifice to society 
as a whole, there was no social necessity to charge for this service. 
The fact that such charges did exist meant that the economy contained 
a socially unnecessary private monopoly of credit, a monopoly which 
did not in fact supply additional capital but merely provided the 
social sanction for the creation of capital.^
By attempting to demonstrate historically that the rate of 
interest had not decreased in France with the accumulation of capital, 
Proudhon tried to prove his position that interest was a payment for 
monopoly-created-credit and not a payment for the use of capital. In 
this attempt, he shows that the discount rate of the Bank of France 
had remained at four per cent during years in which both the national 
capital of France and the assets of the Bank itself increased
^what is Property?, p. l6^.
^Solution of the Social Problem, p. llU.
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27several-fold.
His remedy for the unnecessary and Illegitimate Interest
28
payments was a financial system which would supply gratuitous credit.
This procedure would fully recognize the fact that the function of a
credit institution was to substitute its well-known credit for the
little-known credit of the individual enterpriser.^ Thus a "mutual"
30
(socialized) credit system was the answer to the problem. In a
specific sense, Proudhon's mutual credit system would nullify interest
by making it equal for all producers ,3^ h Ib position reduced itself
to: If I used as much of your capital a3 you use of mine, the interest
which you suppose to derive from the productivity of capital would
32councel out leaving a balance of zero. Proudhon insisted that in­
equality of income distribution existed because of interest and argued 
that this could be corrected only "by centralizing credit and abolish­
ing interest, in order to equalize facilities, needs, and chances."33
Proudhon further supported his exploitation theory of interest
by contending that there was no analogy between the rate of interest
ok
and the price of a commodity. He explained that a "loan" and a 
"sale" are qualitatively different. When a merchant sells a commodity
g^0euyres completes, p. 265.
^ Solution of the Social Problem, pp. 123, 125. 
g9Ibid., p. 11U.
3<^ This perhaps was also the logical conclusion of Keynes1 
argument that the interest rate must be pushed down to zero.
33Solutjon of the Social Problem, p. 125.
32Ibid., p. 117. 33Ibld., p. 12U. 3UIbid., pp. 123, 131.
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at a given price, the price Is the equivalent value of the good, 
and the seller relinquishes all future claim to the commodity.
In this type of activity there is no exploitation (receipt of non­
functional income) because the "price" and the "value" of the com­
modity are quantitatively equal. However, when a capitalist makes 
a loan of either money or credit, he not only does not relinquish 
title, but he receives it back and can lend it over and over again. 
Furthermore, he receives a payment in the form of interest in 
addition to the repayment of the amount of the l o a n . 35 This was 
exploitation, according to Proudhon, because the lender of money- 
capital extracts from this exchange process a greater value than 
he contributes to it.3^ Thus Proudhon made no distinction between 
"value" and "price," did distinguish between a "loan" and a "sale," 
and contended that exploitation occurs only in the payment of interest 
by borrowers to lenders.
Finally, Proudhon held that it was not the multiplication of 
capital which decreased the rate of interest, but it was the de­
crease in the rate of interest which caused capital to multiply.37 
This position closely approximates Keynes1 central thesis that it 
is the rate of interest which determines the rate of accumulation 
of capital, and thus the marginal efficiency of capital, and not 
vice-versa.3® Thus both Proudhon and Keynes believed that the monopo­
listic privilege of interest charging inhibited a nation's attempt to
35lbid., p. 123. 36Ibld. 37Ibld., p. 13U.
3%ee P. G. Hawtrey, Capital and Bnployment (New York:
Longnans, Green, 1937), p. 230.
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accumulate wealth and was contrary to the welfare of society.
In order that his theories and views concerning interest and 
capital mi^it bear fruit, Proudhon advocated a reorganization of the 
exchange process. To accomplish this, he proposed that what he called 
a "bank of exchange" be organized and replace the Bank of France, It 
was through this new financial institution that Proudhon hoped to achieve 
a gratutious credit system, which was the very heart of his reform pro­
gram. Free credit, he believed, would eliminate the major evils of 
financial capitalism.
The basic function of the bank of exchange was discounting.
A producer who sold a commodity or rendered a service would make out 
a bill of exchange, have it accepted by the purchaser and then take 
the bill to the bank to have it discounted, lhe discounting process 
consisted of the substitution of a bill of exchange of the bank— called 
a "bon de circulation"--for the bill of the individual. The. "bon de 
circulation" bearing the signature of the exchange bank, was redeemable 
at si$vt in merchandise or services equal to the face value of the "bon." 
All members of the association were pledged to honor these notes by 
products or services of the type which they customarily produced.^ 9 
Hie notes, in contrast to those of the Bank of France, were not to be 
redeemable in specie. According to Proudhon, "Gold is the talisman 
which congeals life in society, which binds circulation, kills labor 
and credit, and makes slavery mutual. We must destroy the royalty 
of gold; we must republicanize specie by making every product of
^See Proudhon, Oeuvres completes, VI, p. 309 for a model 
of a "bon de circulation"?1
labor ready money."
Ihe basic Principle of the bank was to make the bill of ex­
change universal and thus overcome the scarcity of money and credit; 
that 1b make credit free. In its most complete form the bank would 
have been essentially a system of national bookkeeping in which the 
bill of exchange served as the medium of transfer. Every commodity 
was to be raised to the level of exchangeability; products would ex­
change directly for products. While Proudhon's reform called for com­
plete abandonment of a relation between gold, or any other type of 
1+1
specie, and legal tender money, it was not his intent to establish 
a new type of paper money. He asked, "Is this a paper currency?" And 
he answered, "I answer unhesitatingly, No.' It is neither paper money, 
nor money of paper; it is neither government checks, nor even bank 
bills; it is not of the nature of anything that has been hitherto in­
vented to make up for the scarcity of specie. It is the bill of exchange
kp
generalized." Ohe essence of the idea, in Proudhon's view, was to
1+3
make every product of labor ready money. J The "bon de circulation" was 
merely a means for facilitating the exchange of commodities for com­
modities between producers. Bank paper was to be based upon neither
1+ 1+
specie nor land but upon products of labor. In order to be eligible 
for discount, bills had to represent "products accepted or sold,
^°Ibld., p. 112.
^ ^Specie would have been used only for small change.
^Proudhon, Oeuvres completes, VI, p. Il6.
^Solution of the Social problem, p. 60.
1+5delivered or immediately deliverable." Such discount credit was to
be unlimited when there was previous acceptance of products by an 
1+6
actual buyer. Die bank would grant credit to borrowers on open ac­
count with the guarantee of two signatures by association members, who
h 7
would be jointly and severally liable. 1
The bank would also make long-term loans on notes secured by 
mortgages, and would purchase property on time, consign it to a pro­
prietor and permit him to repay in installments with no interest. If 
a proprietor were unable to repay, the bank would take over the prop­
erty. It would, however, oxtend to the proprietor the privilege of
liftcontinued occupancy as a tenant or manager. ° These bank loans differed 
from ordinary loans only in that they carried no interest charges.
The essential feature of Proudhon's exchange bank was to make 
all commodities as exchangeable as money. His argument was that if 
labor-time were the true measure of value, then there was no neces­
sity for a second measure of value in the form of money. Furthermore, 
if it were the presence of money which caused economic difficulties, 
the sensible solution was to abolish gold and silver money and sub­
stitute labor-money. All commodities being the product of labor and 
their value measured in labor-time, they would exchange directly for 
one another. After the initiation of his bank and the consequent 
elimination of interest charges as a corrupting element in the price 
structure, the competitive market was to be the process for equating
l6o
1+9
prices to true value.
Thus it is very obvious that the reform program which Proudhon 
proposed as a general solution to the social problem was in every 
respect a financial one. His new financial system would eliminate 
interest— bank credit would be gratuitous— and every producer would 
always have a market for his goods; that is, commodities would ex­
change for commodities. There could not be a lack of effective demand 
because the bunk of exchange would create a market for all the goods 
that producers were capable of supplying. Thus unemployment could not 
exist. Proudhon believed that the ideal of a barter economy envisaged 
in classical economic theory was at long last to be made to function 
free from monetary inhibitions and aberrations. He was convinced that 
a revolutionary change in the distribution of property ownership would 
follow as a consequence of his banking reforms, and that the bureau­
cratic form of government would be transformed into an anarchistic 
type of society. Every producer would become a small capitalist, 
either as an agricultural proprietor, an artisan, or in such instances
,f%arly in l81+9 Proud.hon organized the Bnnque du Peuple, which 
was modeled after his bank of exchange, but was much less pretentious. 
Its basic operating principles were: (l) no interest would be charged
on loans, (2) circulating notes would be issued based on economic 
goods, certain types of securities, and outstanding loans on landed 
property, and (3 ) buyers and sellers, throu^i the bargaining procedure, 
would determine commodity prices, and the seller could take the cer­
tificate of Bale to the bank and have it discounted at par.
Just when Proudhon had secured sufficient subscribers, and ad­
herents to begin operation of the bonk, ho was sentenced to a three 
year term in prison for articles against Louis Napoleon, who was at 
the time (spring of I8U9) serving as the first president of the newly 
established French Republic. Rather than allow his associates to 
carry on without him, Proudhon dissolved the enterprise and refunded 
the subscriptions.
l6l
as vas necessary, an "associate" in an industrial enterprise.50 This 
was possible because the bank of exchange would make free credit availa 
ble to all workers.
3. Silvio Gesell*3 Idea System
Gesell viewed the capitalistic economy as an interest ex­
ploiting system. For him, capitalism was, "an economic condition
in which the demand for loan-money and real-capital exceeds its sup-
51ply and therefore gives rise to interest."^ It was in terms of this 
definition that Gesell developed his economic theory and his attack 
on financial-, rentier-capitalism.
Gesell*s attack on financial'capitalism centered on interest 
and rent. These types of income, he believed, were non-functional 
(unearned) because they derived frcm monopolies of money and land.
His new economic order would be one in which interest and rent would 
not e x i s t . H i s  program called for a periodic stamping of all cur­
rency, which would eliminate the private monopoly of money; and for
the nationalization of all natural resources, which would eliminate
53the private monopoly in land. The stamped currency plan would cause
•^Proudhon, General Idea of devolution in the Nineteenth 
Century (London: Freedom Press, 1923)> PP. 215, 2l6. Translated
from the French by John Beverley Robinson.
Natural Economic Order, Money Part, p. 110.
52The Natural Economic Order, Money Part and Land Part. Sub­
title: A Plan to Secure an Uninterrupted Exchange of the Products of
Labor, Free from Bureaucratic Interference, Usury and Exploitation.
53Gesell*s land reform program is of no direct interest to the 
subject natter In this chapter. His Free-Land program was much less 
important than the Free-Money program in the sense that the former is
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interest payments to wither away until income from the mere owner­
ship of capital goods had disappeared. This would be the euthanasia 
of the rentier class.
Geaell'a money program consisted of rigid controls over the 
quantity and velocity of money. Hie regulation of the quantity of 
money was for the purpose of maintaining a stable price level, and by 
regulating the velocity of money "hoarding" would be prevented. Thus, 
the prevention of "hoarding" money and the maintenance of a stable 
price level were the two aspects of Gesell's money program.
He would prevent "hoarding" of money by requiring that all 
currency be stamped at a rate (rate of demurrage) which would be suf­
ficient to cause people to part with their money. According to Gesell,
the issuance of this currency (Free-Money) would eliminate checks,
kL.
bills of exchange, and all other credit instrumentsS  This Free- 
Mcney was to take the form of notes ranging in value from $1.00 to 
$1,000. Perforated sheets of stamps would serve as a medium of ex­
change for amounts less than $1.00 and for weekly attachment to the 
currency notes. Metallic money would not enjoy legal tender priv­
ileges, and there would be no redemption of Free-Money in specie.
only a problem in the distribution of a given volume of output, where­
as the Free-Money program is essential to the maintenance of the total 
output at a maximum. The problems of unemployment and economic crises 
are essentially problems of money and exchange and not of distribution 
as such, according to those who find the evils of capitalism in its 
financial aspects. Furthermore, with respect to the objectives of this 
study, there is no relationship between Gesell1 s land program and Keynes' 
policies. Hence, we shall not treat this aspect of Gesell’s idea system.
For the essence of his land program see, The Natural Economic 
Order, Land Part, pp. 77, 78.
5^The Natural Economic Order, Money Part, p. 151.
1*>3
At the time of Introduction, no one would "be compelled to redeem 
gold or silver for Free-Money, but after a period of grace, all metal 
coins and other types of old money would cease to be legal tender.
Gesell believed that a rate of demurrage of 5*2 per cent per 
year would be sufficient to prevent "hoarding." He would accomplish 
this by taxing (attaching a stamp) currency bills one-thousandth of 
their face value each week. In this manner, "hoarded" currency would 
lose value each week, and if held long enough would cease to have 
value. This rate of demurrage was to be administered upward or down­
ward-depending upon changing economic conditions--by the National 
Currency Office, which was the administrative agency that would exer­
cise the State's monopoly power over money. Gesell insisted that this 
monetary agency of the State must be guided by and base its rate of 
demurrage decisions on his theoretical principles. ^  Another basic 
function of the National Currency Office was to issue new money each 
year in amounts sufficient to offset the annual shrinkage in the total 
quantity of money; that is to say, enough new money would be issued 
to equal the total volume of the tax levied on currency.
Gesell was firmly convinced that if his money program were to 
be successful a stable price level would have to be maintained. This 
could be accomplished, he believed, by correlating the total quantity 
of money to the volume, of output of economic goods and services. This 
would be still another function of the National Currency Office since 
it would have displaced the central bank of issue. This monetary agency
55ihese principles are presented in seme detail later in this
chapter.
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of the government would issue and withdraw money in relation to Changes 
in the volume of output.5^ As the price level, calculated hy an index
number, ^  tended to rise or fall, the monetary circulation would be
reduced or increased. New money would be injected into the economy 
through a reduction in taxes. 3he currency office would pay into the 
public treasury the necessary amount of new money, and the treasury 
would reduce the collection of tax money by an eqiivalent amount. A
reduction in the quantity of money would result automatically from
the annual depreciation in its value. If a further decrease were re­
quired, additional taxes could be levied which would withdraw money 
from circulation.
The effects which Gesell expected from the introduction of 
Free-Money indicate the intent of his proposal. He listed the antici­
pated effects of Free-Money as follows;
"On Commerce:
"1. An uninterrupted circulation of money and consequently 
a steady increase of cash-payments.
"2. Unlimited sales of goods.
”3. Elimination of the causes which led to the general fall
of prices of goods and securities.
"Ij-. Elimination of commercial and industrial criBes.
"5. Cessation of the market fluctuations, of the cycles of
general trade activity of depression (alternating periods 
of rising and falling prices) resulting from changes in 
the exchange relation of goodB to money.
Natural Economic Order, Money Part, pp. lUl, llj-2.
Awhile Gesell was skeptical of the indices of Jevons, Sauerbeck, 
and Soetbeer, he felt that the determination of proper index numbers was 
no real obstacle to his program. He proposed a law requiring all pro­
ducers to furnish data on the amounts of commodities produced and the 
prices obtained from sales. On a basis of this information, a weighted 
index would be established.for the guidance of the National Currency 
Office in its injection and withdrawal of money. The Natural Economic 
Order, Money Part, p. 68.
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"6 . Elimination of stock-Jobbing ana speculation.
”7. Cessation, to a large extent, of retail commerce in its 
present form, an increasing number of commercial employees 
becanlng available for productive work.
"8 . Simplification and cheapening of commerce generally.
"9. Reduction of the present high cost of commerce from 30- 
bof> to about 10-15$ of production.
"10. Abolition of protective tariffs which will no longer be 
needed, and transition to Free-Trade. ,
"11. Removal of the economic causes of war.
"12, Facilitation of international trade through a currency 
agreement on the basis of common interests.
"On Interest and Wages:
"1. Money loses its power of exacting interest and is reduced 
to the rank of goods and labor.
"2. Continuous conversion of all money surpluses into means 
of production, dwellings, etc., even if such investments 
yield no profit (interest, "surplus-value1).
"3. immediate and permanent cessation of unemployment, entire 
disappearance of the labor reserve.
"1*-. Gradual decline and, if Free-Money is adopted universally, 
disappearance of interest.
"5. Gradual rise of wages until they completely absorb capital 
interest with the exception of rent on land, which will be 
made to accrue to the whole population by our land reform 
(Free-Land).
"6 . Facilitation of saving by removal of the present burden 
of capital interest, by the unfettered development of 
production and trade, and by the reduction of the cost
of commerce."58
It is interesting to view Gesell*s expected results from his
Free-Money plan in connection with what Proudhon wrote when he proposed
his Bank of Exchange. He said:
I no longer hesitate to propose that which speculative study 
of social economy shows me is most applicable to the situation 
in which we now find ourselves. Work is at a standstill— it 
must be resumed. Credit is dead--it must be resuscitated. 
Circulation is stopped--it must be reestablished. The market 
is closed— it must be reopened. Taxes never suffice— they must 
be abolished. Money hides itself— we must dispense with it.
Or better still, since we should express ourselves in an 
absolute manner, for what we are going to do today must serve
58Ibid., pp. 138, 139.
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for all time. Doable, triple, augnent labor indefinitely, 
and in consequence the products of labor. Give credit so 
broad a base that no demand will exhaust it. Create a market 
that no amount of production can supply. Organize a full, 
regular circulation, which no accident can disturb. Instead 
of taxes always increasing and always insufficient abolish all 
taxes. Let all merchandise become current money and abolish 
the royalty of gold.59
Dius the. problem of full employment for Proudhon was one of organizing
exchange (credit) for the purpose of Increasing the effective demand for
goods. For Gesell, effective demand could be maintained by organizing
exchange (money). It is quite obvious that in many ways Gesell's list
of expectations bears a close similarity to Proudhon's anticipated
effects despite the fact that Gesell's program was a currency reform,
while Proudhon's program called for a credit reform.
Gesell did not pretend that the introduction of stamped money
would immediately eliminate the necessity for paying interest on loans.
Die rate of loans would be equal to the rate of return on so-called
real capital, and would fall continuously as real capital became more
and more abundant. However, interest would never disappear entirely
unless Free-Money were adopted universally. The Important anticipated
effect of the change to demurrage money was that the monetary barrier
which impedes production and acts as a brake an accumulation would
disappear.
Attention is now directed to a rather brief examination of 
Gesell's major theoretical principles as they relate to his program 
for reform. Die objective of his theory as a whole was to develop a 
theory of interest and money which would explain the non-utilization
59solutlon of the Social Problem, p. U6 .
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of resources and the existence of unearned income in terms of the 
peculiarities of conventional money. The theoretical argument in 
his program of monetary reform was "based upon the principle of as­
signing to money a rate of interest of its own. He believed this 
rate was determined independently of the return on assets other than 
money. He was very explicit on this;
It used to be considered a scientifically proven fact that 
money bore interest only because the instruments of production 
bore interest^ that the interest-bearing power of money was 
fundamentally a delegated or borrowed power. And it now 
seems that the reverse is true.°0
There is great similarity between this position of Gesell and Keynes 
when the latter says: "Instead of the marginal efficiency of capital 
determining the rate of interest it is truer (though not a full state­
ment of the case) to say that it is the rate of interest which deter­
mines the marginal efficiency of capital."^l
Throughout the history of economic theory, economists, as a 
group, whether they were orthodox or unorthodox, have concerned them­
selves with the issue of economic value. Gesell, however, was unique 
in this respect. He was intolerant of all value theory, and criticized 
both orthodox and unorthodox theory for attaching central significance 
to it. He refers to value theory as "futile theological speculation," 
"completely sterile," "an illusion," "a fantasy," and "pernicious by 
its very existence." He acknowledged supply and demand schedules
^°The Natural Economic Order, p. 186.
^J. M. KeyneB, "The General Theory of Employment," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LI (February, 1937), pp. 222, 223.
^gThe Natural Economic Order, pp. 32, 33.
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as the "sovereign regulators of p r i c e s . " ^
The practical intent of Gesell!s criticism of value theory was 
to show why metallic money and banking currency should be replaced by
money made of paper without any kind of promise of conversion into
6ksubstance of "Intrinsic" value. "Our gold standard," he said, "is
6*5
the off-spring of the theory of value." p And Gesell believed that 
a monetary system which in any way was linked to gold was inherently 
unstable. It was primarily against the misuse of gold money as a. 
store of value that he directed his attack on financial capitalism.
The physical durability of conventional money and its consequent 
desirability as a form of "hoarded" wealth was, in Gesell's view, 
the basis for the use of money as an object of speculation. He there­
fore proposed that money be made unhoardable, and that its quantity 
be regulated in such a way that industrial activity would not be sub­
jected to a fluctuating level of prices. Gesell's program reco&iized 
that money was Indispensable to an economy that enjoyed the advantages 
of the division of labor, but he held that the material from which 
money was made was of no importance as long as its value periodically
decreased. Biua the precious metals were one of the few substances
66
unsuited to serve as a medium of exchange.
When Gesell argued that the "laws" of demand were different 
from the "laws" of supply, he meant that those who produced commod­
ities for sale were under compulsion to exchange their products for 
money, whereas the owners of money were not always willing to exchange
63ibjd., p. 92. ^ Ibld., pp. 2h, 63. ^ Ibid., p. 100. 
^Compare with General Theory, pp. 235> 236.
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their money for products.^ The owners of commodities had no choice, 
they had to sell because their products were subject to carrying costs 
in the form of deterioration, depreciation, storage costs, rust, rot, 
etc. The inadequacy of effective demand In a money economy was ac­
counted for by the fact that the conventional forms of money did not 
Involve carrying coBts similar to those "naturally" Incurred In the 
case of all, or almost all, other assets. Individuals who received 
Income (in the form of money) and did not spend It all would "hoard" 
unless there was sufficient Inducement to offset the advantages which 
money enjoys as a medium of saving. The premium which was necessary
to Induce conversion Into non-monetary assets, either directly or
68
through an agent, was called "basic-interest."
In a barter economy, according to Gesell, Interest could not 
exist because when real products confront one another in a market, 
they cancel each other. In a money-economy In which goods exchange 
for money and money exchange for goods, basic Interest would continue 
to be extorted as long as money could be withheld from circulation 
without loss to the owner. In order to stimulate the circulation of 
money and create a continuous demand, basic interest had to be abol­
ished. Its abolition involved placing money under the same handicap 
which all other commodities were under. In short, money muBt be 
perishable and the periodic tax in the form of stamps on the currency 
was to serve this function. Such was Gesell's theoretical argument 
for stamped money. By "compelling demand (money) to appear regularly
^?The Natural' Economic Order, pp. 88, 95. ^ Ibid., p. 263.
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In the market," the fluctuating price level and the accompanying 
variations in employment and output could he eliminated.^ Gesell 
refers to his plan as the "revolutionary proposal of compulsory 
demand,"70 which is all that is needed "to protect the exchange of 
goods against any conceivable disturbance, to render crises and un­
employment impossible, to reduce commercial profits to the rank of a 
wage, and in a short space of time to drown capital interest in a 
sea of capital."7^ Gesell proposed to alter the currency system so 
that the capitalist economy would work as if goods exchange directly 
for goods. His attack upon Say's law was part of his appeal for a
reformed economy in which supply would create its own demand, and
72in which money would be "neutral."
Gesell's theory of interest must be classified as an exploi­
tation theory in much the same sense as Proudhon's. Interest income 
was non-functional (unearned) income incident to the monopolistic 
position of money in relation to other ccmmodities. This share of
the total social income was a deduction from the social income created 
73by workers. He finds the explanation for the existence of interest
69lbid., p. 133. 7°Ibid., p. 136. 71Ibld., p. 13^.
f^on pages 266-275 In The Natural Economic Order, Gesell
discusses former attempts to explain interest on capital. One by
one he discards as unsatisfactory the fructification, productivity,
utility, and abstinence theories. In BShm-Bawerk's history and
analysis of interest, he finds nothing satisfactory. It is in terms
of the superiority of his own analysis that Gesell rejects the previ­
ous theories.
^Despite his "disgust" with value theory, Gesell seems to
have embraced a labor theory of value at this point.
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Income In the hoardable character of money.^ Gesell states that, 
"Interest is the byproduct of our traditional form of money and can 
therefore be scientifically explained only with the help of a theory 
of money. . .a theory of interest can only be derived from a theory 
of money. "75 According to Gesell, "Money is an instrument of exchange 
and nothing else."7^ Die use of money as a medium of saving as well 
as a medium for facilitating the exchange of commodities and services
77has been described as an anomaly, a misuse of the meditlm of exchange.
The misuse derives from the durable qualities of the prevailing types
of money. "Its material privilege (as a precious metal) and its legal
privilege (as legal tender) give gold money an exceptional position
among the products which depend upon money for their exchange."7®
The advantages of the durable character of money do not accrue
to all members of society, but only to those members who save their
money and do not invest it in capital assets which they themselves
own. These savers "will not pass their money into circulation again
79without the promise of interest.'"^ In the consumers' market, money 
does not extract interest because the necessity of existence of the
Oq
consumer compels him to spend his money. Likewise the producers
7^This is what basically distinguishes Gesell's exploitation 
theory of interest from the "surplus-value" theory of Marx.
The Natural Economic Order, p. 19. ^ IbldtJ p, 130.
T^silvio Gesell, Die Foundations of Peace (San Antonio,
Texas: Free-Economy Publishing Co., 1937*57 p. W>. Translated from 
the German by Philip Pye.
7®Ibid. 79jbid. 8°Oie Natural Economic Order, p. 225.
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cannot postpone sale of their products to the merchant because delay
01results in increasing losses connected with the storage of products.
Hius the fundamental aim of Gesell's theory of interest was to show
that interest was a payment to prevent "hoarding" of money. According
to his analysis, the great difficulty in economic life arises because
the same money which is needed as a medium of exchange is also capable
of being used as an instrument of savings. Hie purpose of stamped
money was "a complete separation of the medium of exchange and the 
82medium of saving." Gesell’s concept of interest assumed the utmost 
Importance in his theory as a whole because he conceived the fundamental 
aspects of economics to be "commodities" and "exchange." For him, all 
economic life resolved itself into a series of exchange transactions.
He described terms such as "wages," "labor," and "value" as "superfluous 
circumlocutions" of the two basic concepts, commodities and exchange.83
In order to explain why unemployment, crises, and unearned in­
come have their origins in the dual use of money as a medium of exchange 
and a medium of saving, and also in order to explain the manner in which 
stamped money would eliminate these difficulties, Gesell employs a three­
fold classification of interest rates: the basic rate (a theoretical
rate), the rate of real capital (an estimated rate), and the loan rote 
(a contractual rate).
Basic interest is a purely monetary phenomenon whose existence 
has nothing to do with time-preference, waiting, or the productivity 
of real capital. Instead, it is a payment extracted for the use of
^Ibid. 8g(Ihe Natural Economic Order, p. 112.
83Ibid., p. 202.
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money in exchange. It is a monopoly price which must he paid in 
order to induce those who save to transfer their savings into a 
non-monetary form, and it can be charged because historical coin­
cidence has made the moBt efficient medium of exchange also the 
most desired store of value. The basic rate is measured by the 
difference between the efficiency of money and its surrogates:
"Basic interest corresponds to the difference of efficiency between 
money and the substitutes for money (bills of exchange, barter and
DJi
primitive production) as media of exchange."
Gesell refers to the payment made to the owners of assets
other than money as "interest" on real capital. This rate depends
on the relative scarcity or abundance of instruments of production,
though a very important characteristic is the fact that it can never
fall below the basic interest rate. As the quantity of instruments
is augmented, the rate of return on real capital declines. While
Gesell retains the term "interest" in referring to this phenomenon,
he says, in contrasting it with basic interest, "We ought to cease
designating two so fundamentally different things by the same word, 
85interest," This is the reference of Keynes' statement that Gesell
distinguishes clearly between the rate of interest and the marginal
8 6efficiency of capital. Of course it is Gesell's basic rate of 
interest which corresponds to the rate of interest in Keynes* 
liquidity-preference schedule, and Gesell’s rate of interest on 
real capital is analogous to Keynes' marginal efficiency of capital.
Q^Ibld., p. 263. ^ Ibid. ^General Theory, p. 355.
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She meaning of the distinction between basic interest and the
rate of interest on real capital may be seen in relation to Gesell's
practical program. The object of stamped money was to eliminate basic
interest. The elimination of basic interest meant the elimination of
unemployment because persons who otherwise would tend to hold money
in order to extract baBic interest, would, under stamped money, be
willing to part with their money even if they received no return in
excess of the loan. With money no longer hoarded, thero would be no
lack of effective demand and no unemployment. One who received money
would create demand directly through the purchase of a. consumption
good or capital asset, or indirectly through someone else who would
invest in a capital asset. According to Gesell's theory, all private
income not consumed would be invested. After money had been received
from the sale of a service or commodity, it would be immediately passed
on. "If money is to fulfill its purpose, purchase must follow step
flTfor step on the heels of sale." ' This is the point at which Gesell 
insisted that social control was necessary.
Gesell's distinction between basic interest and interest on 
real capital is also used to contrast the declining rate of return on
QQ
real capital assets with the constant rate of return on money. In 
this way he points out that it is the money rate of interest which 
checks accumulation and impedes production. Hie accumulation of
8?The Natural Economic Order, p. 115.
^Gesell cited evidence to show that the basic rate of interest 
had been relatively constant throughout the ages, or at least since 
money was first used as the medium of exchange. The figure he gave 
was about four per cent. Ibid., pp. 2Bk, 285.
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capital assets in no way reduces the independently determined money 
rate of interest. The accumulation of capital assets, on the other 
hand, does lower the rate of return on real capital, and when the 
latter tends to fall below the basic rate of interest, accumulation 
of capital ceases because it is more profitable to hold money for the 
premium it will bring from those who prefer to have it for use as a 
medium of exchange, than to invest in industrial enterprise. If it 
were not that money had a rate of interest of its own (basic interest), 
accumulation would continue without interruption and the rate of re­
turn on real capital would fall and soon become zero. Under a system 
of stamped money, with basic interest eliminated, the only reason for 
paying a reward to the owners of instruments of production would be 
their scarcity.
Gesell did not concern himself with the question of the rate 
at which the productivity of capital assets would probably fall under 
the impetus of unrestrained accumulation. He took an optimistic view 
of the productive powers of the industrial system and held that it 
would not be long until the payment of scarcity rents would disappear.89 
The purpose of his theory was to show that payments for the use of real 
capital were caused by the special character of money, whereas in an 1 
economy employing stamped money, they would depend upon the demand for 
loans exceeding the supply of loans at a zero loan rate of interest.90
This loan interest is the third aspect of Gesell's complete 
theory of interest. It is the interest paid to lenders by the borrowers
89The Natural Economic Order, pp. 26l, 262. ^°Ibld., p. 263.
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of liquid funds. According to Gesell, the loan rate would always 
be equal to the rate of return on real capital assets, whether the 
loan be made In conventional money or Free-Money. It will be re­
called that Gesell's Free-Money program would not cause interest on 
loans to disappear Immediately. The explanation of this is found in 
the distinction between basic interest and loan interest, a distinction 
which turns on the difference between an exchange and a loan.^ Basic 
interest is not interest on a loan, but the tribute that arises when 
money is exchanged for other commodities in cases in which the purchaser 
is in a position to delay the transaction. In saying that basic inter­
est will disappear with the introduction of stamped money, Gesell meant 
that the consequences which flowed from the use of conventional money 
would be eliminated, and processes would be set in motion which in 
time would reduce the loan rate and the real rate to zero. When this 
had come about, interest income would have disappeared, and with this, 
rentier-capitalism, the "interest exploiting system," would come to 
an end.^
Loans contracted in stamped money would bear loan-interest as 
long as the demand for loan capital and real capital exceeded the sup­
ply at a zero loan rate, or, in other words, as long as a scarcity of
93real capital assets existed. Since real capital assets would con­
tinue to yield a return above cost, and since money could be used to 
purchase such assets, "anyone seeking a loan of money must pay for it
91lbid., p. 261.
92see Gesell's definition of capitalism, Supra, p. 161t
93The Natural Economic Order, p. 262.
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the same Interest as Is yielded "by real capital, This is obvious 
from the laws of competition."^ The Immediately significant dif­
ference arising from the substitution of Free-Money for conventional 
forms would be that all resources would be continuously employed. 
Basic interest would not exist as a barrier inhibiting new capital 
formation. The "natural" forces of competitive production would 
adjust to a level of output at which all the resources would be 
fully employed. This is the meaning, in terms of practical conse­
quences, of Gesell’s distinction between basic and loan interest.
Gesell did not develop a separate theory of crises. Fluctu­
ations in output and employment were' viewed as part of the normal be­
havior of an economy which emplqyed hoardable money as the medium of 
exchange. For Gesell, the immediate cause of crises was falling 
prices. Most important among the reasons why prices must sooner or
later fall in an economy employing conventional money was the decline
95in the rate of return on each new unit of real capital produced.
When this rate tended to fall below the basic-rate of interest, money 
would be withdrawn from circulation, or what amounts to the same 
thing, the velocity of circulation of money would be reduced. The 
reduction in the supply of money, which was equivalent to a reduction
9^Ibid.
^Gesell gave two other reasons why prices fall, "because the 
conditions under which gold is produced do not allow the supply of 
money (demand) to be adapted to the supply of wares," and "because 
with increased production and prosperity money 1b melted by gold­
smiths. . ." The Natural Economic Order, p. 109. It is clear that 
Gesell's argument w b b  addressed to a gold standard economy.
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96In the demand for products, caused prices to begin falling. Die fall
in prices would lead to an expectation of a further fall, developing
97into a cumulative process of deflation. The merchant would cease 
buying goods, fearing that the goods he was tempted to buy so cheaply 
today could be bou^it still more cheaply tomorrow. "Wares are un­
salable because they are too cheap and threaten to become still
98
cheaper. This is the crisis." Recovery from a crisis began with
the discovery of gold, the issue of paper money, or any factor which
99would increase credit, and the velocity of circulation.
Clearly, Gesell's explanation of crises was based upon his 
theory of interest, the essence of which was that interest on money 
was independent of the. interest on real capital.
C . Similarities of the Idea Systems of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes 
The purpose of this Section is to make a comparative analysis 
of the practical attitudes and theoretical positions of Proudhon,
Gesell, and-Keynes.
Die programs of these three men attempted to initiate social 
controls which, they believed, were justified by the theoretical pre­
mise that the competitive market system was not automatically self- 
adjusting because money had characteristics not possessed by other 
commodities. These unique qualities of money were linked directly 
to the existence of restraints imposed upon the activity of the entre­
preneur by the cost and difficulty of securing money capital for
96Die Natural Economic Order, p. 100. ^ Ibld., p. 101,
9^Ibid. "ibid. 1Q0Ibid., p. 108.
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industrial enterprise. All three men believed they had formulated 
programs which would result in a rectification and preservation of 
a system of private enterprise.
In their critical aspect these men were dedicated to a con-' 
demndtion of financial institutions which seemed to the authors to 
inhibit the free flow of community resources into the production 
and satisfaction of community wants. In particular their anti- 
financial capital orientation was associated with attitudes toward 
private property, metallic money, speculation, and the rentier. It 
was in these areas that the practical attitudes of Proudhon, Gesell, 
and Keynes took form and substance.
With respect to property, the attitudes of Proudhon and 
Keynes bear an interesting relation to one another. In spite of 
difference in terminology, they come essentially to the same position 
on the private ownership of property and money. It was the intention 
of both that there should be no legal change in the rights to the 
ownership of property. But both condemned all income from property, 
and attributed the flow of such income to the artificial scarcity 
of property caused by the peculiarities of money.
Proudhon's objection to "property"--his name is universally 
associated with the phrase, "Property is theft"— had much the same 
meaning as Keynes1 objection to interest income, or rentier income 
in general. Proudhon distinguished between "property" and "possession." 
By the latter he meant the private ownership of the instruments of pro­
duction minus the unearned (non-labor) income which usually accrues to 
such ownership. Keynes said that it was not the ownership (possession)
0
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of property which was important for the state to assume. The state 
should merely control certain aspects of investment and determine 
the basic rate of reward to those who own the instruments of pro­
duction.^0^ Since interest rewarded no genuine sacrifice any more
than did rent frcm land, the non-functional rentier capitalist would
102gradually disappear, as a result of the inauguration of a rational
economic reform program. To be sure, Keynes differs from Proudhon
in that he is not directly concerned with the problem of non-functional
income from land. He does, however, refer to the income frcm land as 
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a scarcity rent. Insofar as Proudhon believed that free credit 
would lead to the disappearance of rent as well as interest, his pri­
mary preoccupation did not differ from that of Keynes. In both cases
it is the money (credit) institutions to which the principal diffi-
10^culty is attributed.
The focal point of the historical attacks on financial capital 
has always been a criticism of the conventional forms of money. Througi- 
out the writings of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes there is a very vig­
orous condemnation of the practice which makes gold the basis for the 
money and banking system. Their oppositibn to metallic money has in 
common this characteristic. It is associated with an abnormally
101General Theory, p. 378. 10gIbid., pp. 376, 378.
103Ibid., p. 376.
•1,oiHj'hen an economic theorist combines the view that private 
property in production is fundamentally sound, with the view that 
the hoarding, or tendency to hoard, money is the real source of the 
economic problem, his theoretical analysis is almost certain to 
center on money and interest. This is the fundamental basis for 
the similar idea systems of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes.
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hi$i rate of Interest, which acts as a brake on industrial enterprise.
Proudhon's bank of exchange called for complete abandonment of the
relation between gold and legal tender money. To Proudhon and to his
predecessors in England, the Ricardian socialists, gold was the symbol
of economic disharmony. The relation which it bore to the rate of
interest involved his theory of constituted value and "engaged" capi-
»
tal. In the passage which Gesell so frequently quoted from Proudhon
concerning money as the barrier to the exchange of products, "gold"
is scmetimeB substituted for "money" in the p a r a p h r a s e . 1 * ^  To Gesell,
stamped currency represented a technique for avoiding the unnatural
restraints placed on industrial enterprise by any money such as gold,
which is‘protected by its physical properties against depreciation 
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in substance. He regarded interest as a direct consequence of 
the durability of precious metals. Keynes was one of the most influ­
ential opponents of the gold standard in England. His country's 
greatest economic ills were ascribed by him to an attempt to protect
her foreign balances at the expense of exercising control over the
107domestic rate of interest. The international gold standard, which 
necessitated maintenance of foreign balances, limited the degree of 
monetary autonomy and precluded the possibility of independence in
national economic policy. Keyne3 ' advocacy of economic self-sufficiency
108was largely responsible for his protectionist policies, and was 
directly related to his view that the international gold standard was
105The Natural Economic Order. Compare the quotation on p. 7 
. with the paraphrases on pp. 182 and 271, 272.
l0^Ibid., p. 95. -^General Theory, p. 339. 10^Ibld., p. 339.
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In no small degree responsible for the struggle for foreign markets
among nations, and in consequence, to the economic causes of war:
Never in history was there a method devised of such 
efficacy for setting each country’s advantage at variance 
with its neighbours' as the international gold standard.
For it made domestic prosperity directly dependent on a 
competitive pursuit of markets and a competitive appetite 
for the precious metals.
This passage could serve well as the thesis of Gesell's pamphlet on 
The Foundations of Peace. Much of Keynes' best social satire, intended 
to illustrate the contradictions in the present economic organization, 
related directly to the characteristics of gold.^‘L®
All three authors condemned the stock exchange, no less than 
the gold standard, as one of the institutions by which financial capi­
tal exerts a perverting influence on industrial capital. Their posi­
tion may be summed up in this way. The legitimate function of money 
is to move goods and services through the stages of production to the 
final consumer. It is important that the volume of money correspond 
to the needs of such transactions, and particularly important that 
there should be no sudden shifts in the rate of output. Unfortunately 
a major source of disturbance was to be found in the buying and selling 
of shares on the stock exchange. The absorption of money into the 
financial sphere for speculative purposes impinged on industrial ac­
tivity by making it difficult for the industrial entrepreneur to 
secure funds for operating and extending his plant. The exchange also 
added to the uncertainties of the industrial entrepreneur until he
1Q9lbid., p. 31*9.
■^General Theory, esp, pp. 130, 131.
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was forced either to close down hia film or participate himself, 
through the anticipation of price changes, in the speculative pro­
cess. Keynes said, "Business loses its genuine character and be­
lli
canes no better than a speculation in the exchanges." The business 
man became a gambler in a process in which his gains bore no relation 
to what his activities had contributed to society. The sensitivity 
of industry to the activities of the exchanges was a major point of 
emphasis with all three writers. Of course, Keynes made a more 
direct attack upon the investment market than did either Proudhon 
or Gesell when he advocated the socialization of investment. This 
resulted from his skepticism of monetary reform (lowering the interest 
rate) as an adequate Bocial control for securing a sufficient induce­
ment to invest, and his belief that the incidence on the marginal 
efficiency of capital of the instability of market estimations made
through the stock exchange would be too great to be offset by re-
112ductions in the rate of interest. Neither Proudhon nor Gesell called 
for socialized investment; however, the logical implications of their 
programs make quite clear the fact that, had their reform plans been 
adopted, investment would have been socialized.
The fourth aspect of the attack on financial capital relates 
to the rentier. The finance capitalist and the rentier were the 
twin results of the separation of management frcm ownership, a con­
dition associated at the present time with the growth of the corporate
M. Keynes, Economic Consequences of the peace (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920), p. 2^3.
• ^ General Theory, p. 16k.
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form of economic organization, but formerly with absentee land pro­
prietorship as well as the growth of large public debts. Hie rentier
is a passive income receiver, whereas the term "finance-capitalist”
113refers to the promoter, speculator and banker. J
The most deep-seated change in the social structure involved 
in the type of reform proposed by Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes is the 
passing of the rentier, whose disappearance will occur when the rate 
of return on capital falls to zero. Ihis implies no necessary ethical 
judgnent prejudicial to the rentier. The attitude toward the rentier 
is not fully explained until the emphasis on the role of the entre­
preneur has been clearly indicated. Disappearance of the non-functional 
rentier is incidental to a practical program which makes the entre­
preneur the initiator of economic activity. Society has no particular 
stake in the inactive, functionless rentier. On the other hand, any­
thing which dampens the ardor of entrepreneurship is inimical to the 
welfare of society as a whole. In an economy in which enterprise is 
carried on with borrowed capital, a reduction’ in the cost of borrowing 
1b obviously a stimulus to enterprise. The Proudhon-Gesell-Keynes 
attack on the rentier involves, on the objective level, a matter of 
fact pronouncement that if the conditions under which enterprise is 
carried on are not bettered, the community as a whole will suffer in 
consequence.
In directing attention to a comparative analysis of the theo­
retical positions of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes, the concern is with
1^3l. C. Merriam, "Rentier," Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, XIU, pp. 296-300, esp. p. 297.
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Ilk
the theories as a whole rather than to matters of specific detail.
It Is necessary to note first that the primary reference of
Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes was to the sphere of circulation, thougi
some exceptions must he allowed In the case of Keynes. The three
authors selected from the entire economic process the difficulties
arising from the use of money in making transfers between buyers
and sellers as the special point of emphasis. Proudhon's statement
that the theory of circulation of capital constituted the whole of
economic theory11-* corresponds to Gesell's assertions that the funda-
tt6
mental concepts of economics are "exchange" and "commodities."
Gesell represents the social relations between the Industrial employer 
and the worker as an exchange of the product of the worker for a value - 
equivalent. With Keynes the Institutional process which links indi­
vidual non-consumption to social accumulation was the particular point 
of friction in the economic process.
This "transfer" difficulty was associated with the peculiarity 
of exchanges of commodities for money. The preferred qualities of 
money were related in a casual way to interest. Thus the theories
HkThese writers differed greatly in their preparation for 
technical economic analysis. Keynes was the only academically 
trained economist in the group. Proudhon was largely self-educated. 
Although he wrote prolifically on economic subjects, he was by no 
means a master craftsman with the tools of analysis of political 
economy. Gesell was even less an academician than Proudhon. His 
writings were stimulated by his experience as a business man who 
was implicated in situations in which he could scarcely have avoided 
pondering the events which affected his affairs daily. For these 
reasons, a detailed comparison would not be particularly relevant 
under any circumstances.
■^^proudhon, Oeuvres completes, XIX, p. 218.
Natural Economic Order, p. 20e,
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of Proudhon, Gesell and Keynes are theories of money and Interest 
considered In relation to the utilization of resources and the ac­
cumulation of capital. While Interest is purely a monetary phenom­
enon, money Is Important In ways not related directly to Interest,
and insofar as this is significant, this type of theory may better
117
be described as the "theory of a Monetary Economy." The purely 
monetary theory of interest of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes is dis­
tinguished by the strategic role which interest plays in relation
118to the total theoretical construction.
The way in which money, working through the rate of interest, 
acted as a brake to the growth of real capital assets was singularly 
significant for this trinity of economic reformers. They all main­
tained that if the monetary barriers to production were removed, the 
accumulation of real capital assets would increase so rapidly that 
the necessity for paying scarcity rents to the owners would disappear 
in a relatively short time. The integration of money into general 
economic theory is closely connected with the insight that the failure
^ ^General Theory, p. 293. Keynes refers to the "complete 
theory of a Monetary Economy."
iiQ
There have been economists who Interpreted interest as 
essentially a payment for money who cannot be identified with the 
Proudhon-Keynes type of economic theorizing. For example, both 
Marx and Schumpeter regarded interest as a purely monetary problem, 
but in the theoretical systems of Marx and of Schumpeter the rate 
of interest occupies a somewhat incidental position. See Marx, 
Capital, III, p. k35, and Schumpeter, "Eevidw of Keynes’ General 
Theory," Journal of the American Statistical Association, New 
Series, XXXI, (December, 1936), p. 795. Schumpeter said: "I wish
to welcome his (Keynes) purely monetary theory of interest which 
is, as far as I can see, the first to follow upon my own. Unfor­
tunately, I must add that the similarity stops there and that I 
do not think my argument open to the objections which this one is 
sure to meet."
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to accumulate assets and the continual lack of effective demand for 
products are attributable to the Impediments to continuous production 
afforded by the behavior of financial capital. It was because Keynes 
and his predecessors believed that they had discovered In monetary 
processes the strategic flaw In the capitalist economy that they logi­
cally Insisted that money could not be abstracted away, even on a 
preliminary level of analysis.
In the writings of each author there is a particular concept 
with which the pretended uniqueness of his entire theory is associated. 
In the case of Keynes, it is "liquidity-preference," In the case of 
Gesell, "basic-Interest," and In the case of Proudhon, "constituted - 
value."^9 These are parallel concepts in the sense that they are 
the most important in the views of the theorists. "Basic-interest" 
and "liquidity-preference" are directly related to the theory of 
Interest, but "constituted'value" is not. Each was rather preten­
tious concerning his theoretical Innovation. Upon a basis of the 
idea described by the concept, each proclaimed the superiority of his 
theory over that of any predecessor. The advocacy of practical policy 
was closely connected with these "scientific discoveries." The meaning
^ % y  having values "constituted" Proudhon meant having the true, 
and therefore stable and certain values assigned to commodities. In 
the existing organization of society, with its particularltype of money 
and credit institutions, the only commodity whose value is constituted 
is specie (money). It is the uncertain value of other commodities which 
makes these less readily exchangeable than specie. If this quality of 
constituted value could be extended to all commodities, they would be 
raised to a level of exchangeability equal to that of specie, and in 
this way would serve directly as money. For Proudhon's complete theory 
of value, see System of Economic Contradictions, pp. 65, 73, 82, 83,
91, 95, 102, 226, 233, 236.”
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of the proposition that the theories as a whole are theories of 
interest may be illustrated by taking these strategic concepts and 
showing how they are related to one another and to the ideas about 
money.
These theories differ from the orthodox theory in that the 
latter assumes in its general principles that all c.apital is indus­
trial capital. Ihe repudiation of this assumption is the starting 
point of the Proudhon-Keynes tradition. It is precisely the presence 
of financial capital which causes the disturbances to the movements 
of industrial capital in such a way as to lead to the characteristic 
difficulties associated with capitalism: unemployment, poverty,
unearned Incomes, inequality, and insufficiency of effective demand. 
This distinction focuses the analysis on the different behavior of 
financial and industrial capital.
Each is agreed that financial capital possesses characteristics 
which, because of its strategic place in the mobilization and exchange 
of Industrial capital, impose profound limitations on the working of 
an otherwise sound competitive system. Hie theoretical systems of 
Keynes, Gesell, and Proudhon are most similar in relation to their 
theories of interest. Allowing for differences in exposition, all 
three migfct be appropriately described as liquidity-preference theories 
of interest. According to each theory, interest is the payment, or 
the reward, for parting with liquidity, i.e., with money. Proudhon 
says that interest payments are necessary in order to induce the 
owner of money to "engage” it. Gesell maintains that interest has 
to be paid by those who want money for a medium of exchange to those
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who prefer money as a medium of saving. It is preferred as the medium 
of saving because it does not involve carrying costs. Ih the case of 
Keynes, the preference for holding money is explained by the uncertainty 
of the future rates of interest and the instability of the marginal ef­
ficiency of capital.
Proudhon's constituted value becomes coordinate with Keynes' 
liquidity-preference and Gesell's basic interest in that it attempts 
to explain how the bank of exchange would overcome, or eliminate, the 
preference of wealth-owners for money. If the objective of the bank 
could be realized, there would be no basis for preferring money to 
any other asset. According to Proudhon, the value of money was the 
only constituted value. The aim of his bank of exchange was to con­
stitute the value of all commodities. If this condition were realized, 
there would be an uninterrupted exchange of products for products in 
proportion to their "true" or constituted values. Gesell believed 
that stamped money would eliminate the preference for money as a 
medium of saving. Keynes' central bank control was designed to re­
duce uncertainly concerning the interest rates which prevail in the 
future.
Starting frcm the proposition that reductions in the rate of 
interest are of fundamental significance in the programs of Gesell 
and Keynes, the question may be asked how this practical view was re­
lated to the use of the concepts basic interest and liquidity-preference 
and how these concepts were analogous in the analyses of the two theo-
120
rists. Keynes' description of interest as the reward for not hoarding,
General Theory, p. 171*.
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or alternatively, as the reward for parting with liquidity, fits 
easily into Gesell's notion of interest. In proposing that currency 
be taxed by requiring periodic stamping, Gesell's idea was to prevent 
wealth-owners frcm hoarding money, or to compel them by pecuniary 
penalty to part with liquidity. Keynes employs the concept liquidity- 
preference (due to speculative motive) to denote the resistances 
which must be overcome before people will part with their money.
The reference of the concept is to the subjective state of mind of 
wealth-owners, and in this sense liquidity-preference is an independ­
ent variable, though of course it is subject to change. Analytically, 
Keynes represents liquidity-preference in a diagram involving three
variables. When' the liquidity-preference schedule is held constant,
122
the coordinates are the rate of interest and the quantity of money. 
Given the state of liquidity-preference and the quantity of money, 
the rate of interest is determined.
If the liquidity-preference curve is assumed to be given, 
Gesell's basic rate of Interest could be represented as the rate of 
interest which appears in Keynes' liquidity-preference diagram. If 
the liquidity-preference schedule were lowered, e.g., following Gesell's 
stamped money proposal, and assuming a constant volume of money, there 
would be a point at which the basic rate of interest would fall to zero.
Keynes states that the rate of stamp-taxing should be, in his 
terminology, approximately equal to "the excess of the money-rate of 
interest. . .over the marginal efficiency of capital corresponding 
to a rate of new investment compatible with full employment."
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This corresponds in Gesell’s terminology to the difference between 
the basic rate of interest and the rate of return on real capital.
It would appear from his analysis that Gesell intended the stamping 
rate should be equal to the basic rate of interest. In Keynes' 
system this corresponds to the rate of interest appearing in the 
liquidity-preference schedule.
Keynes’ major criticism of Gesell's theory is that it repre­
sented "only half a theory of the rate of interest. . .because the
I0I4.
notion of liquidity-preference escaped him." In his discussion of 
Gesell, Keynes does not once mention the theory of basic interest, 
which contains the crux of Gesell's whole position. Keynes' pro­
nouncement was valid only in the sense that Gesell did not develop 
in explicit fashion a theory of liquidity-preference.
. Gesell's argument may be restated as follows. In a barter
125economy there would be no interest. In a money economy interest 
exists for two reasons: (1 ) the carrying costs of money are negli­
gible compared to the carrying costs of other commodities, (2 ) money
is more efficient than bills of exchange and other media for trans- 
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ferring goods. Money is more efficient because it is the unit of 
account, and no special knowledge is needed to know its value. More­
over, it is easily divisible into fractions for making payments. 
Private property includes the rigit to accumulate on a large scale,
^Ibld., p. 356.
3-25 The Natural Economic Order, pp. 228, 238.
^Ibid., p. 263.
and accumulation presupposes saving. The function of saving Is
divorced from the function of producing goods and services. Interest
Is necessary to Induce the Inactive savers to transfer their wealth
Into the control of the active producers. With Gesell, as with Keynes,
Interest was a rentier phenomenon, and would disappear with the rentier.
The object of Gesell's explanation of basic interest was to show why
money draws interest. It was not true, as Keynes said, that Gesell
completely overlooked the need of an explanation why the money rate
127of Interest was positive. ' Gesell's theory represented a refinement 
of his practical insist that money should be forced to circulate by 
means of a periodic taxing which would offset the preference of wealth 
owners for holding, or "hoarding" money rather than spending it for 
seme form of productive or consumable wealth. In attempting to refine 
and theoretically justify this insigit, it should not be surprising 
that Gesell, in a sense, anticipated the notion of liquidity-preference.
Gesell's stamped money fits logically into Keynes' general 
program, which is otherwise lacking in proposals for lowering the 
money rate of interest below the. minimum attainable through manipu­
lating the quantity of money. The socialization of investment as such 
has nothing to do with reductions in the rate of interest for the 
reason that the latter is a monetary phenomenon and is subject to 
change only via monetary influences. Some variation of stamped money, 
such as a tax on bank deposits, is a logical step toward the attain­
ment of the long-term implications of Keynes' position, i.e.,
•^ General Theory, p. 35^.
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disappearance of a rate of return on accumulated wealth and the conse­
quent euthanasia of the rentier. Dius the theoretical problem for 
both Gesell and Keynes was to develop a theory which would show the 
way to eliminate the private ownership of money while maintaining 
the private ownership of other forms of wealth.
The above discussion has been concerned with the similarities
between the theories of interest of Gesell and Keynes. Let us now
turn to a consideration of Proudhon's theory in this same respect.
As has been shown, Proudhon viewed Interest as the premium paid for
getting capital to "engage itself," and stated that "exploitation
alone is capable of maintaining engaged capital at its nominal 
128value." The owner of money was able to extract this premium 
because of the peculiar nature of money, which was, in Proudhon's 
language, explained by the fact that money was the only article of 
exchange whose value had been "constituted." Of course the meaning 
of Proudhon's constituted value was related to his bank of exchange, 
which was his method for extending constituted value to all other 
commodities.
Proudhon's proposal to convert the bill of exchange into the 
universal medium of exchange may be described in terms of the con­
ditions under which a "debt" in the Keynesian sense can be used as 
"money." Keynes said that there was no hard and fast division be­
tween a "debt" and money; "We can treat as money any command over 
general purchasing power which the owner haB not parted with for a 
period in excess of. . .three months, one month, or three days or
^®Econcmic Contradictions, I, p. 291.
three hours or any other period; or we can exclude from money what­
ever is not legal tender on the spot."^2^ The use of a "debt," i.e., 
Proudhon's bill of exchange, directly as money, would be possible in 
circumstances in which there was no reason for preferring money. If 
there were no uncertainty about the future value of a "debt," and 
if it could at any time be converted into general purchasing power 
without inconvenience to the owner, there would be no preference for 
holding money, Proudhon believed that his program would create an 
ideal exchange economy in which production and circulation would be 
well coordinated, and in which there would exist no uncertainty about 
the liquidity of bills of exchange (about the debtor's ability and 
willingness to pay). "Debtslike bank notes, would earn no interest. , 
Under these circumstances the distinction between money and "debts" 
would have no practical significance. The rate of interest could be 
zero as Proudhon believed it would be.
Whether such a scheme is realizable under private enterprise 
production raises an issue of the validity of the program and of the 
significance of the theory devised in support of such a program. If 
an investigation of this problem were made, it would probably indicate 
that the evidence, drawn from the historical development of the private 
enterprise economy, would be against supposing such a proposal workable. 
One of the essential implications of the formal principles of a free 
enterprise economy is that the less efficient forms will be forced out 
of the market. ttie competitive process itself produces uncertainty 
concerning the future exchange "value" of any particular debt and
^General Theory, p. 167.
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affords a basis for preferring cash to "debts." It is likewise 
difficult to imagine that a system of production based on private 
enterprise could be coordinated in production, circulation, and con­
sumption after the fashion of an ideal planned economy. The least 
shock may interrupt the chain of payments by bills of exchange.
Goods would depreciate and if the fall in prices gained momentum, 
a cumulative deflation and crisis would result.
Uiere are, then, fundamental similarities among the concepts 
liquidity-preference, basic-interest, and constituted value. Each 
involves the notion that money possesses distinctive qualities which 
cause it to be preferred, particularly in times of crisis, to all other 
forms of wealth. When on individual acquires money from the sale of 
commodities, there is no social control over its subsequent use. The 
money may be withheld from circulation, thus failing to be exchanged 
for commodities produced in anticipation of exchanging for money.
Again, the money may be used for speculative transaction.’ Hie diver­
sion of money away from industrial transactions interferes with the 
process of production by reducing the money demand for consumption and 
investment goods, lhis is the heart of the Proudhon, Gesell, Keynes 
tradition and to view Keynes* theory of interest and money as a revolu­
tionary contribution to economic thought is to completely ignore this 
strong tradition.
Arguments for reform which involve an attack on income- 
receiving groups characteristically take on a theoretical dress 
which attempts to demonstrate that the group attacked occupies a 
non-functional position in the creation of output. KeyrieB, Gesell,
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and Proudhon all point to the rentier as non-functional and conclude 
that the rentier will disappear with the inauguration of a rational 
program of reform. They all point out that the institutional mech­
anism which is responsible for rentier income is contrary to the 
interests of society because it inhibits the activity of the entre­
preneur, the initiator of new enterprise and innovations. The com­
munity will benefit from a lowering of the rate of interest because 
it facilitates transferring the use of wealth into the control of the 
active entrepreneur from the control of the inactive rentier or specu­
lator.
Uhe attack on the rentier involves in each case arguments 
that the payment of interest is not necessary to induce individual 
saving, and also that the rate of social accumulation will be accel­
erated by a low or zero rate of interest. It is not necessary to 
deny the tendency of individuals to save more out of a given income 
at a higher rate of interest than at a lower rate. Die essence of 
this position is to regard the rate of interest as the principal 
deterrent to the creation of income. The functional relationship 
between the rate of interest and the volume of saving from a given 
income is of secondary importance. The existence of unemployed 
resources is the substantial basis which gives validity to the argu­
ment that consumption and the accumulation of capital can proceed to­
gether. This contrasts with the orthodox view that accumulation can 
increase only at the expense of consumption, or vice-versa. Thus 
Proudhon said:
It is not the multiplication of capital which decreases
the rate of interest, but the decrease in the rate of
197
Interest which increases capital.^0 
GeseU said:
The greater the fall in interest, the greater the amount 
of real capital created. . .If interest is an incentive, 
it is still more an obstacle to saving. ^ 31
Keynes said:
Thus, even if it is the case that a rise in the rate of 
interest would cause the community to save more out of 
a given income, we can be quite sure that a rise in the
rate of interest. . .will decrease the actual aggregate
of savings.132
All ‘three theorists were extreme optimists concerning the rate 
at which accumulation would proceed if substantial reductions were made 
in the rate of interest. They believed that within a relatively brief 
period capital could be deprived of its scarcity value so that the re­
turn over the life of an investment would Just be equal to its cost. 
Keynes estimated that in countries as wealthy as the United States and 
Great Britain, a period of about twenty-five years would be required 
to reduce the marginal efficiency of capital to zero.^^ Gesell be­
lieved likewise that unimpeded production would soon lead to an "ocean
of real capital necessary to drown interest."^*’ He gives no specific
indication as to how long this would take but says that interest- would 
have been eliminated long ago, had not production been frustrated by 
the traditional medium of exchange.^5
Proudhon was iess clear as to the length of the period requisite
130Qeuvres completSs, X3X, p. 267.
•^ T h e  Natural Economic Order, pp. 250, 251.
^ General Theory, p. 111. ^ Ibld., p> ^2k.
•^The Natural Economic Order, p. 262. ‘^ Ibld., p< 361.
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under the bank of exchange plan to abolish interest. The actual 
proposals which he drew and presented for adoption called for a 
gradual lowering of the discount rate, thou^i his writings often 
implied that the interest rate could be reduced forthwith to zero.
The passage from Proudhon which Gesell quotes at the opening of The 
Natural Economic Order is, however, a significant indication of the 
similarity in their views. "Qhe surest method of depreciating real 
capital. . .is to create and operate additional real capital. By 
every economic law, increased production of capital increases also 
the total of the capital supplied to the workers, thus raising wages 
and finally reducing interest to zero'.'^ 6
Opposition to the so-cdlled productivity and abstinence 
theories followed logically from this position on interest. The 
interpretation of interest as a scarcity rent paid for the use of 
unnecessarily scarce capital assets is not consistent with the view 
that capital is "productive." All versions of the productivity theory 
were explicitly rejected by Proudhon,Gesell, and Keynes.
If all income is said to be created by labor, including the efforts
of entrepreneurs, the income received by the owners of capital is 
not a consequence of the "productivity" of capital, but a deduction 
from the income created by labor. In this sense the interest theories 
of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes are "exploitation" theories. The
3. Cited by Gesell from Proudhon's What is Property? 
^oeuvres completes t XIX, passim, esp. pp. 217, 291.
•^38>[he Natural Economic Order, pp. 268, 269.
■^ General Theory, pp. 213-217.
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exploitation results from the institutional monopoly vhlch centers 
around the restrictive tendencies of financial capital.
The above comparative analysis indicates that there Is a sig­
nificant theoretical similarity corresponding to the similar practical 
outlooks of Proudhon, Gesell, and Keynes. Their attack on financial 
capital directed their emphasis toward money and Interest theory, and 
led to Interesting uniformities In seme of the special aspects of the 
respective theories. Thus Keynes' place In the history of economic
thought, so far as money and Interest theories are concerned, Is with
1^0
the "circulation" reformers, the monetary "heretics." Keynes was
completely honest when he said:
Now I range myself with the heretics. I believe their flair 
and their instinct move them towards the right conclusion.
But I was brought up In the citadel. . .A large part of the 
established body of econanic doctrine I cannot but accept as 
broadly correct. I do not'doubt it. For me, therefore, It 
Is Impossible to rest satisfied until I can put my finger on 
that part of the orthodox reasoning that leads me to the 
conclusions that for various reasons seem to me to be unac­
ceptable. I believe that I am on my way to do so. There Is,
I am convinced, a fatal flaw In the part of orthodox reason­
ing that deals with the theory of what determines the level 
of effective demand and the volume of aggregate employment; 
the flaw being largely due to the failure of the classical 
doctrine to develop a satisfactory and realistic theory of 
the rate of Interest.1^!
lUOjhQ material in this chapter Is based upon Dudley Dillard, 
Proudhon and Gesell; Antecedents of John Maynard Keynes' General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. An unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation, 19^0.
M. Keynes, "A Self-Adjusting Economic SyBtem," The 
New Republic, IXXXII (February 20, 1935)» P* 36.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
No longer do professional economists debate whether or not 
the economics of John Maynard Keynes had tremendous Influence upon 
economic theory, inquiry, thinking, and policy. The validity of the 
many facets of Keynesianism is still a topic for discussion, but It 
Is safe to say that now— after twenty years of the General Theory—  
all economists agree that economic theory was profoundly affected by 
J. M. Keynes, the English aristocrat, a scholar of Eton and King’s 
College, Cambridge, a director of the Bonk of England, an advisor to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a peer of the Realm.'1' This is not 
to say that all economists have become Keynesians or Keynesian econo-
p
mists. The economics of Keynes has its converts and critics, its 
friends and foes, and there are those who classify themselves as 
Keynesians and there are economists who consider themselves to be
•^ See: OBITUART— The Times (London), April 22, 1946, Reprinted
in The New Economics— Keynes ’ influence on Theory and Public Policy 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945). Hereafter cited as The New
Economics.
2The writer has heard H. L. McCracken, Professor of Economic 
Theory and Head of the Department of Economics at Louisiana State 
University, say many timeB that there is a great difference between 
a Keynesian and a Keynesian economist. A Keynesian is one who begdns 
and ende: his study of economic theory with the General Theory. A 
Keynesian economist, on the other hand, is one who has been thoroughly 
trained in the complete history of economic thought, with the General 
Theory being only a part of his economic education.
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non- or anti-KeynesIans. But they all agree that Keynes ". . .stirred
the stale economic frog pond to its depth.
Seymour Harris says, "Keynes' influence, both in theory and
practice, has of course been outstanding. It is indeed doubtful
whether any other economist ever had so large an influence on policy,
and particularly in so short a time."14' Harris' final appraisal of
the General Theory is that;
. . .Keynes was undoubtedly the great figure in economics 
of the twentieth century and may well prove to be the 
giant of modem economics. . .Certainly, the economic 
historian interpreting the middle year^ of the 20th cen­
tury will characterize the period bb the struggle for, 
and over, full employment. He may well refer to the 
period as the Keynesian period in the same manner as we 
now refer to the Mercantilist, the Physiocratic, and the 
Classical periods. He will point to Keynes' emphasis on 
the level of employment against the classical concern with 
the allocation of economic resources; he will stress 
Keynes' skill in marshalling available weapons and tech­
niques and inventing of new oneB for attaining the objective; 
and he will comment on the persuasive manner in which the 
message was passed to disciples and policy-makers.5
Alvin H. Hansen, perhaps the most thorougi-going Keynesian
economist in the United States, does not believe that one should draw
a complete line of demarcation dividing pre-Keynesian and Keynesian
economics. Nevertheless, "If a stranger from Mars," he says, "should
undertake to read the literature of economics from, say, 1700 to the
present day, he would be struck, I believe, particularly by the new
^Gottfried Haberler, "Hie General Theory," The New Economics,
p. l6l.
^Seymour Harris, "Keynes' Influence on Public Policy," The 
New Economics, p. 12.
^Seymour Harris, "About This Book," and "Keynes’ Influence on 
Public Policy," The New Economics, pp. 6, 15.
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direction and outlook injected by the publication of (a) Wealth of
Nationst (b) the works of Jevons, the Austrians, and Walras, and
£
(c) Keynes' General Theory.11 . Hansen's attitude toward the economics 
of Keynes may be summarized by quoting the following statements:
It is evident that a new outlook was injected into eco- 
nanics, both with respect to theory and policy, by the publi­
cation of the General Theory. That it was not Just "old 
stuff" is evidenced by the terrific effort it required for 
economists to readjust their thinking and, indeed, the dif­
ficulty they had in understanding what it was all about. 
Witness, for example, the first reviews (including my own) 
and the endless controversial articles on concepts which, 
in retrospect, are rarely a credit to the profession.
More and more, even those who professed to see little in 
Keynes that was new or valid began to reveal that they 
had experienced a rebirth despite their protestations to 
the contrary. Add to this the fact that the Influence of 
Keynes permeates all official international gatherings grap­
pling with economic problems and is present wherever internal 
economic problems are under consideration. . .It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that nothing like it has happened in 
the whole history of economics. It is too early to say, but 
it does not now appear an extravagant statement, that Keynes 
may in the end rival Adam Smith in his influence on the eco- 
ncraic thinking and governmental policy of his time and age. . .
Paul Samuelson, probably the most outstanding young Keynesian
economist in this country, believes that the doctrines of Keynes have
correctly been named "The Keynesian Revolution." Becoming lyrical
in his praise for the great English economist, Samuelson says, "To
have been b o m  as an economist before 1936 was a boon--yes. But not
to have been b o m  too long before! Bliss was it in that dawn to be
^Alvin H. Hansen, "The General Theory," The New Economics,
p. 133.
7Ibid., pp. lk3~lhk.
®Paul Samuelson, "The General Theory," The New Economics,
p. 1^5.
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alive, But to be young was very heaven?"^
The General Theory caugit most economists under the age 
of 35 vith the unexpected virulence of a disease first at­
tacking and decimating an isolated tribe of south sea islanders. 
Economists beyond fifty turned out to be quite Immune to the 
ailment. With time, most economists in-between began to run 
the fever, often without knowing or admitting their condition.
With respect to the influence of the General Theory and its
importance as a lasting body of thought, Samuelson takes a firm stand:
Fashion always plays an important role in economic science; 
new concepts become the mode and then are passe. . .In this 
case, gradually and against heavy resistance, the realization 
grew that the new analysis of effective demand associated with 
the General Theory w b b  not to prove such a passing fad, that 
here indeed was part of "the wave of the future." This im­
pression was confiimed by the rapidity with which English 
economists, other than those at Cambridge, took up the new 
Gospel: e.g., Harrod, Meade, and others, at Oxford; and, 
still more surprisingly, the young blades at the-London 
School, like Kaldor, Lemer, and Hicks, who threw off their 
Hayekian garments and joined in the swim.
Instead of burning out like a fad, ten years after its 
birth, the General Theory is still gaining adherents and 
appears to be in business to stay. Many economists who 
are most vehement in criticism of the specific Keynesian 
policies— which must always be carefully distinguished from 
the scientific analysis associated with his name— will never 
again be the same after passing through his hands.
Finally, and perhaps most important from the long-run 
standpoint, the Keynesian analysis has begun to filter down 
into the elementary text-books; and, as everybody knows, 
once an idea gets Into these, however bad it may be, it be­
comes practically immortal.
So much for the unswerving admiration of the Keynesian econo­
mists for the General Theory. They are disciples of Lord Keynes in the 
truest meaning of the term. Although Samuelson believes that the "new 
doctrines" of Keynes are something more than a religion, he refers to 
Keynes and the General Theory in a religious manner. "True, we find
9Ibid., (Italics by Samuelson). 10Ibid., p. lU6. 
^Ibid., pp. 1U6-IU7. (Italics by Samuelson).
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a Gospel, a Scripture, a Prophet, Disciples, Apostles, Epigoni, ana
even a Dualityj and if there 1b no Apostolic Succession, there is
12at least an Apostolic Benediction." And Harris refers to the General 
Theory as "the Keynesian bible," and says, "Keynes indeed had the 
Bevelation. His disciples are new dividing into groups, each taking 
sustenance from the Keynesian larder. Die struggle for the Apostolic 
Succession is on."^
But even the critics have had high praise for Keynes* idea 
system. In commenting upon Keynes* influence, Joseph Schumpeter sajs.;
A Keynesian school formed itself, not a school in that
loose sense in which some historians of economics speak of
a French, German, Italian school, but a genuine one which is 
a sociological entity, namely, a group that professes al­
legiance to one master and one doctrine, and has its inner 
circle, its propagandists, its watchwords, its esoteric and 
its popular doctrine. Nor is this all. Beyond the pale of 
orthodox Keynesianism there is a broad fringe of sympathizers, 
and beyond this again are the many who have absorbed, in one 
form or another, readily or grudgingly, some of the spirit 
or some of the individual itemB of Keynesian analysis. There 
are but two analogous cases In the whole history of econcmics-- 
the Physiocrats and the Marxists.^
And Paul Sweezy, a Marxian and hence an anti-Keynesian, has 
characterized Keynes as "one of the most brilliant and versatile gen­
iuses of our time. . .the most important and illustrious product of 
the neo-classical school,. . .whose mission was to reform neo-classical 
economics, to bring it back into contact with the real world." Sweezy 
has said that he has no doubt that "Keynes is the greatest British
^ Ibid.. p. lJ+7 .
^Seymour Harris, "About Diis Book," The New Economics,
PP. 9.
^Joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, Die Economist," Die New Economics,
P. 97.
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(or American) economist since Bicardo," and that he thinks "his school 
sheds a flood of ligit on the functioning of the capitalist economy.
Thus economists are in agreement that the Keynesian idea sys­
tem was a phenomenal development in the history of economic theory.
No one now denies the fact that Keynes' equilibrium analysis has had 
tremendous influence on economic policy. According to the best au­
thorities the economics of Keynes has forced all economists to subject 
their thinking to a rather rigid re-examination, and has had the effect 
of compelling many to revise and reformulate their basic theoretical 
framework.
Of course it comes as no great surprise to anyone to learn 
that the Keynesian economists account for the great popularity and in­
fluence of the General Theory on the basis that contained within the 
Keynesian idea system are very important and everlasting contributions 
to economic science. It is claimed that Keynes manufactured new ana­
lytical tools by the use of which the economic problems of the present 
day can be solved. "Keynes contributed Importantly to the solution 
of the following problems: reparations, exchange rates, international
equilibrium, appropriate rates of interest, central banking policy, 
inflation, deflation and wastage of economic resources, and employment. 
Ihese problems are, of course, interrelated; they are not, and perhapB 
never will be, solved satisfactorily; nevertheless, by removing under­
brush, building foundations, and illuminating the signposts, Keynes
•*-5paul Sweezy, "John Maynard Keynes," Science and Society, 
X (Fall, 19^6), p. i+m.
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prepared the road to full employment and stability."
Lawrence R. Klein wrote The Keynesian Revolution in 19*+7> a 
book which was based on his doctoral thesis written in 19^  at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology under the guidance and inspi­
ration of Paul Samuelson. In the Foreword, Klein says, "Hie Keynesian 
theory is viewed in the following pages as a revolutionary doctrine in 
the sense that it produces theoretical results entirely different from 
the body of economic thou$it existing at the time of its development. 
The 'Revolution' discussed here is a revolution in thou^it, not in the 
economic policies of government."^ According to Klein, once Keynes 
realized that orthodox interest theory did not conform to the facts of 
the real world and what was needed was a theory of income determination 
to replace traditional interest rate theory, "a revolution occurred in 
economic theory." Klein also maintained that Keynes' refusal to ac­
cept the standard theory of flexible wage rates as a cure for unemploy-
19ment rendered the Keynesian system revolutionary.
Klein asked "what has been Keynes' revolutionary contribution?"
And he answers the question in a quite precise manner;
. . .the revolution was solely the development of a theory 
of effective demand; i.e., a theory of the determination of 
the level of output as a whole.
There are two major economic problems— the problem of 
achieving full employment, and the problem of allocating 
resources in a full-employment economy. Keynes haB shown 
how the level of employment gets determined, and thus has 
provided a theory with which to attack the first problem.
l^Seymour Harris, "Keynes' Influence on Public Policy," Hie 
New Economics, pp. 12, 13.
^Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution (New York; The 
Macmillan Company, 19*+7) p. vii.
l8Ibld., p. 37. 19Ibid., p. Wj.
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He did not presume to advance a solution of the second problem, 
except in so far as the first must necessarily be cleared 
away before thinking about the second can start.2°
Samuelson is in basic agreement with Klein concerning the sig­
nificance of Keynes' work when he says, "I myself believe the broad 
significance of the General Theory to be in the fact that it provides
a relatively realistic, complete system for analyzing the level of ef-
21fective demand and its fluctuations." In a more restricted or spe­
cific sense:
I conceive the heart of its contribution to be in that 
subset of its equations which relate to the propensity to 
consume and to saving in relation to offsets-to-saving.
In addition to linking saving explicitly to income, there 
is an equally important denial of the implicit "classical 
axiom that motivated investment is indefinitely expansible 
or contractable, so that whatever people try to save will 
always be fully invested.22
Harris thinks the great contribution of the General Theory to
bo its adaptation of economics,
to the changing institutional structure of modem society. 
Economics had failed to keep pace with the developments of 
science, of government, of changes in the market-place, of 
organization by groups, and in general with institutional 
developments. Up to 1936, when the General Theory was first 
published, accepted economics in general belonged much more 
to the vanished age of competition, of capital deficiencies, 
of full employment or transitional unemployment, and the like, 
than to the twentieth-century economy which tolerated and, 
to some extent encouraged, monopolies, rigidities, excessive 
savings, deficiency of demand, and unemployment. To make 
up for the growing lag, Keynes sailed boldly and vigorously
2QIbld., p. 56.
21paul Samuelson, "Lord Keynes and the General Theory," 
Econometrlca, XIV, No. 3 (July, 19*+6), P« 192.
22paul Samuelson, '"Dae General Theory," The New Economics, 
p. 151. (Italics by Samuelson).
into uncharted w a t e r s . 2 ^
Hansen is very specific concerning what he believes to be Keynes' 
greatest contribution in the General Theory. "It has been my con­
viction for many years," he says, "that the great contribution of 
Keynes' General Theory was the clear and specific formulation of the 
consumption function. This is an epoch-making contribution to the
tools of economic analysis, analogous to, but even more important
oh
than, Marshall's discovery of the demand function." In more general 
terms, Hansen says, "The effect of variations in income upon all man­
ner of economic variables has, since Keynes, become an important field
for research and analysis. Income analysis at long last occupies-a
25place equally as important as price analysis."
Dudley Dillard sees a very close relationship between the
theoretical and the policy concepts of the General Theory. First,
"Keynes1 major purpose may be characterized as an attempt to buttress
political liberalism with a new economic program and to fortify this
2 6economic program with a new political economy." Second, "The his­
toric significance of Keynes' new political economy is that it fur­
nishes the theoretical basis for a new liberalism, which, unlike
27
classical liberalism, rejects laissez-faire." And finally, "The
23seymour Harris, "About This Book," The New Economics, p. h. 
""Alvin Hansen, "The General Theory," The Hew Economics,
P. 135.
25Ibid., p. 135, 136.
26Dudley Dillard, The Economics of John Maynard Keynes (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19^8), p. 3lST
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ultimate significance of the theory. . .resides in the program of
pA
action with which it is associated."
Schumpeter and Haberler, perhaps the two leading critics of 
Keynes in this country, concede a victory for the General Theory hut 
for somewhat different reasons than those given by the disciples of 
Keynes. Haberler attributes, as a partial cause,
. . .the brilliance of (Keynes') style, the versatility, 
incredible quickness, and fecundity of his mind, the many- 
sidedness of his intellectual interests, the sharpness of 
his wit, in one word the fullness of his personality.
(These, he says, were) bound to fascinate scores of people 
in and outside the economic profession. Only a dullard 
or narrow-minded fanatic could fail to be moved to admi­
ration by Keynes' genius.29
He further notes:
The tremendous appeal of the General Theory to theoretioally- 
mihdpd economists has been attributed by many to the (alleged) 
fact that it uses for the first time in the history of economic 
thought a general equilibrium approach in easily manageable 
macroscopic (aggregative) terms.3°
Yet in Haberler's opinion neither the brilliance of Keynes' style and 
wit nor the attractiveness of macroscopic general equilibrium analysis 
is the major cause of the sweeping success of the General Theory. On 
the contrary, "we can safely assume," he sayB, "that the concrete con­
tent and the policy recommendations which Keynes and others deduced
from hia system had oven more to do with its persuasiveness (even for
\
his theoretically-minded followers) than its theoretical beauty and 
simplicity."31 With respect to the thesis of this study, it is
28Ibid.t p. 326.
29Gottfried Haberler, "The General Theory," Tie New Economics,
p. l6l.
3°Ibld., p. 162. 31Ibld.
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interesting to note Haberler's attitude towards Keynes' aggregative 
approach. "The u b o of aggregative systems of general equilibrium is 
by no means new. All business-cycle theories run in macroscopic 
terms.
Schumpeter in an even more straightforward manner attributes 
the appeal of the General theory to the fact that it once more re­
duces economics, which over the past decades "had been growing in­
creasingly complex and increasingly incapable of giving straightforward 
answers to straightforward questions. . .to simplicity," and enables 
"the economist once more to give simple advice that everybody can 
understand." Yet, Schumpeter continues, "exactly as in the case of 
Ricardian economics there was enough to attract, to inspire even, the 
sophisticated. Die same system that linked up so well with the notions 
of the untutored mind proved satisfactory to the best brains of the 
rising generation of theorists."33
Ihis reminds one of Keynes' answer in the General Theory to a 
similar question pertaining to David Ricardo's Principles, viz., what 
accounts for the victory of Ricardian economics over the Malthusian 
doctrine of inadequacy of general demand? According to Keynes,
"Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition 
conquered Spain. Not only was his theory accepted by the city, by
1^4-statesmen and by the academic world. But controversy ceased. . ."**
32lbld.
33joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
pp. 99, 100.
3^General Theory, p. 32.
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The completeness of the Ricardian victory is something 
of a curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a 
complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment 
into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions 
quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person 
would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual prestige. 
That its teaching, translated into practice, was austere and 
often unpalatable, lent it virtue. That it was adapted to 
carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure, gave it 
beauty. That it could explain much social injustice and 
apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of 
progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely 
on the whole to do more harm than good, commended it to 
authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to 
the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted 
to it the support of the dominant social force behind au­
thority. 35
Like Ricardo's Principles, the General Theory also was highly suited 
to the environment into which it was projected--the breakdown of 
capitalism in the great depression of the nineteen thirties, Like 
Ricardian theory, the General Theory reached "conclusions quite dif­
ferent from what the ordinary uninstructed person mi#it expect." It 
may be noted, among others, the conclusions that employment and real 
income ore independent of the price level and money wage rates, that 
saving is a residual and is determined by the level of investment, 
that thrift is generally an economic vice and spending an economic 
virtue, that boondoggling in a depression increases income and the 
wealth of the nation. The General Theory, like Ricardo's Principles, 
is "adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure."
Here, thou$i, the similarity ends.
Keynes' teaching translated into practice is not, like Ricardo's, 
austere and unpalatable. Quite the contrary. It calls for hi^ier
35Ibid., pp. 32, 33.
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living, more consumption, and more leisure. It explains social 
injustice and apparent cruelty not as an inevitable incident in the 
scheme of progress, but as a result of stupidity and ignorance which 
prevent the formulation of policies and the ubo of controls already 
at hand to establish and maintain full employment and maximum income. 
Since these policies, thougji, call for a rather severe redistribution 
of income and a vast deal of government interference in the activities 
of businessmen, the General Theory is damned by authority and by the 
dominant social force that stands behind authority.
Undoubtedly all the opinions noted above as to the signifi­
cance of the General Theory to economic theory and public policy are 
important. The writer should like to submit, however, the idea that 
the above list does not include one important and significant point of 
the General Theory. Schumpeter hints at this idea, but his analysis 
does not include the essential point. He notes that in economics such 
enthusiasm--and correspondingly strong averBions--as greeted the General 
Theory "never flare up unless the cold steel of analysis derives a 
temperature not naturally its own from the real or putative political 
implications of the analyst’s message."?^ A survey of the development 
of economic thou^tit will reveal the fact that economic theory at any 
given time is an intellectual reaction to particularly pressing eco­
nomic issues and problems of the time. Major problems demand solutionsj 
major issues demand resolution. The great shifts in economic theory 
(for example, from Mercantilism to Classical doctrine) have been
^Joseph Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The Hew Economics,
P. 98.
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Intellectual responses to the changes in economic conditions; that is 
to say, the great systems of economic thou^it originally were developed 
in an attempt to solve problems and resolve issues. The economic 
theorists who have contributed most to economic thought have been the 
great thinkers who were deeply concerned with the issues that concerned 
their generations. Their theories were attempts to deal scientifically 
with those problems. Thus economic theory does not develop in a vacuum; 
it is an intellectual response to economic problems, issues, conditions, 
and circumstances of the time. In consequence perhaps each of the great 
systems of economic thought in its time derived "a temperature not 
naturally its own" from the political implications of its message.
Several examples supporting the above thesis may be given.
Adam Smith lived during a period that witnessed a gradual disintegra­
tion of mercantillstic theory and a very rapid integration of the 
policy of individual initiative in economic affairs. This rise of 
individual initiative was hampered by the multitudinous regulations 
of economic activity which the government exerted under its scheme 
of economic planning. Smith was a philosopher. He lived at a time 
when economics was juBt beginning to separate itself clearly from 
other disciplines and interests. Reflecting on existing conditions, 
he became convinced that the policy of economic planning inhibited 
the progress of the nation. So he propounded the idea that progress 
would be greater if the government interferred less. He was concernod 
with the wealth of nations and the policy that would allow a nation 
to most fully achieve its potentialities. This was the issue he 
raised and it is still one that men are debating. Smith centered
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economic theory on the problem of the production of wealth and how 
best to encourage this production. That was the problem of economics 
as he saw it. Thus, Smith was interested in something hi^ily practi­
cal. In fact, he was dealing with the overwhelming issue of his age, 
and he came to quite definite conclusions as to what should be the 
best policy for the English government to follow. In addition, he 
did not hestitate to say what he thou$it.
Another example is Thomas Malthus and his theory of population. 
Malthus lived at a time when the industrial revolution was beginning 
to produce its marked effects on the increased population. Population 
was increasing at its most rapid rate in history, and this was particu­
larly true in England. In addition, the French Revolution had dras­
tically disrupted foreign trade channels, and later the continental 
blockade by Napoleon cut England off from her food supply just when 
she had ceased to be self-supporting. Malthus reflected on these 
practical issues and his conclusions were set forth in his theory of 
population.
David Ricardo presents another example. Adam Smith centered 
his economics around the problem of how to increase the wealth of 
nations. Ricardo changed the perspective of economic theory to the 
problem of distribution of wealth. Ho believed that the Job of eco­
nomics was to search out and analyze the determinants of the dis­
tribution of income among the three great classes that composed 
society: capitalists, landowners, and laborers. He differed from
Smith on the fundamental problem with which economics should be con­
cerned. This difference w b b  because of the economic conditions that
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existed In Ricardo’s time. Ihe great problem In government was the 
Issue posed by the C o m  Laws. These laws Imposed Import duties upon 
the Importation of the staple food products of the British people. 
Everybody believed that these laws would mean an increase in the price 
of food. Economic theory of the time related money wages with the cost 
of living; hence, higji food prices would mean hi$i wages. This would 
mean hi^er costs of production for the entrepreneur, which would place 
British merchants at a disadvantage in competing with other countries 
for both foreign and domestic markets. The rising class of manufac­
turers and merchants were greatly concerned with these Corn Laws 
lest they should decrease their profits. On the other hand, the 
landowners favored the C o m  Laws as protecting their rents. The 
Laws kept up the price of agricultural foods thereby keeping up rent.
So the issue was clearly drawn. The issue was the distribution of in­
come between landowners and the capitalists. It was generally believed 
that the Corn Laws increased rents and reduced profits. That was the 
issue which was largely responsible for Ricardian economics. It was 
because of him that the issue of distribution became the central theme 
of economics for the following one hundred years. Clearly, Ricardo 
attempted to solve a practical problem of the day.
Many such examples could be given. One final one will have 
to suffice, however. John Stuart Mill lived during the period when 
England was reaching maturity industrially and the evils of the in­
dustrial revolution were becoming apparent to everybody. Crowded 
living conditions and extremely low wages were prevalent. British 
capitalists were growing wealthier and wealthier, while the laborers
were becoming poorer and poorer. What should be done about this 
condition was a major Issue of the time. Economists had long since 
adopted the theory that economic laws were natural laws about which 
nothing could be done. Mill was a logician and a humanitarian, and 
he was deeply concerned with existing economic conditions. He dis­
agreed with the economists’ concept of natural laws and drew a dis­
tinction between the laws of production and the laws of distribution. 
In other words, he distinguished between the wealth of a nation and 
the distribution of that wealth. He said the laws of production were 
natural, but those of distribution were not, The laws of distri­
bution resulted from the institutions of the society. Hence, they 
were man made--man had made them; man could change them. He explained 
that the laws of distribution were different in different societies, 
and that, lie believed, proved his position. Mill believed that to a 
very great degree, the future welfare of the nation depended upon what 
alterations were made in the methods of distribution of income. Thus, 
Mill was concerned with the practical issue of his day and his theory 
reflects this interest.
And so it was with the economics of J. M. Keynes. The General 
Theory was an intellectual response to the momentous economic problems 
and issues created when capitalism ceased to. function throughout the 
Western world between 1929 and 1936.^ For everyone, the events of 
this period were terrifying. The most direful predictions of Karl
^ T o  be sure, the depression continued for another four or 
five years, but its most terrible phase was between 1929 and 1936, 
particularly between 1929 and 1933.
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Marx seemed to have a better than even chance of coming true. In 
the United States, the wealthiest and strongest of the capitalist 
countries, capitalism appeared to be In its death throes with some­
thing like fifteen million people walking the streets searching for 
any kind of work and the great American industrial system— the envy 
of the world--operating at less than fifteen per cent capacity. The 
Gross National Product declined from 103.8 billion dollars in 1929 to 
55*8 billion dollars in 1933, the low point of the depression. Personal 
income fell from 85.1 billion dollars to k6.6 billion dollars during 
the same period. Personal savings were 3.7 billion dollars in 1929 
and a negative 1.2 billion dollars in 1933. It is interesting to note 
what happened to personal consumption expenditures and private domestic 
investment, the two most important economic indicators in the Keynesian 
system, during this same period. Personal consumption expenditures 
declined from 78.8 billion dollars to b6.3 billion dollars. Private 
domestic investment decreased from 15.8 billion dollars to 1.3 billion
O Q
dollars. Something had to be done, but what?
To provide a theory adequate to diagpiose the illness of capi­
talism in the Great Depression and thus to indicate what was required 
to be done to restore that system to health and vigor was the task 
Keynes set himself in the General Theory. For Keynes was convinced 
that the postulates of the classical theory were applicable only to 
a special case, and "the characteristics of the special case assumed
^Statistics taken from W. Nelson Peach and Walter Krause,
Basic Data of the American Economy (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
3rd. Ed., 1950-1951),"PP. 9, 11, 13, 1^.
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by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society 
In which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is mis­
leading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of ex­
perience,"^
Keynes was not a socialist, radical or otherwise. He did not 
claim to be a member of the Proletariat; he had nothing but scorn for 
Marxian economics, and certainly there is no adherence in the General 
Theory to Marx' "class-strugglc" theory of history. Keynes promulgated 
his ideas concerning Marxism and the economic system of Soviet Russia 
after visiting that country in the early part of the nineteen twenties. 
Writing in 1925; Keynes says, "Marxian Socialism must always remain a 
portent to the historians of Opinion--hop a doctrine so illogical and 
so dull can have exercised b o powerful and enduring an influence over 
the minds of men, and, through them, the events of history. How can 
I accept a doctrine which sets up as its bible, above and beyond criti­
cism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know to be not only scien­
tifically erroneous but without interest or application for the modern 
1+0
world."
Keynes concluded that perhaps communism had a future, but it 
would be as a new religion and not as a more efficient form of economic 
organization. And he was quite impressed with the economic inefficiency 
of the Soviet Union;
On the economic side I cannot perceive that Russian
^General Theory, p. 3#
^Pjohn Maynard Keynes, Laissez-Faire and Communism (New York:
New Republic, Inc., 1926), pp. 1+7; *+8, 99.
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Communism has made any contribution to our economic problems 
of intellectual interest or scientific value. I do not think 
that it contains, or is likely to contain, any piece of use­
ful economic technique which we could not apply, if we chose, 
with equal or greater success in a society which retained all
the marks. . .of British bourgeois ideals.
As to aligning himself on one side or the other in case the class strug­
gle materialized, Keynes refused to become a member of the Labour party
in England, desiring to be associated with the bourgeoisie and not the
"boorish proletariat." Keynes listed his reasons for not joining the 
Labour party in quite precise terms:
To begin with, it is a class party, and the class is not 
my class. If I am going to pursue sectional interests at 
all, I shall pursue my own. When it comes to the class 
struggle as such, my local and personal patriotisms,. . . 
are attached to my own surroundings. I can be influenced 
by what seems to me to be Justice and good sense; but the 
Class war will find me on the side of the educated bour­
geoisie. g
Althou^i these philosophical, economic, and political ideas were ex­
pressed in 1925--long before he started writing the General Theory-- 
there is no evidence in his published works after 1925 to indicate 
that he changed his basic thinking in those areas. In point of fact, 
on pages 380 and 38I of the General Theory and on pages 7, 53> on*3 55 
of How to Pay for the War, there is positive evidence which indicates 
a continuation of his earlier views.
However, there are similarities between Keynes and Marx. The 
General Theory, like Das Kapital, teaches that unemployment and de­
pression are the norms to which the capitalist economy tends. Both
^1Ibld., p. 130.
John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and Co., 1932), p. 321*. (Italics by Keynes).
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Keynes and Marx were aware of deficient demand and oversaving, of 
the declining profit rate resulting from limited investment oppor­
tunities, of the unwisdom of capital exportation. But Keynes was an 
ardent believer in and defender of the virtues of industrial capital­
ism. That system, he was convinced, possessed great values and ad­
vantages, values and advantages that must be preserved in the interest 
of economic efficiency and of human dignity and freedom.
This, however, did not blind him to what he thou^it were the 
major faults of capitalism. For him, the illness of capitalism was 
manifested in the form of periodic depressions that had tormented 
industrial capitalism throu^iout its lifetime. Keynes believed that 
the most obvious faults of capitalism were its failure to, provide for 
full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of 
wealth and income. These faults, in his opinion, were linked as cause 
and effect. But Keynes was sufficiently sophisticated to realize that 
no economic system is perfect. And he was convinced that these faults 
of industrial capitalism could be eliminated by measures that would 
not impair the basic institutions of the system or injure any of its 
vital organs. Keynes has nothing but praise for industrial capital; 
the villain in the plot is financial capital. It is the presence and 
operation of financial capital that causes capitalism to function by 
a series of "spurts and stalls." The source of the periodic sicknesses 
(depressions) of the system is financial capital.
Keynes reserved his most vehement remarks for the rentier, 
the idle and functionless receiver of property income, and the specu­
lator, who, he says, has made the capital development of the country
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a "by-product of the activities of a c a s i n o . i n  the Keynesian 
system the rentier would be eliminated by reducing the rate of inter­
est to zero. Such a measure not only would mean the "euthanasia of 
the r e n t i e r , a s  he puts it, but would also cause investment to in­
crease to the point at which the marginal efficiency of capital, the 
expected return over cost, would fall to zero; that is to say, capital 
goods would cease to be scarce. He would make up for deficiency of 
private Investment and eliminate the speculator as the guiding force 
in investment by what he calls the "socialization of investment.
He never explains precisely what he means by socialized investment, 
but perhaps he means a wide expansion of public investment to augment 
private Investment and some public control of private investment.
These measures, together with progressive taxation and regressive 
expenditures to raise the propensity to consume, constitute the major 
means proposed by Keynes for correcting the faults of capitalism and 
making it function effectively at higfr. levels of employment, output, 
and income. Collective ownership of the means of production, he in­
sisted, was unnecessary. "If the State is able to determine the ag­
gregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments 
and the basic rate of reward to those who own them," he says, "then 
it will have accomplished all that is necessary." He admits that 
the controls required to insure full employment involve a large ex­
tension of the traditional functions of government, but contends that 
"there will still remain a wide field for the exercise of private
^ General Theory, Ch. 2U. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 378,
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Initiative and responsibility." "By rig£it analysis," he concludes,
"it is possible. . .to cure the disease whilst preserving efficiency 
and freedom.
Many economists insist that the Keynesian analysis is a 
static one. For example, John H. Williams says:
Assuming, as Keynes did, constant technique, and confining 
himself to short-period analysis, with no analysis at all of 
economic processes— how we get from one state of static equi­
librium to another--Keynes' theory has always seemed to me 
peculiarly inapt as a starting point for an analysis of growth 
and change, and in this regard inferior to the classical 
theory it was intended to supplant.
According to E. E. Hale;
He (Keynes) assumes that the technology of production is 
constant and the amount of fixed capital unchanged through­
out the periods which his analysis treats. He makes the 
highly traditional assumption that perfect competition exists 
throughout "the economy. No where in the General Theory is 
there reference made to monopoly or monopolistic competition. 
He assumes increasing costs and diminishing returns in all 
industry as production increases. Of course this is neces­
sary because of the assumption of constant techniques. Fi­
nally, he assumes a closed economy. Indeed, Keynes yielded 
to no person in making unrealistic assumptions. Die tech­
nique that flows from these assumptions is one of static 
equilibrium analysis in the tradition pf Ricardo and Marshall 
and of classical economists generally.*"9
And Arthur Smithies states:
Die General Theory is static and consequently does not 
take into account the fact that economic events at one point 
of time are not independent of what went before and will
^Ibid., pp. 380, 381.
^8Jchn H. Williams, Economic Stability in a Changing World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953); p. 11.
^9e, e. Hale, "Some Implications of Keynes' General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money," pp. 16, 17, an unpublished paper 
read at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Associ­
ation in 19^9.
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not fail to influence what will occur subsequently.
If the economics of Keynes is static, then, the following interpre­
tation of the General Theory may be made.
In a capitalist economy the rate of interest could not be 
reduced to zero without completely nationalizing or socializing the 
banking system, and the banking or credit system is the very heart 
of capitalism. With a zero rate of interest, Keynes assumes that 
investment would be pushed to the point at which the marginal ef­
ficiency of capital equals the rate of interest; that is to say, a 
zero rate of interest would be the motivating force causing the mar­
ginal efficiency of capital to fall to zero. No one can possibly 
predict all the effects of this drastic measure on the free enter­
prise system, but one result is quite obvious. Property income as 
it is recognized in the capitalistic system would disappear, and the 
desire to acquire and hold property would undergo change. After all, 
it is not the mere satisfaction of owning something that induces 
people to acquire property; it is the income which property yields 
to its owner that makes the acquisition of property significant. If 
the income producing power of property is eliminated, it is impos­
sible for any rational person to argue that the desirability of own­
ing property would remain unaltered.
Keynes concludes that when the marginal efficiency of capital
52
has fallen to zero, the rentier will have disappeared. Uiere is
•^Arthur Smithies, "Effective Demand and Employment," The 
New Economics, pp. 558, 559.
5lsee Hale, og. cjt. ^ General Theory, p. 221.
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something of a hiatus in his argument at this point. Hie euthanasia 
of the rentier requires a zero rate of interest rather than a zero 
marginal efficiency of capital. In his own analysis, Keynes admits 
that the interest rate could not be reduced to zero in the absence of 
measures which are not suggested in his program. Indeed, that is the 
case. As suggested above, it would be necessary to completely social­
ize the banking and credit system of the economy to achieve a zero 
rate of interest. Hiat is what is not included in his program. So­
cialized investment is the instrument which will reduce the rate of 
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital to a value of zero.
But if socialized investment, either of a self-liquidating or non­
self-liquidating type, does not compete with private enterprise, it 
will not lower the marginal efficiency of private industrial capital.
On this basis, the socialization of investment would be irrelevant to 
its purported aim of lowering the marginal efficiency of capital, and 
would be useful only as a means for increasing employment through the 
modium of "make-work" projects. If it does compete with private enter­
prise, it will lower the marginal efficiency of private capital and 
weaken the inducement to invest. If carried to the extent necessary 
to reduce the marginal efficiency of capital to zero, the inducement 
to invest would be destroyed. In the absence of some additional meas­
ure to reduce the preference for liquidity, private wealth holders 
will shift their holdings from industrial securities to money assets 
on an ever increasing scale. Ihus Keynbs' socialization of investment 
can mean nothing less than a transition (perhaps gradual) to what he 
deemed to be unnecessary, namely, government ownership of the means of
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production. In the "social philosophy" of the General Theory, the
rentier must he eliminated, and also "the cumulative oppressive power
53of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value of capital.
Keynes said there was no way to maintain sufficient private 
investment to fill the "gap" left between a full-employment income 
level and the amount of that income spent by consumers on consump­
tion. dhe purpose of public investment is to absorb this difference, 
and in so doing, maintain full employment which would serve as a 
strong inducement to private investment. This is not a simple "pump- 
priming" proposition to be used until "things economic get better," 
but a permanent procedure to follow for the purpose of maintaining 
. prosperity. For Keynes, prosperity was not the normal condition of 
capitalism; quite the contrary, a less than full-employment equilibrium 
characterized the capitalistic system. Consequently, a constant and 
permanent injection of public expenditures was necessary. Hence, it is 
perfectly obvious that Keynes believed he was merely advocating that 
public investment be used only to compensate for the deficiency of 
private investment. What form would this public investment take?
Well, the government could spend money on a host of investment pro­
jects; for example, a modem hi#iway system could.be constructed, 
parks and playgrounds could be built all over the country, school 
houses could be made to materialize wherever needed, and floodways, 
dams, etc. could be built. In short, the government would invest 
heavily in those areas where private capital is reluctant to enter.
So far so good. But after all these areas have been completely
53ibid., p. 376.
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developed, what then? This Is a permanent program and thus the govern­
ment would have to move Into those areas which are considered to be 
for private investment only--starting perhaps with heavy industry and 
moving through the whole industrial system. And this is the manner 
by which industrial capital would become socialized. If this is added 
to the method of reducing the rate of interest to zero (socializing 
the banking and credit system), only one conclusion is possible. Ihe 
entire economy becomes socialized.
But there is more. There can be no question but that Keynes 
was thinking in terms of a full investment economy when he said, "I 
feel sure that the demand for capital is strictly limited in the sense 
that it would not be difficult to increase the stock of capital up to
5b
a point where its marginal efficiency had fallen to a very low figure." 
At another point he guesses "that a properly run community equipped with 
modern technical resources, of which the population is not increasing 
rapidly, ought to be able to bring down the marginal efficiency of capi­
tal in equilibrium approximately to zero within a single generation."^ 
Diis, according to Keynes, would rid capitalism of many of its objec­
tionable features. Perhaps it would rid the system of all its faults 
and weaknesses because it would eliminate capitalism itself.
Keynes recognized that a full investment economy would result 
in a quasi stationary community where change and progress would result 
only from changes in technique, taBte, population, and institutions, 
with the products of capital selling at a price proportioned to the 
labor embodied in them. He realizod that enormous social changes would
^ Ibld.. p. 375. 55lbid., p. 220.
result from a gradual disappearance of a rate of return on accumulated 
vealth. He Is perfectly willing, In fact urges, that the rentier should 
pass from the scene. But he refuses to recognize the most significant 
aspect of his program. Not only would the rentier disappear, he would 
take with him capitalism Itself. This Is true because in a full invest­
ment economy the entire amount of net income produced each year would 
necessarily have to be spent on consumption goods. There could be no 
net addition to investment, by definition, and therefore, if any given 
level of income were to be maintained, 100 per cent of it would have to 
be consumed. Anything less than 100 per cent would result in a decline 
in national income. In other words, under conditions of full investment 
consumer spending is the only contribution to the national income; they 
are identical in amounts. This certainly would not resemble capitalism, 
a system which is characterized by profit making and capital accumula­
tion. Profits are made through investment and not from consumption, 
and capital is accumulated by continued investment and not from 100 
per cent consumption. A capitalistic economy cannot consume all that 
it produces and remain capitalistic because thero would be no profits 
from net investment and no accumulation of capital, the two character­
istics of capitalism which distinguishes it from a collective economy.
A zero-investment economy with 100 per cent consumption would be the 
antithesis of an economy in which capitalists engage in enterprise to 
make profits, not merely to make a living, and to acquire investment 
goods, not consumer goods.
Hale contends, "Keynes could maintain that his program of ac­
tion would create and maintain a stronger capitalism only because he
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excludes from his analysis all phenomena that really dominate the
5 6capitalist processes.''-' She classical economists tau$it that capi­
talism evolves into a stationary state characterized by full employ­
ment and maximum wealth and income. For Marx, the capitalistic evo­
lution eventually results in complete breakdown. Keynes viewed 
capitalism as a system that constantly threatened to break down and 
is prevented from doing so by the state. But the amount of govern­
ment activity that the Keynesian program calls for would destroy 
capitalism. No matter how one feels on this issue, the fact is that
capitalism is an economy operated by free private enterprise and not
57one operated from Washington by a government bureaucracy. Hale con­
cludes :
Thus Keynes attacked the major citadels of capitalism, 
private property and investment profits, and smashed them 
to dust. This is the logical conclusion of his program.
3 M g is the significance of his idea system. This, if one 
is so inclined, is the "new economics." To search for ro 
something new elsewhere in Keynes* idea system is futile.
While the above analysis is logical, it is not necessarily 
true. One may accept the idea that the General Theory contains static 
elements without drawing the above conclusions.
In analyzing Keynes' concepts of a zero rate of interest and
a zero level for the marginal efficiency of capital, one must keep
in mind that Keynes was well steeped in the "equilibrium" and "tend­
ency" aspects of classical and neo-classical economics.
Reducing the interest rate toward zero by monetary measures 
could make feasible the development of more and more investment
5%ale, op. cit., p. 15. -^Ibld., p. 15. ^ Ibld., p. 17.
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opportunities vith lower and lower marginal efficiencies. A tend­
ency for the Interest rate to move downward would stimulate private 
Investment as long as economically efficient Investment opportunities 
existed. It is not logical to assume that private Investment would 
decrease merely because the marginal efficiency of capital Indicated 
a tendency to decline. Furthermore, there Is no need to assume that 
the banking system would have to be socialized under conditions of 
a zero rate of Interest. Banking incctne--much of which now comes 
from bank ownership of public debt--could bo supplemented by service 
charges. This was done during the depression of the 1930's and has 
been continued since.
With reference to the rate of Interest, attention must be 
called to the fact that the government does In effect determine the 
private rate of Interest In today's world. It does so by the Interest 
rate it pays on the public debt and by the particular monetary policy 
It follows.
Because the federal government is so large a borrower, 
and because the public debt Is greater than the private, 
the rates of Interest paid on government securities set the 
rates paid on private borrowing. If the Treasury secures 
an easy money policy, the rates of Interest in the private 
area of the economy decline. If the Federal Reserve System 
secures a hard money policy, there tends to be an Increase 
In Interest rates on private borrowing.59
The long-run point of view regarding the size of the public debt Is 
that it will remain large. Hence, the government will continue to 
determine the private rates of Interest, and It is unrealistic to 
assume that the government will adopt a policy calling for zero rates 
of Interest.
Nelson Peach, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois; 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), p. 386.
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Even if it is true that there are forces at work in the 
economy to cause interest rates and the marginal efficiency of 
capital to fall to zero, this can be interpreted as a tendency in 
the tradition of classical equilibrium. The Classicists taught that 
there was a tendency for profits to disappear, but they did not say 
this position would be achieved. If Keynes is to be charged with 
advocating the end of capitalism because of his belief that capital 
assets would not be a source of Income once they ceased to be scarce, 
then, the same charge must be made against the classical economists. 
Capitalism could not exist without the presence of profits.
Keynes did not say in the General Theory that the rates of 
interest and marginal efficiencies would fall to zero. It was a 
tendency concept, and this tendency toward zero rates can very well 
be an ultimate which the system ever approaches but never reaches.
The American economy is not static, it is not a closed system, end 
the arts are not in a constant state. The zero rate concepts, viewed 
as goals to approach but not to attain (as in the case of classical 
equilibrium), are not inconsistent with capitalism, technological 
progress, and rising standards of living.
With reference to the above argument, the following is sig­
nificant;
In my last talk with Keynes, a few months before his 
death, it was clear that he had got far away from his 
'euthanasia of the rentier.' He complained that the easy 
money policy was being pushed too far, both in Jh gland and 
here, and emphasized interest as an element of income, and 
its basic importance in the structure and functioning of 
private capitalism.®0
^fyilliamB, o£. cit., p. 60.
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Of the two Interpretations of Keynesian economics presented 
above, the latter one appears to be more tenable. It Is true that 
there are static elements In the General Theory. But It Is equally 
true that there are dynamic tendency elements.
The exact skeleton of Keynes' system belongs. . .to 
macrostatics, not to macrodynamics. In part this limitation 
must be attributed to those who formulated his teaching 
rather than to his teaching Itself which contains several 
dynamic elements, expectations In particular,6l
Keynes' national Income formula, his concept that the consumption 
function may change, his ex-ante and ex-post analyses of the equality 
of savings and investment, his attitude toward varying supplies of 
money, his concern with shifting values of the multiplier, his ex­
pectation theory of value, and his tendency analysis of zero rates 
of interest and marginal efficiencies are evidence that the Keynesian 
system Is one largely composed of dynamic tendencies. It appears 
that this characteristic far outweighs the static aspects.
The proposition that Keynes embraced a dynamic philosophy was 
explored In seme detail In Chapter Two. There It was shown that Keynes 
did accept the concept of an emerging society and viewed the econcmy 
In a quite realistic manner. For too long now segnents of the Keynesian 
system have been examined In lsolatlon^fran other parts of the system. 
This has been a grave error and has perhaps postponed a proper under­
standing of the General Theory. The system must be considered as a 
whole— no one part Is logical without the support of all the other 
parts— to be clearly understood and appreciated. And when It Is so
^Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
PP. 92, 93.
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considered, the dynamic tendency characteristic becomes clear. Fur­
thermore, perhaps it is time that economists abandon the old argu­
ments about dynamic and static economics and substitute the word 
"evolutionary" for the word "dynamic" when they find it necessary 
to treat qualitative changes. For quantitative changes, economists 
perhaps would profit by doing what many physicists do, namely, con­
sider statics as including dynamics.
Both in terms of quantitative and qualitative factors, the 
economics of Keynes measures up to the dynamic requirements. His 
concepts involving movement toward and oscillations around an under­
employment equilibrium level are clearly in the nature of quantitative 
dynamics. And the forces which cause the movement and oscillations 
are the dynamic factors. His concepts of changes or reforms--pri­
marily in the financial and monetary areas--take on the characteristics 
of qualitative dynamics, dhe fact that Keynes' evolutionary dynamics 
is teleological rather than scientific is of no great importance. IhoBe 
persons who treat qualitative or evolutionary dynamics in a teleolo- 
logical manner see change as tending toward sane end or ideal, which 
of course they assume that they know. Those who believe that their 
evolutionary dynamics is scientific attempt to think of evolution in 
terms of survival, free from any presumptions as to the first cause or 
ultimate goal. Keynes clearly had "ends" in mind when he developed 
his ideas concerning the euthanasia of the rentier, the socialization 
of investment, and zero rates of interest and marginal efficiencies.
Sane familiarity with the thougit of those who mean by dynamics a 
particular kind of qualitative change, seems to warrant the observation
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that they are seldom free from teleological assumptions. After all, 
they are dealing with qualitative values, and if they are frankly 
teleological, they must make some choice among ends; while if they 
reason in terms of survival, the question is, Who are the "fittest" 
to survive? Also it is difficult to escape the question as to whether 
the results of the survival test are. "best."
The logical content of Keynesianism involves the consumption 
function, the marginal efficiency of capital, liquidity preference, 
the wage-unit and the labor-unit concepts, a "labor-expectation" 
theory of value, and the assumption of a given quantity of money.
These are the factors which, according to Keynes, govern and determine 
the level of income and employment. In brief, the welfare of the econ­
omy is dependent upon these factors and the relationships between them. 
But surely no one will any longer claim that these .are new factors in 
the body of economic theory. Schumpeter announces, "What a cordon
62bleu to make such a sauce out of such scanty material."
Mention has already been made of Haberler's view towards the 
belief held by some that Keynes was the first to UBe a macroscopic 
analysis of general equilibrium.
The use of aggregative systems of general equilibrium 
is by no means new. All business-cycle theories run in 
macroscopic terms. It is true that most of the earlier 
business-cycle theories are incompletely stated, the number 
of explicitly stated relations is frequently not equal to 
the number of unknowns, the structure of the system is such 
that it is unstable (or does not oscillate, which is bad 
for a business-cycle theory). But even before the appearance 
of Keynes' General Theory, the work of econometricians, 
notably Frisch and Tinbergen, had done much to clarify
•
6gIbld., p. 91.
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these issues and had set higher standards of formal complete­
ness and precision. 3 In fact, these early models, or models 
of models, were superior to Keynes' system in scientific work­
manship because they made a clear distinction between static 
and dynamics, while Keynes' system is entirely static. .
As to the logical content of Keynes' idea system:
We thus reach the conclusion that, as far as the logical 
content of Keynes' theory goes, i.e., apart from his judgnent 
of the typical shape of the various functions and of concrete 
situations and apart from policy recommendations, no revolution 
has taken place; the General Theory marks a milestone, albeit 
a conspicuous one, but not a break or a new beginning in the 
development of economic theory. 5
As has been shown, Hansen argues that Keynes' consumption 
function was the new contribution to economic theory. It is quite 
true that Keynes honed this analytical tool to a very fine edge, 
but he did not originate it. The consumption function is a major 
factor in the entire analysis and argument of the underconsumption 
economists. Surely no one will deny that Boisguilbert, Malthus, 
Sismondi, Marx, Hobson, and many others were quite aware of the im­
portance of consumption to the welfare of an economy, perhaps even 
more important to a proper chronology of economic thought is the fact 
that the consumption function is a major factor in the subjective
63The quickest way to learn how far aggregative analysis had 
progressed before the publication of the General Theory is to read 
Tinbergen, "Suggestions on Quantitative Business Cycle Theory," 
Econometrics, July, 1935* Haberler cites this source.
^Haberler, op. cjt., p. 162.
^ Ibid., p. 176. The writer is of the opinion that Haberler 
minimizes certain differences between the Keynesian and the Classical 
systems and is in error in holding generally that where they differ, 
as for example, in the theory of interest or the relation between 
money wages and- employment, the classical theory is more realistic 
and useful. However, the quotation above is certainly accurate.
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value theory and demand analysis of the Austrian school of economics. 
The consumption function is virtually stated in Engel's Law of Con­
sumption.
Many economists have claimed that the significant and new 
factor in the General Theory was Keynes' frontal attack on saving and 
hiB enthusiasm for spending. Schumpeter says:
Many of the men who entered the field of teaching or 
research in the twenties and thirties had renounced al­
legiance to the bourgeois scheme of life, the bourgeois 
scheme of values. Many of them sneered at the profit 
motive and at the element of personal performance in the 
capitalist process. But so far as they did not embrace 
straight socialism, they still had to pay respect to 
saving--under penalty of losing caste in their own eyes 
and ranging themselves with what Keynes so tellingly 
called the economist's "underworld." But Keynes broke 
their fetters: here, at last, was theoretical doctrine
that not only obliterated the personal element and was, 
if not mechanistic itself, at least mechanizable, but 
also smashed the pillar into dust; a doctrine that may 
not actually say but can easily be made to say both that 
who tries to save destroys real capital and that, via 
saving, the unequal distribution of income is the ulti­
mate cause of unemployment. This is what the Keynesian 
Revolution amounts to.°°
The greatness of Schumpeter as a student and scholar of economic 
theory and its history is accepted, but it is submitted that he 
must have forgotten some of his history of economic thought as he 
wrote the above statements. For the doctrine that saving is es­
sential to capital formation and capital formation is the sine 
qua non of economic progress has been subjected to many attacks for 
at least two hundred years. One of the earliest and most devastating 
blows against saving was delivered by Bernard de Mandeville in his
Schumpeter, "Keynes, the Economist," The New Economics,
P. 99.
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Fable of the Beea published in 1705. And the underconsumptionists 
from Lord Lauderdale and Malthus to John Hobson and H. Gordon Hayes 
have engaged In spirited, and sometimes bitter, attacks on this doc­
trine. Keynes appeared about two centuries too late to be credited 
with this "radical" move against economic orthodoxy. To be sure,
Keynes lent prestige and respectability to this long fight against 
the idea that "saving is a virtue and spending is a sin" and com­
pletely endorsed the concept that "saving is a sin and spending is 
a virtue," and that was perhaps an important contribution, but it 
can hardly be classified as a revolution in economic theory. Keynes 
himself took no credit for originality in all this. He frankly states 
that his concepts regarding saving and spending had been living in a 
furtive manner in the underworld of economics, espoused by such un­
orthodox characters as Malthus, Hobson, Marx, and Gesell.
This study has demonstrated that there was no "Keynesian 
Revolution" and that the idea system of Keynes cannot logically be 
considered as a "New Economics." How, then, can one account for the 
place of the economics of Keynes in the history of economic theory?
It is quite simple. First, Keynes accepted and utilized the major 
parts of the new philosophy. He recognized the evolutionary process 
as applied to society and its institutions. He formulated his theory 
in terms of the "totality" of things. And he looked at the capitalistic 
economy from a more realistic point of view than had some of his pred­
ecessors. Second, Keynes took many of the unorthodox concepts which 
had long been present in the "underworld" of economic theory and 
molded them into a system. This was a major contribution, but it
did not constitute a revolution. These concepts all revolved around 
the doctrine of effective demand, and it is this doctrine upon which 
hangs the entire Keynesian idea system. And third, the General Theory 
appeared at an opportune time in the history of capitalism. Every 
industrial nation was deep in the throes of a depression. The econom­
ics of Keynes appeared to be able to point the way out, to relieve 
human misery, to answer burning economic questions and resolve social 
issues.
These three factors in combination created a bench-mark in the 
history of economic theory, but the General Theory did not constitute 
a break or create a new beginning in the history of economic thought. 
It was simply an Important part in the evolution of economic theory.
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